

1762 B
The Book that caused

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

BY

General von Bernhardi


Translated by

J. ELLIS BARKER

Author of "Modern Germany"

2/-
NET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO



3 1761 01542713 1

WM. DAWSON & SONS LTD. LONDON



Britain as Germany's Vassal

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

By
General Friedrich von Bernhardi

Together with *Kriegsbrauch—The Customs of War.* [Published by
the German General Staff, Berlin, 1902
and,
Extracts from Regulations adopted by the Hague Conference 1907
and subscribed to by Germany

Translated by J. Ellis Barker
Author of "Modern Germany."

136008
23/5/15

London:
WM. DAWSON & SONS LTD., ROLLS HOUSE,
BREAMS BUILDINGS, E.C.
1914

Ramph.
Hmed. B.



TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

THE present work was published a year after the appearance of "Germany and the Next War," and it is, perhaps, the more important work of the two. It is more popular in tone, more outspoken, more striking and more up to date. It contains the after-thoughts of the author, who in the clearest language urges Germany to acquire by war first the supremacy in Europe and the Mediterranean, and then the mastery of the world. Having been published at one-fifth the price of the former book, the present volume had a far larger circulation in Germany and a far greater influence upon German public opinion.

In the present work decadent England is described as Germany's principal enemy, and she is to be made subservient to that country either by war or by an "alliance," under which (see Chapter VII) England would have to give up her naval supremacy, leave the Triple Entente, abandon her allies, disarm by distributing her Fleet all over the world, and would have to allow Germany to smash France and to dominate the Continent of Europe, North Africa and Asia Minor. Great Britain was to become Germany's vassal. The original title of the book was "Our Future—A Word of Warning to the German Nation." The title I have selected seems to summarise more correctly its chief contents as it affects this country.

Von Bernhardi bitterly criticises (see Introduction and Chapter III) Emperor and Chancellor, by unmistakable

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

allusions, and reproaches them for their policy of peace, drift and surrender. He urges the necessity of an attack upon the Entente Powers, although it "may certainly lead to a war similar to the 'Seven Years' War'" (see last Chapter). The war should be made to arise out of the Balkan question. Then England might perhaps not join in (see last Chapter). Turkey should attack Russia in the South and Britain in Egypt (Chapter X). Diplomatically and militarily Germany has carried out every one of Bernhardi's recommendations contained in the present volume. His latest book is perhaps the most remarkable political indiscretion of modern times. It is, besides, a pæan of war and of German civilisation. The word "Kultur" occurs three or four times on most pages, and seven or eight times on several.

As the question has been discussed whether Germany has, or has not, observed the laws and rules of civilised warfare, I have appended a few extracts from the regulations adopted at the Hague Conference of 1907 to which Germany has subscribed, and from "Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege," the authoritative German handbook on the customs of war published by the German General Staff in 1902. I would draw particular attention to their great importance. They will enable every reader to form for himself an opinion as to the character and legality of Germany's actions based on the highest international and German authorities.

J. ELLIS BARKER.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE	9
INTRODUCTION	13
CHAPTER I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF GERMANISM ...	23
CHAPTER II. GERMANY'S CIVILISATION AND HER POLITICAL DESTINY	59
CHAPTER III. THE WAYS AND MEANS OF NATIONAL FOREIGN POLICY	86
CHAPTER IV. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SIGNI- FICANCE OF WAR	106
CHAPTER V. COURTS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRA- TION AND POLITICAL MORALITY	121
CHAPTER VI. THE PRESENT POLITICAL POSITION OF THE WORLD	132
CHAPTER VII. IS AN ARRANGEMENT WITH ENGLAND POSSIBLE?	150
CHAPTER VIII. MILITARY PREPARATIONS FOR WAR	166
CHAPTER IX. CAN GERMANY HOPE FOR VICTORY?	192
CHAPTER X. POLITICAL READINESS FOR WAR	205
CHAPTER XI. ON THE GERMAN PEOPLE AND ITS GOVERNMENT	220
CHAPTER XII. POST SCRIPTUM. THE POLITICAL POSITION OF THE MOMENT	224
KRIEGSBRAUCH—THE CUSTOMS OF WAR	235
REGULATIONS OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE RELATING TO WARFARE AND TO NEUTRALITY	253

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

DURING a journey around the globe I studied many countries, and wherever I went I recognised the great power and significance of Germanism. While I was so occupied, there appeared, in spring, 1912, a book of mine entitled "Germany and the Next War." It was intended to point out to the German nation the danger of their political position. It was to show that a great crisis has arrived in Germany's history, a crisis which is due to the fact that Germany has entered upon a policy which is making her a colonial and naval Power. That policy is bound to determine Germany's future. In the book mentioned I intended not only to point out that Germany had arrived at a turning-point in her development, but also that the country must concentrate all its strength and prepare energetically for the impending storm.

My book "Germany and the Next War" has been reviewed by the Press of all civilised nations. It has been translated into English

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

and Swedish, and it has met in nearly all countries with unfavourable and frequently with malicious criticism. That has been its fate particularly in England and in the Press influenced by that country. On the other hand, "Germany and the Next War" has found support and recognition in many quarters, and particularly in the patriotic circles of the German Fatherland.

In the interest of the cause, the views and teachings which are expressed in the book mentioned should be made known to the widest circles. Therefore, when I was asked to popularise "Germany and the Next War" and to offer it to the public at a moderate price I most gladly consented. I could only welcome an opportunity of awakening Germany's national consciousness and addressing to my compatriots the warning of the Great Elector: "Remember that you are a German!"

However, there was an additional reason which induced me once more to take up my pen. The political tension in Europe has once more become accentuated by the sudden development of the Balkan crisis. Although at the moment it appears probable that diplomacy will succeed in localising the Balkan war, it is obvious that

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

many irreconcilable interests collide in that quarter of the world. Therefore it is quite possible that the conflagration will extend to Central Europe and bring about an explosion, notwithstanding all attempts to preserve the peace. After all, the European system resembles a barrel of the French *poudre B.*, which is apt to cause a disaster by spontaneous combustion.

The danger of a general European war becomes greater and greater, and every day it becomes more necessary that the German people should be acquainted with the danger which threatens them, and should prepare to meet it with the greatest earnestness and determination. At present the peril is not yet generally recognised. Hence we have not yet steeled our will to exert ourselves to the utmost. Large numbers of the German people are given over to an absolutely unjustified optimism regarding the future. Under these circumstances I have thought it my duty once more to depict the gravity of the position, especially as the perils which beset us have greatly increased. In the following pages will be found here and there ideas which I have expressed in "Germany and the Next War." *However, there will also be*

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

found new views to which the present political position has given rise. Besides, the material has been handled from a different point of view. I therefore hope that the present book will be of value also to those who are acquainted with my larger work.

I present the present pages to those Germans who are animated by the same ideas as I am, and I would ask them to promote the views expressed therein by all means in their power. After all, Germany stands close before a great political crisis. We are rapidly approaching it, and the German people will pass through it victoriously only if it is determined to the utmost to achieve victory and if it is prepared to bear the heaviest burdens and sacrifices. This is necessary if Germany desires to maintain her position in a hostile world, and thus only can she prepare for herself a future that is worthy of her greatness and of her civilisation.

THE AUTHOR.

INTRODUCTION

THOSE who wish to guide the policy of a great State must have made up their mind as to the aims which they desire to pursue.

It suffices in no way to form vague and nebulous views as to the policy which one wishes to adopt, views which, owing to their lack of definiteness, lead only too often to the adoption of a vacillating policy, swayed by the impulses of the moment.* On the contrary, it is necessary to express one's aim and purpose in clearly marked and unmistakable phrases which do not admit of more than one interpretation. Thus only can one lay down distinct rules for the guidance of national policy. Thus only can national policy be developed in a predetermined direction. Thus only can all minor problems be

* The foregoing is a veiled criticism of William II policy. (Note of the Translator.)

INTRODUCTION

solved in accordance with certain great leading principles.

If Germany's motto is to be "Full steam ahead,"† then the course of the ship must be clearly predetermined, and it must be carefully mapped out so as to avoid both shoals and breakers. It must take account of the currents prevailing in sea and air. Besides, the captain must be prepared to encounter gales and bad weather, and to steer the ship in the intended direction, storm and stress notwithstanding.

The great aims which must sway the policy of the Government should correspond with the requirements of the nation, with its need of development, and with its practical interests. Besides, it must be remembered that the most important duty of the State consists in increasing the intellectual and moral forces of the citizens to the utmost. Of course, limits are set to human endeavour. The ideal is always unattainable. Hence the aims of the State also must be limited. A statesman may endeavour to attain only what is practicable. At the same time, the aims of the State must not be circumscribed by timorousness and overcaution. On the contrary,

† Allusion to a well-known pronouncement of William II. (Note of the Translator.)

INTRODUCTION

the State should be animated by a feeling of proud self-consciousness, to which a nation possessing great vitality is entitled, and should endeavour to obtain the laurel by boldness.

If these views are considered justified, it will logically follow that a nation's foreign and domestic policy are inseparably bound together, that they are two branches of the same tree which complement one another.

Domestic policy is intended to develop the intellectual and material forces of the nation. It furnishes the basis of the national power, and therefore it determines the limits of its foreign policy. Foreign policy, on the other hand, reacts on the internal development of the nation by stimulating its growth, and spurring it to the utmost effort. Besides, foreign policy should furnish the nation with those material conditions of life which increase the well-being of the people and the power of the State. Foreign and domestic policy reciprocally influence one another. Both can be most effective only if they make use of all the living forces of the nation, promote the justified patriotic aspirations of the people, and know how to obtain the enthusiastic support of the larger and the better part of the people.

INTRODUCTION

On the other hand, a policy which depends on the changing currents of opinion, and which endeavours to please and flatter chance majorities, is as pernicious as is a policy which habitually hurts or outrages the spirit and the will of the nation. In political affairs Government and nation must understand and support one another. Therefore it is as necessary for the people to understand the aims of national policy as it is for the Government itself. Both Government and people must be equally ready to make the sacrifices which are required. Only when Government and people work hand in hand can the nation judge with justice the policy of the Government and measure it by a reasonable standard. Otherwise the national policy will be criticised in accordance with the moods of the moment. Only when the nation fully understands the aim of its Government can it with full knowledge either support the Government's action or oppose it.

At a time such as the present it is particularly important that the German nation should clearly recognise the aim and purpose of Germany's policy, and the tasks which have to be solved. Germany stands undoubtedly at a turning point

INTRODUCTION

in her history. *The question which calls for an answer is whether Germany is to become a world-Power or is destined to decline.* We cannot much longer continue to occupy the present ill-defined position. Germany is at the moment a Continental Power which is hedged about and circumscribed in every direction. She is prevented from expanding, and at the same time she is a world-Power which is able and entitled to give to Germanism that position in the world which, by right, is its due. We cannot continue to remain a nondescript Power, partly Continental and partly Colonial. Frederick the Great would have said: "Il faut décider cet être." Politically, a nation cannot stand still. It must either rise to greatness or decline politically and culturally. Soon it will be decided whether Germany is to develop in the one direction or in the other, and all those who do not deliberately close their eyes to the signs of the times must recognise that Fate is approaching Germany. Notwithstanding the smooth words of statesmen and the Utopian speeches of the peace apostles, and notwithstanding the paper chains with which European policy has endeavoured to shackle the tremendous latent forces of the nation, "does one hear

INTRODUCTION

God's steps approaching, tearing them like spider webs."

Cowardice and egotism try everywhere to confuse the German people, to hamper its natural development, to weaken its confidence in its own strength, and to direct the country into a path which will lead to its decline. In view of these endeavours, it seems that the time has arrived for appealing again, and ever again, to the idealism within the soul of the German nation. We must clearly and distinctly understand the tasks which Germany has to fulfil in consequence of her history, owing to the national peculiarities and owing to the numbers and the rapid increase of the German people. We must openly and unreservedly discuss the question whether Germany possesses the means for fulfilling her political ideals and inquire into the dangers and difficulties which must be overcome.

The German nation must make up its mind as to the path which it will follow, and it must form its determination after carefully weighing and considering all the circumstances. It must neither vainly over-estimate its own strength, nor close its eyes to the difficulties which have to be overcome, if it wishes to enter on the road which

INTRODUCTION

leads to greatness. It must make its choice without faint-heartedness, and with faith in its ability, and should do so in the joyful consciousness that its strength will increase with the greatness of the task in hand. After all, a nation can achieve the highest aims only if it is not afraid of sacrifices. Success cannot be bought cheaply. The readiness to strive and suffer determines the greatness of a nation and establishes its worth.

The enormous political tension under which all European nations live is noticeable also in Germany, where it is, perhaps, felt most acutely. This feeling finds expression in various ways. It induces patriotic circles to demonstrate their will to act and to make Germany powerful. Therefore it finds expression, and often passionate expression, in the German Navy League, in the Colonial Society, in the League for Fighting Social Democracy, in the Society for Promoting Germanism among the Poles, in the Pan-Germanic League, and in many other organisations and in the pronouncements of individual leaders. Wherever we look we find that the German will to greatness is stimulated by the opposition with which it meets and by the lukewarmness of those who doubt Germany's future.

INTRODUCTION

Unfortunately we find only too frequently that the citizens do not fully comprehend the significance of the approaching crisis. The Germans are not sufficiently united in their views as to the needs of a great national policy. They lack a political aim and object which appeals to all. Besides, some fail to discriminate between aims which are practicable and those which are not, while others fail to recognise the dangers which threaten Germany, and therefore do not recognise that the greatest exertions are required in order to overcome them.

This lack of understanding is regrettable. The following pages are intended to supply the necessary enlightenment. I shall briefly show the tasks which devolve upon Germany and upon German civilisation in view of her past history and achievements, and I shall then discuss the ways and means whereby German statesmanship can obtain its end. The latter is particularly necessary, because Germany attaches a greater significance to the elements of right and justice in international relations than do most other States. I shall describe the international situation from the German point of view. Lastly, I shall discuss the political tasks of the moment,

INTRODUCTION

and weigh the factors which must determine our action. Thus I hope not only to be able to enlighten the public, but to lay down a general policy which can simultaneously be furthered by all citizens.

Germany lacks a single will and a single aim. She lacks a battle-cry which resounds through the whole country, which appeals to all, and which causes all patriotic Germans to fight together for the high ideals of the nation and for the greatness and the glory of the Empire. Only in a Greater Germany can we realise our ideals and lay the firm foundation of a prosperous future and of a future worthy of Germany.

CHAPTER I.

The Significance of Germanism

THE peoples and States which are united in the German Empire have had a long and tragic history. That history, it is true, is filled with great and glorious deeds. At the same time, it cannot be disguised that it has been the history of a gradual decline from the time when the ancient German Empire broke up, down to the moment when, in our own time, Germany once more became united. During this epoch of decline the glorious wars of the Great Elector and of Frederick the Great, and the War of Liberation against Napoleon I, were beacons of light. They have surrounded the names of Brandenburg and Prussia with a halo of glory, and have brought about Germany's renaissance and reunion. At the same time, these glorious episodes have not

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

stayed the gradual decline of the old German Empire. The heroic struggle against Napoleon was followed by the disgraceful period of the German Federation, and it has left a lasting imprint on the character of the German nation.

At the time of Germany's weakness the German people lost their sense of national consciousness. They lost their faith in their own strength and in their destiny. Germans began to over-value everything foreign. The people became accustomed to narrow parochial conditions in their country, and they acquired equally narrow and parochial political views. Germany's reunion became their greatest ideal. Consciously or unconsciously, they longed to increase the power of the German race. However, they had completely lost the idea of world-politics. No German dared to glance across the sea, although England had entered upon the conquest of the world's trade long since. The sad and depressing history of Germany and the hard times she had experienced had created this peculiarity in the German character. Even the glorious time during which the German Empire was recreated did not free the German mind. Even to-day many German people do not realise the

GERMANY'S PAST HISTORY

necessity of a world-policy, and cannot make up their minds to pursue a larger policy. There are many Germans who would like to confine their country to its continental position, and who describe those who desire to open for their country a great future as advocates of a policy of reckless adventure. Even to-day we are told that Germany might very well acknowledge the existence of the Triple Entente and approve of its policy, although that Entente has been concluded for the express purpose of fettering Germany's action, a purpose which, it is true, is not openly confessed by its members. Even to-day there are people who do not object to the alliance which Germany's enemies have concluded among themselves, for they believe that the Triple Entente serves to maintain the peace of Europe.

Under these circumstances it seems necessary to tell the people again and again that Germany is an exceedingly important factor in human civilisation. We must point to the enormous achievements of the Germans in the past, their great progress, and the high position which Germanism has acquired for itself in its most recent development in all parts of the world. Besides,

we must dwell on the tasks which, in view of her past, Germany has to fulfil in the future.

The German nation must find itself. It must become aware of its power, and endeavour to acquire a pride and a self-consciousness which correspond with its strength, so that the people may find courage to strive towards greater achievements, a larger sphere of action, and a larger future. We must hold before the German nation a mirror, so that it may see itself, understand its greatness, and its need for further development. That will strengthen the national will to action.

Let us glance into the past. Only the past will teach us the laws which determine the development of nations. The history of the past will make us acquainted with the particular gifts possessed by the various nations. By the study of the past of the nations we may form an opinion as to their future, as to their vital force, and as to their cultural value. The past is the key to the future. Fortified with a knowledge of the history of nations, we shall be able to appreciate the policy of individual States.

National policy stands in the most intimate relation with national civilisation. It follows that

national policy must be justified *by aiming at serving the high purposes of civilisation*. Frequently this object can only indirectly be aimed at. Statesmanship will before all have to endeavour to acquire those means and that power which are required to make its will respected. The worth or worthlessness of its aspirations will in the last resort be determined by the objects which it endeavours to obtain and by the means which it is able to use.

It is a general law that the civilisation of mankind is continually progressing. However, progress among nations is not universal, because the nations do not form a single society. The various nations and States are, even if we look only at Europe, very different in character, quality and talent. Therefore, the different nations are called upon to promote civilisation in different ways. Every nation possesses an individuality of its own, and all progress among nations is based on their competition among themselves.

As the competition among nations leads occasionally and unavoidably to differences among them, all real progress is founded upon the struggle for existence and the struggle for power prevailing among them. That struggle elimi-

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

nates the weak and used-up nations, and allows strong nations possessed of a sturdy civilisation to maintain themselves and to obtain a position of predominant power until they too have fulfilled their civilising task and have to go down before young and rising nations. This is confirmed by the history of mankind, and a brief retrospect suffices to prove that this is indeed a law of national development.

The first germs of modern civilisation developed in Egypt and in the great Empires of Western Asia. Here the arts and sciences and national order and organisation began to arise. Starting from these countries, civilisation crossed, by means of the islands, the Ægean Sea into Greece, where the Greeks, an Aryan people, had penetrated from the North. Gradually these arrived at a high state of civilisation. Philosophy and the arts flourished more in Greece than they have in any country ever since. The achievements of Greece in these directions are, and will remain, an ideal for all time. Compared with the civilisation of the Greeks, that of the Asiatic nations occupies a very modest position. However, Greek power became exhausted with Greek achievements in philosophy and art. Alexander

THE MARCH OF CIVILISATION

the Great, with his Macedonian warriors, took over the Greek heritage and spread civilisation all over Asia Minor by his victorious wars of conquest. The great Asiatic Empires which had fulfilled their civilising mission collapsed entirely, and new States and groups of nations arose on their ruins. Meanwhile the inhabitants of the European West had remained unaffected by the wave of civilisation that had swept over the world.

In the heart of Italy a new Power arose, the Romans. It became their task to civilise the West and part of the North of Europe, and at the same time to subdue the countries of the East. They gave to the world the conception of law. They not only subdued all the countries around the Mediterranean and part of Northern Europe with arms, but they gave to these territories an ordered existence and a national organisation. Thus they impressed their civilisation upon the whole of the then known world.

The Romans became the pace-makers of Christianity. On the foundations which the Romans had laid a Christian Empire stretching as far as the limits of the Roman Empire was painfully built up by unceasing wars. Personal

morality became the purpose and watchword of a new civilisation. The ideals of Christianity and of heathen antiquity co-mingled. A new civilisation arose.

The Roman Empire had fulfilled its historic mission and had broken down before the attack of the youthful German nations. New States arose on the ruins of the ancient Empire. Their rise led to competition among them and to further wars. All these nations shared fundamentally the same civilisation, and in all of them the German element stimulated their progress and their development. By their fierce and frequently sanguinary competition the nations of the Middle Ages were formed, and their progress was hastened by the advent of the Reformation and by the discovery of the New World, of India, and of America.

The new nations succeeded in defeating the attack of Islam upon Central Europe. On the other hand, Mahommedanism was victorious in the East and in North Africa, and began to dominate these territories. A new task arose for the civilised nations of Europe. They had not only to regain to civilisation the lands of the East conquered by Mahommedanism, but also to carry

ENGLAND AS A CIVILISING FACTOR

civilisation beyond the limits of the Old World and to create a world-civilisation. This task was undertaken by the nations dwelling in the Iberian Peninsula. The Portuguese discovered the sea-way to India. The Spaniards penetrated into Central and South America and into North America as far as the Pacific Coast. In course of time the Spanish and Portuguese became exhausted by their task, and they lost the power and influence which they had possessed in Europe.

Now it became England's task to spread European civilisation over the other continents. That country accomplished a truly world-historic mission on the one hand by founding new and essentially Germanic States in North America, by subjecting India and Australia to European influence, and by effecting settlements on the coasts of Eastern Asia; and on the other, by creating the framework of the modern State, by organising the world's commerce, and by giving an enormous impetus to the manufacturing industries. By her activity England has created civilising factors which promise to be of permanent value.

At the present moment it is difficult to say

whether England has arrived at the zenith of her greatness. It is certain that she makes colossal exertions to maintain her predominance, and even to increase it, and she will obviously not allow herself to be deprived of her great position without a struggle.

History teaches us that the great civilised nations have always gradually declined when they had fulfilled their civilising mission, when they had reached their zenith. This is a law of nature, and there is no reason to believe that that law will be invalid in the future.

The Germanic peoples, whose pure descendants and intellectual heirs, apart from the Scandinavian nations, are particularly the Germans of to-day, have taken a part of special importance in the whole of this evolution. They have been, in truth, the most important promoters of modern civilisation, and they have imprinted upon nearly all the nations of Europe, and of those lands beyond Europe which have received Europe's civilisation, the stamp of their individuality. From their first appearance in history the Germans have proved themselves to be a civilised nation of the first rank and, one may say, *the* civilised nation.

The Germans were the people who broke down the Roman world-empire. In vast streams they overflowed ancient Gaul, Spain, Africa, the Balkan Peninsula, and especially Italy. It is true the States which they founded did not exist for long, because they could not preserve their German characteristics while dwelling among the more civilised nations of the antique world. However, they brought new blood to the exhausted and dying nations around the Mediterranean, so that new and energetic peoples could arise. Among the new nations which arose those proved the strongest and the most able to become promoters of civilisation in which there was the largest proportion of Germanic blood. Those were particularly the nations of Western Europe, where the German element was strongest. In the East, however, where the Germans never obtained a dominant position, the peoples sank back into barbarism under the influence of the decadent Greek element, and later on owing to the pressure of Islam, which swamped all the Eastern countries.

Western Europe became the principal factor in the civilisation and progress of the world. Two separate groups of nations arose: the Latin

race, which was formed by the amalgamation of Germans with Italians, Gauls and Iberians, and the Germanic nations, which were able to preserve their race in its purity in that country which later on was called Germany, and in the Scandinavian countries. In the course of time national and political differences grew up between the Latin and Germanic groups of nations. The Germans took up the Roman idea of a world-Empire, and, in endeavouring to create a world-Empire similar to the Roman one, they came into collision with the papacy, which laid claim to a spiritual and theocratic world-Empire, while relying on the power of Italy, with Rome for a centre.

Thus commenced a struggle which has been exceedingly important to the world, a struggle which has had the most potent influence upon modern history, because the highest interests of humanity were at stake. The fight between Germanism and the papacy was a battle for the free development of human civilisation, a battle against spiritual and intellectual bondage, a battle for national independence and for the right of nations to liberty. That battle has not been fought to a finish up to the present day. In

THE OLD GERMAN WORLD EMPIRE

that struggle Germany has shed her best blood, but at the same time she has acquired *the highest merit for the progressive development of human civilisation.*

In the beginning the Germans were defeated. The idea of a world-Empire similar to the Roman one, and dominated by Germans, had to be given up. The Germans did not succeed in creating an Empire similar to the Roman Empire, in which the civilised nations were united within a single organisation. The papacy resisted the German emperors victoriously. The last monarch of the Hohenstaufen dynasty died on the scaffold at Naples, and with him the idea of a Roman-German Empire collapsed entirely.

The struggle did not end with this defeat. The fight which could not be won with weapons of war had to be refought with spiritual arms.

The Church had become more and more temporal, selfish and time-serving, and had lost her power over the minds of the people. At the same time, a new spiritual power had arisen in humanism. The Church and the new power of humanism were bound to come into collision because humanism opened to the nations which were kept in spiritual bondage the intellectual

treasures of antiquity, and thus implanted in them the longing for freedom and the longing for truth, characteristic of the ancient nations. Thus secular humanism prepared the way for the Reformation of the Church, and became later on an ally of the Reformation. The Reformation, born from the soul of the German people, shook all Europe to its foundations, and opened a new era. The German nation was nearly completely destroyed in the wars of religion, and lost all its political power. However, its blood had not been shed in vain. It is true the Germans did not succeed in conclusively defeating the Roman Church. In fact the Roman Catholic States became superior to the Protestant ones. On the other hand, the Protestant States won for themselves a right to spiritual freedom. That most important element of civilisation was thus preserved for humanity. After all, the importance of the Reformation cannot but be seen by the rearrangement of the map of Europe, which was effected at the Peace of Westphalia. The recognition of the Reformed Church was a far-reaching factor. That Church supported the right of criticism in matters of religion. Thus the spirit of the Reformation logically led to the freedom

GERMANY'S SPIRITUAL GREATNESS

of thought and investigation. Thus was laid the foundation of intellectual progress for all time.

A great progress had been achieved. At a single stroke the German nation became the leader of humanity. Germany led all civilised nations. However, this achievement did not exhaust German genius.

On the basis of spiritual freedom which had been gained by the Reformation was built up the classical literature of Germany and the critical philosophy of Emanuel Kant.

In German literature a lofty idealism, a depth of feeling, and a strength of passion found expression probably greater than anything that has been achieved by any other nation of modern times. In the philosophy of Kant a doctrine was created which became the foundation of all philosophical speculation, and was therefore of decisive importance for understanding the world-idea and the conception of life in all its aspects.

One should not under-estimate the spiritual achievements of other nations. At the same time, it is clear that in the course of modern history *Germany's genius has been responsible for the most decisive spiritual progress, and has therefore been of universal importance.* Germany's

spiritual achievements deserve all the more admiration as the German nation not only deserves credit for its spiritual work, but because it has besides poured out rivers of blood in order to give victory to the cause of the Reformation, and in order to protect European civilisation against the powers of barbarism and against the violence which threatened it.

In long and sanguinary wars which brought Germany close to complete annihilation the desire of the Latin race to obtain the mastery of the world was victoriously defeated. The flood of the Asiatic Turks which threatened to overwhelm Europe was successfully turned, and in century-long wars were vast territories wrested from the Slavs and converted into flourishing homes of Western civilisation.

In spite of their wars, the Germans have shown a physical vitality which is perhaps unique in the history of nations.

Unceasingly large streams of emigrants have flowed from Germany into foreign lands, and these have contributed to the formation of new States. The losses of people owing to emigration and war were always rapidly made good, although the German people were occasionally

GERMANY'S RECENT DEVELOPMENT

almost exposed to annihilation. After the great exhaustion of Germany consequent upon the Napoleonic war era, a tremendous development has taken place. It began with Germany's victorious wars for achieving her unity, and since then the people have progressed step by step.

Since 1870-71 an increase in Germany's population has set in which is surprising, and which threatens to burst the geographical limits of Germany. The population of the German Empire has increased from about 40,000,000 to 65,000,000, and it increases by nearly a million per year. At the same time, vast achievements have been effected both economically and intellectually.

Of late years Germany has become an industrial State of the first rank. The German industries give at present occupation not only to the entire yearly increment of the German population, but they even depopulate the rural districts to such an extent that German agriculture is compelled to employ foreign labour. The quality of German manufactured goods has constantly improved. Hence "Made in Germany," a sentence which was intended to advertise the inferiority of German goods, has now become a

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

mark of honour throughout the world. Step by step with the increasing prosperity and power of her manufacturing industries have increased Germany's foreign trade, and the German mercantile marine.

Before 1866 the German ocean fleet was of very modest dimensions. To-day the German Empire possesses the second largest merchant marine in the world. Notwithstanding Germany's unfavourable geographical structure, and her insufficient possession of coasts, we find that the German flag carries German goods to nearly all countries of the world. A large portion of the passenger traffic of the ocean has fallen into German hands because the German ships are better found than those possessed by other nations, and because, generally speaking, they are more carefully navigated. The Hamburg-Amerika line is the largest shipping line in the world. This line and the North German Lloyd, as well as the other large German shipping companies, serves the whole world.

Germany's foreign trade has similarly progressed. Before 1866 it was only small. To-day Germany's foreign trade is inferior only to that of England, although that country has developed

GERMANY'S TRADE AND WEALTH

her foreign commerce during centuries and dominates one-fifth of the inhabited world. England's imports and exports come together to at least £1,000,000,000 per year. Germany's foreign trade comes to £800,000,000 or £850,000,000. However, these statistics by no means give a complete and exhaustive account of Germany's foreign trade. A large portion of England's commerce is carried on by German firms, and the profits they make increase Germany's national wealth. For instance, Egyptian cotton is chiefly exported by German merchants. In Southern and Eastern Asia many German firms are occupied in selling English productions. Hong Kong, the great emporium of Southern China, has been raised to its position of eminence chiefly by German industry. In Ceylon, Singapore, Shanghai, and elsewhere the large and dominating firms are in German hands, and Kiao-Chau, the only German settlement on the coast of Eastern Asia, promises to become a commercial centre of the first rank as soon as the mineral wealth of Shantung is thoroughly exploited and the railways are built which will find their natural outlet at that port. At any rate, Kiao-Chau possesses incalculable future pos-

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

sibilities, and Germany must retain that position under all circumstances.

It is widely believed that the English people pursue a particularly generous and liberal commercial policy by impeding in no way the commerce of foreign nations, and particularly German commerce, throughout their Dominions and Colonies. In reality, however, this policy is not dictated by generosity or by international courtesy. The English simply *require* the German merchant. They cannot do without him, and therefore they give him a free hand. England's population is quite out of proportion to the size of England's Colonial domain. The United Kingdom has 45,000,000 inhabitants. In the Dominions, Canada, Newfoundland, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, dwell altogether 13,950,000 white men. Of these a large portion are not even English. In all the remaining British possessions, India included, there are only 550,000 white people. The white population of the British Empire in its entirety is therefore smaller than is that of the comparatively small German Empire. It has further to be considered that in the year 1911 alone 260,000 men emigrated from the United Kingdom. In 1912

ENGLAND'S BUSINESS INFERIORITY

the number of emigrants will probably be greater. The excess of births over deaths in Great Britain has a sinking tendency, and the female population exceeds the male by about 1,400,000. It is clear, if we look at these figures, that the population does not suffice to exploit the vast possessions in British hands. The English are absolutely compelled to rely on the aid of foreigners. Besides, the German merchant is generally considered to be more reliable and more industrious than the English. The German engineer and mechanic is more highly esteemed by many than is his English competitor. Even in Manchester, one of the largest centres of the English manufacturing industry, there are many mills and factories which are managed by Germans, and German merchants may be found in many English business houses. We Germans have no reason to thank the English for generously admitting us to the trade with their Colonies. On the contrary, they have reason to thank the Germans, for without them they would not be able to carry on their huge trade at all. The fact that we make a profit out of English trade has nothing to do with the matter. We owe that profit to our own industry.

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

Outside the British Colonies also may be found many German merchants, engineers and other business men. Throughout the world they assist foreign nations. At the same time, they increase the German national wealth by their income, which frequently is substantial.

Germany works abroad not only through her people, but also through her capital. The German capital invested abroad is estimated to amount to £1,500,000,000. Although our imports are larger than are our exports, Germany's national wealth increases rapidly and substantially. Per head of population, Germany is already at least as wealthy as is France, although Germany, which is about equal in size to France, gives room to 25,000,000 more people than does her western neighbour. The wealth which German industry and German capital acquire every year in foreign countries are large enough, not only to pay for Germany's excess of imports over exports, but also to increase the national wealth very greatly. The German nation does not spend the whole of its income, although the standard of life has been very greatly raised among all classes. That is noticeable from the improvement in the dwellings of

GERMANY'S LEAD IN ART AND SCIENCE

the people, from the increase in the consumption of meat, and from the increase in the consumption of many commodities. This is all the more surprising, as large sums are invested in the German colonies which at present do not yield an income. Altogether, a vast amount of labour has taken place in the German colonies, notwithstanding many mistakes made by the administration and much neglect.

In the German colonies German industry and German labour have produced surprising results, and Germany has reason to be proud of the success of her sons as pioneers of civilisation. In all the German colonies substantial progress can be reported, notwithstanding the great difficulties which had to be overcome. The success achieved is particularly noteworthy, in view of the fact that the Government has only hesitatingly taken part in the development of the German colonies. Its activity was lamed by the parochial views predominating in the Reichstag. Hence a cheeseparing policy had to be adopted.

The intellectual progress of the German nation has kept step with its colossal material progress. It would lead too far to compare Germany's achievements in the fields of science and art with

those of other countries. However, no one will deny that in all the branches of science Germany has conquered and preserved for herself a leading place. In philosophy, in historical and in economic science, Germany occupies the foremost place among the nations. That is not denied by anyone. The high development of the practical sciences in Germany has largely contributed to the success of Germany's manufacturing industries. The fact that Germany's economic success is largely based on her scientific pre-eminence is particularly noticeable in the chemical industry and in the electrical industry. In both industries Germany has obtained the first place among the nations of the world.

It is worth noting, and characteristic of Germany, that, according to reliable statistics, Germany's export of books is twice as large per year as is the export of books from France, England, and the United States combined. This fact proves, at any rate, that Germany's influence upon the intellectual development of mankind is proportionately far larger than that of any other nation. The increasing influence of German intelligence throughout the world may also be seen from the fact that the German language is

GERMANY'S ARMY AND NAVY

steadily gaining ground in foreign countries, and partly at the cost of English.

Germany has been the first among the nations to introduce universally compulsory military service, and with it she has introduced a new element of moral improvement in the life of nations. She has created an army which is superior in numbers to the army of every other State, Russia alone excepted. The German army is, as regards fighting value, probably the foremost army in the world. Furthermore, impelled by the Emperor William II., the German nation has built up a navy of the highest technical excellence. Its strength is exceeded only by the British navy and by the navy of the United States.*

The officers and officials of the army and navy, and the engineers and technical experts of every kind connected with the two services, absorb a large portion of the intellectual forces of the nation. As the men in these services concentrate all their efforts upon the service and employ their whole time in furthering its interests, the German

* This is an error. The German navy is considerably stronger than that of the United States. (Note of the Translator.)

army and navy have arrived at a degree of efficiency unequalled among nations. Although the services absorb an enormous number of people belonging to the educated class, and although a large number of eminent Germans are occupied in commerce and industry, not only in Germany, but in foreign countries as well, Germany has been able to establish a civil service which is the most efficient and most reliable in the world. Nowhere in the world is to be found greater order in domestic affairs than is to be found throughout our country. Only a few complaints are heard regarding the German officials, and these are scarcely worth noting in view of their great achievements. It is necessary to go abroad in order to appreciate the excellence of the German bureaucracy and of the institutions directed by it.

If one considers all the achievements of Germany and the tremendous intellectual force which in so remarkably short a time has brought them about, one is justified in saying that Germany has made a most wonderful progress. *No other nation can point to achievements comparable to those of Germany.* If one contemplates German achievements in modern times and in the past, it is clear that Germany disposes of an absolutely

inexhaustible store of national strength. Her successes and triumphs in the past guarantee the continued progress of the country in the future and its further success.

By its past the German nation has acquired a right to strive after the highest aims. That right involves a duty. Every nation must aim at the ideal.

The value of German civilisation reposes on a twofold basis: The impartiality and the universality of the German mind. No nation exists which thinks at the same time so clearly and so historically as does the German; none is more free from prejudice. No other nation possesses a greater spiritual freedom. In none are spiritual freedom and discipline more harmoniously combined, promoting a free and natural development. Deep within the German soul there is a strong need for spiritual freedom. However, notwithstanding that thirst for liberty, it has been possible to oppose revolutionary movements in Germany, and to restrict the impetus which produced them so much, that the driving power which brought them about could be utilised for bringing about a healthy natural progress.

No nation known to modern history has equalled the Germans in combining all elements of civilisation and in furthering civilisation in all its branches. No other nation possesses a greater depth of feeling, and none has given greater gifts to mankind in exchange for those received from other nations. Thus "Germany has enriched European civilisation with new ideas and ideals, and she is now occupying a place in the civilised world which cannot be filled by any other people. Depth, idealism, universality, and absolute freedom from prejudice have been German characteristics at all times." With these words Heinrich von Treitschke described the peculiar character of Germany. These qualities have induced Germany in the past to fight for the highest possessions of humanity, possessions which may be summed up in the single word liberty. Germany strives after intellectual, moral and political liberty, and she will continue to fight for liberty and march in advance of the other nations, carrying high aloft the banner of progress.

The German nation is entitled to look with pride into its past. It is entitled to boast of its achievements in art and science, in commerce and

GERMANY'S IDEALISM

industry, in war and navigation. It can put its trust with full confidence in its national strength, and it is entitled to put to itself the highest aims. It can confidently look into the future. However, if it examines its political position it cannot feel a similar pride. On the contrary, the German nation must be animated with feelings of shame and bitterness, for it must confess that it has allowed itself to be kept back in the political domain by nations of lesser value and a weaker fibre.

The value of a nation's civilisation depends largely upon its political power. The mind of a nation can flourish freely only under the protection of its armed strength. The national individuality disappears when men of one race have to live among men of another race, and have to accommodate themselves to strange men and to strange circumstances. An independent national civilisation cannot continue to exist among men who live abroad among strangers, and who depend for their prosperity on the goodwill of men of a different race and of a different character, even if they dwell together in settlements of their own.

If we bear this fact in mind we must confess

with a bleeding heart that *the political position of the German Empire does not in any way correspond with the pre-eminence of German civilisation and with the economic importance of Germanism abroad.*

Notwithstanding the existence of the Triple Alliance, Germany is in an almost unbearable position on the European continent. We are penned up. We are surrounded by England, France, and Russia, three enemies who are closely allied, and whenever we endeavour to increase our power we meet with their united and determined opposition. These three Powers have tied down Italy's forces in the Mediterranean in such a manner that they can be only of little assistance to Germany in case of war. Only Austria-Hungary stands faithfully by our side. The three hostile Great Powers are unceasingly endeavouring to bring about the disintegration and the collapse of Turkey, and to weaken that Power to the utmost. Now Turkey is a necessary adjunct to the Austro-German Alliance. It is of the utmost importance for us to preserve Turkey, and to make her powerful and efficient. That country is most necessary for us both in war and peace, for military and economic reasons.

The destruction or the weakening of Turkey would directly damage our position and our power on the continent of Europe.

Germany occupies an unfavourable position as a continental Power and as a world-Power. As a matter of fact, one cannot really speak of Germany as a world-Power. Although the economic importance of Germanism has very greatly increased throughout the world in consequence of the prestige which Germany has gained by her successful wars, we cannot act as a world-Power anywhere except in those few colonies which we possess and which Germany was able to acquire in agreement with England.

The value and extent of Germany's colonial possessions correspond neither with Germany's importance as a factor of civilisation, nor her economic needs, nor the numbers of the German people and their rapid increase. Besides, as matters are to-day, Germany's connection with her colonies may be interrupted at any moment, and Germany would be helpless in such a case. If now we look at the colonial Empires of England, France, and even of little Belgium, we clearly see that Germany has been badly treated in the distribution of the territories of the world.

However, we cannot complain, because this has been largely our own fault.

Of course we cannot compare Germany's colonial possessions with those of England. The English have acquired their colonies in the course of several centuries, while the German colonies have been acquired only since 1870. However, if we compare the colonial acquisitions made by Germany since 1870 with those of France since the same year, and if we remember that France has been defeated by Germany and has lost to the Germans the predominant place she held in Europe, Germany can scarcely boast of her colonial successes. Even little Belgium has done better than we have done since the Franco-German war. Since 1870 France has founded the second largest colonial empire in the world. She has occupied territories which were discovered and explored by Germans. Belgium has acquired the Congo State, the extent of which is approximately equal to that of all the African possessions of Germany. Undoubtedly the Congo State possesses very great value. Quite recently Germany allowed France to absorb the valuable colony of Morocco, owing to the threatening attitude of England and to the re-

lentless energy of France, which trod all treaties underfoot and seemed resolved upon war in case of need. In exchange Germany obtained a piece of the French Congo, which, according to the official memorandum, appears to be nearly valueless and which probably is valueless unless Germany succeeds in acquiring the Spanish possessions close by. With Morocco we have let go a healthy settlement colony, and in exchange we have received a piece of land which is neither healthy nor fit for settlement.

The result of the Morocco crisis shows clearly Germany's deplorable position as a world-Power.

Whenever Germany tries to acquire territories which she requires owing to the numerical strength of her people, and the economic importance of the country, she is inevitably placed before the choice either of fighting her united enemies or of submitting to the will of the Triple Entente, which dominates the world, and in which at the present moment England is the decisive factor, for England directs it.

It is scarcely necessary to show that the present state of things cannot be borne for long by a great and proud nation possessed of great strength for war and of a great civilisation. That

state of affairs is unbearable. Our feeling of exasperation must become all the greater when we remember Germany's importance as a civilising factor and as a trading Power, if we remember our claim upon the world's territories in consequence of the increase of Germany's population. Besides, Germany's competitors are by no means better colonists than we are. It is true France has acquired considerable merit in opening up the territories which she has acquired. At the same time it cannot be said that the French have really colonised them. For France colonies possess value only as trading stations, which, in addition, supply France with soldiers. As the French population does not increase, but decreases, and as the French people like to stay at home, the French are incapable of colonising in the proper sense of the word.

Belgium has exploited only financially her large colonial possessions, and she has lost her right to retain them by the cruel treatment of the natives.

Now, let us turn to England. England has been a great coloniser in the past, and even to-day she knows how to open up the rich territories in her possession with surprising energy. How-

ever, the British population is utterly insufficient for spreading the civilisation of Europe throughout the territories under her flag. Besides, English civilisation is after all a very one-sided affair.

Confidently relying upon German strength and German civilisation, we Germans must try by all means in our power to acquire that political pre-eminence which corresponds with our importance in the world. In endeavouring to gain for ourselves a position in the world worthy of Germany, we shall certainly meet with determined opposition. However, it must be clear to us that we shall not be able to maintain the place in the world which we occupy at present unless we strive with all our strength to make Germany a real world-Power and give her that influence which she requires. We must choose between progress and decline. The decline of our political position would soon be followed by that of our economic position. Then the excess of our population would strengthen foreign nations as in former times, and our political decline would no doubt lead to a decline of Germany's intellectual power and significance as well. The progress of German civilisation depends upon Ger-

many's expansion. Germany must become a world-Power. If we continue to be merely a continental State, and if we continue to exist as a colonial Power by the grace of England, Germany will once more occupy that position of utter insignificance which she occupied before 1866. "World-Power or decline " is Germany's motto, by the will of history.

We have no alternative.

CHAPTER II.

Germany's Civilisation and Her Political Destiny

LET us consider the aim of Germanism. All those who recognise the importance of Germanism to humanity in general, who are acquainted with Germany's achievements in the past, understand as a matter of course Germany's claims upon the future. Germany must expand and become a world-Power. She must provide the space required by the German people and secure to Germanism and to the German intellect that influence in the world to which they are entitled. That is our motto. This must be our fixed star, and we must follow it in the same way in which the three wise men of the East followed the star of Bethlehem.

That aim cannot be obtained at one stroke. It must be won and laboured for in joyful devotion.

In the first place, we must endeavour to strengthen Germany's internal power, not only in order to prepare for the great tasks of the future, but also in order to be able to maintain our rank as a civilised nation, for we base our right to expansion upon our high civilisation. We must cure those weaknesses in our character which in the past have retarded Germany's progress, and we must never tire in our endeavour to preserve for Germany the leading position which she occupies among those nations which endeavour to solve the great intellectual, moral, and social problems of the time. Lastly, we must unceasingly improve and increase Germany's armed strength, which alone can give us security, so that, in the competition with nations and States, Germany will really obtain the position to which she is entitled, and that she will preserve it once it has been won.

In the first place, the Germans must free themselves from their lack of national consciousness. They must abandon their abstract doctrinaire discussions and their particularism and individualism which have exercised a pernicious influence throughout Germany's history. At present doctrinaire influences and parochial

patriotism are undermining German Parliamentary life. Every German must recognise that the German Fatherland is so much divided that it cannot be governed by party interests or by economic interests. Non-party government is required, or rather a government which stands above the parties and conciliates all. Everyone must, therefore, be prepared to sacrifice part of his own convictions if he wishes to serve the nation. It would be pernicious to cling to party principles and to personal views when the progress and the prosperity of the common country are at stake.

The strongly marked individualism of the Germans is a great source of strength because it increases the ability of the individual. At the same time, it is a source of weakness, because individualism prevents men subordinating themselves to the interests of the nation as a whole. Only in the stress of the greatest danger or under the guidance of great leaders has Germany hitherto acted with unity.

Matters are totally different in England. Formerly England was torn by faction feuds. However, since the middle of the seventeenth century there has been a tendency in the political

development of that country which has made for unity among the parties. At present individualism is certainly not as strong in England as it is in Germany. England creates types, not individuals, and the individual subordinates itself to the type. In England political instinct and race instinct are far more strongly developed and far more general than in Germany, and national character and political aims are in harmony.

While in Germany the elements of culture are richer and are far more highly and more widely developed than in England, England has developed a far greater political power which is based upon the unity of the national will.

Germany's first duty lies in overcoming the weakness of her national character. While preserving our individuality, we must subordinate our personal views and inclinations to the welfare of the nation. That is our foremost duty. Only when we succeed in this shall we be able to play that part in the world which Germany ought to play in view of her cultural pre-eminence. Only then will Germany's internal development healthily progress.

In the intellectual domain we must continue with spiritual arms the struggle which Germany

THE DANGER OF MATERIALISM

began at the time of the Reformation. We must bridge the differences which divide Roman Catholics and Protestants, especially in Germany. Perhaps we shall be able to unite the people by appealing to the higher ideals of the soul when the results of scientific investigation have become more familiar to the people in general. Only then will be recognised the narrowness of the point of view taken by the various churches towards the Christian religion.

The Reformation has freed science from its ancient shackles, and it was perhaps not unnatural that concentration upon scientific investigation created a materialist conception of the universe and shook the foundations of religion. Materialism is noticeable not only in matters religious. Within certain limits materialism may be justified. At the same time it leads to the over-valuation of certain factors, and it may threaten the very foundations of civilisation. An exaggerated materialism divides the nation into classes and causes a struggle between Capital and Labour, between two elements which ought to be firmly united for the benefit of all.

It will be necessary to harmonise science and religion, the requirements of the head and of the

heart, and to create a firm foundation for the harmonious development of the spiritual life of mankind which at present is torn by two opposing powers. Thus we may be brought back to the straight road which leads to progress.

At the same time it is Germany's duty to bear in mind the economic, moral, and spiritual wishes of the working men. But these must at the same time be led back to the recognition that they have duties towards the nation, that they must exchange their narrow class consciousness for the pride of nationality. Besides, the working men must be taught that Capital is a necessity of modern life, and that real progress can be achieved only if there is a class which enjoys greater well-being and leisure than the wage-earners. The working masses must be shown that they have fallen under the influence of agitators who possess no conscience, that they are dominated by an anti-national terrorism, and that they are being coarsened and brutalised, instead of being elevated, by their leaders.

While Social Democracy endeavours to create a privileged position for a single class, Germany's task consists in giving to all that position which is their due. The welfare of the nation must be

our guiding star. "Every expansion of the activities of the State," said Heinrich von Treitschke, "is a blessing and is reasonable as long as it stimulates the independent action of free and sensible men. It is harmful if it diminishes the independence of spirit and action among free men." To develop the personality within reasonable limits is the ideal for which we should strive.

Many believe that this ideal can be realised only in a republic, because only there the individual can freely develop under conditions of equality, while in a monarchy there is always a tendency, not towards equality, but towards servility. Republics are governed by majority rule. The ruling majority oppresses the minority. Besides, there is no factor which can limit the abuse of power by certain influential individuals. Lastly, we find in republics as much servility as we find in monarchies. On the other hand, in monarchies there is an independent power which is impartial, which stands above the parties, which recognises the right of minorities, and which can harmonise all elements and produce greater unity than is possible in a republic where internal dissensions continually prevail, and where govern-

ment is subjected to the constantly changing currents of public opinion. History teaches us that democracies are in danger of falling under the control of demagogues, that the power of the State becomes dependent upon the incalculable and greedy instincts of the masses. These factors lead to the moral and political decline of republics, while in a constitutionally limited monarchy the power of the State is able to combat the elements of destruction and to confine them within safe limits. Besides, in monarchies there is no danger of power being abused by an individual or by a class.

In view of the superiority of the monarchical over the republican form of government, it is one of the most important tasks of the German people to strengthen the monarchical idea. This is particularly necessary in view of the activity of modern Radicalism. If Germany should allow the monarchical idea which has such a firm historical foundation among us to weaken, we should increase the causes of dissension and of disunion in Germany, and the individualistic character of the nation would, in all probability, lead us to a state of complete anarchy, destructive of German civilisation. No nation in the world requires

THE MONARCHY MUST BE STRENGTHENED

more strongly to be held together by strict bonds of unity, an organisation whereby all the struggling and opposing forces are subordinated under one will, than does the German people.

A casual glance at Germany's tasks shows that they can be solved only by intensive labours. German science must see a holy duty in contributing to the solution of the great world-questions. It must endeavour with all means to increase the power of man over the forces of nature, and the exertions of science must be supported by art. Science and art must combine to enlighten public opinion. They must improve and elevate the people and make the broad masses receptive to the highest ideals.

The State can exercise influence upon the people by means of three instruments of the greatest power: the school, the Press, and the Army. Unfortunately the instrument of education is insufficiently utilised.

The German elementary school has become dust and dry bones. It is an institution which no longer marches with the times. The regulations regarding the management of schools were drafted in the seventies of last century, and they breathe a narrow confessional spirit.

The German schools kill religious feeling among the children by a purely formal religious tuition, which occupies the largest part of the school hours. The religion taught is beyond a child's comprehension. Hence children learn religion by rote, and it fails to influence their heart and mind. The school regulations do not point out at all the duty of teaching patriotism. The children learn nothing about the State. Hence when they leave school, where they have neither acquired knowledge nor been taught to think for themselves, they become easily a prey to the Socialist agitators, especially as they have neither been taught patriotism nor have they been taught that citizens owe a duty to their country. Our schools do not even try to develop the individuality and the character. There may be exceptions to the rule. However, the shortage of teachers and the overgreat number of pupils to each single teacher lead to a purely mechanical tuition of the children in the mass. Boys and girls are not taught individually, but in crowds. Hence the development of the individual character, which ought to be the principal task of the school, has to be omitted.

A reform is urgently required. Religious tui-

THE FAILURE OF GERMAN SCHOOLS

tion must endeavour to impress the soul. The teachers must give greater weight to morals than to the dogmas. The history of the Fatherland must more carefully be taught, and the children must be thoroughly acquainted with the duties which they owe to the State and to the Fatherland. The number of teachers must be increased and the maximum number of children per teacher diminished. Tuition in the mass must be replaced by individual tuition. To effect this improvement the training of teachers must, of course, also be reformed. The importance of a thorough educational reform can scarcely be exaggerated, for German civilisation depends on the activity of the German schools. The introduction of continuation schools is also very important. Their number must be increased. Unfortunately education ceases at that time of life when it is most important for the formation of character. Education should form a counterpoise to the temptations of life and to the influence of those factors which destroy the morality of the young. To combat evil influences continuation schools are required, and their activity might be supported by young men's associations similar to those which have been recom-

mended and introduced by military officers who have formed associations in which young people who have left school unite for the purpose of games and wholesome sports in their leisure time. That prevents them falling into temptation or spending their spare hours in bad company.

The better education of youth will lay the foundation for an improvement of the national intelligence and character. However, the measures recommended do not suffice to protect the masses of the people against the pernicious influences to which they will be exposed in after-life. The Press must act as a kind of continuation school to the nation.

The influence of the Press is unfortunately insufficiently understood by many. The newspapers are nearly the only literature read by the working masses. Besides, many people belonging to the more or less educated classes derive practically their entire education in after-life from the Press. Thus the Press deeply influences public opinion. It is the source whence the people take their views and ideals. Unfortunately the State leaves the tremendous influence exercised by the Press to political parties, to private

THE FAILURE OF THE GERMAN PRESS

interest, and to large capitalists who naturally utilise the Press for their own purposes. It is obvious that, in consequence of the State's indifference, the Press serves nearly exclusively the interests of political parties or of individuals. It takes little interest in the welfare of the nation as a whole, and whenever the newspapers occupy themselves with national affairs they do so only from the point of view of their party or of those interests which they directly represent. The Government, on the other hand, which is guided in its action by the welfare of the nation as a whole, exercises only the smallest influence upon the formation of views and ideas by means of the Press, and it cannot defend itself against the attacks which appear in the newspapers. It is absolutely necessary that the Government itself should dispose of journals by which it can acquaint the broad masses of the population with the Government views. It should in particular endeavour to obtain influence over the poorer and the more ignorant sections of the nation, which are unable to form an independent judgment. We can learn from the activity of Social Democracy, which endeavours to form the views of the young and of the largest number of the people.

The State leaves this powerful instrument for the enlightenment of the masses unutilised, for the official and semi-official Press of Germany has no influence whatever, and enjoys a very doubtful reputation.

The insufficient appreciation of the power of the Press may be seen also in the case of the international distribution of information. The German Government has practically no influence upon the Press of the world. By far the largest number of the world's newspapers stand under the influence of England. Hence England can, through the Press which she dominates, act in a manner hostile to Germany. Everywhere abroad, also among the official representatives of Germany in foreign countries, has this evil been recognised. It damages our interests very severely. Still, hitherto no improvement has taken place. Those who nowadays do not recognise that the Press is a great power prove only that they do not understand the spirit and the actualities of modern times. Therefore they neglect voluntarily one of the most potent instruments of world-policy. The Press should be made to serve the political and cultural aspirations of Germany. That is one of the most im-

WANTED: CONTROL OF THE WORLD PRESS

portant tasks of the German Government. Great successes may be obtained in this direction with a few millions. Thus the prestige of Germanism may be materially increased throughout the world, and the anti-German tendency of the news sent out by England may be neutralised. Besides, German commerce can be greatly furthered throughout the world by means of the Press. Lastly, the Press could exercise a very beneficial influence upon the internal development of Germany if it should be possible in some way or other to create a newspaper read by the broad masses of the people, the policy of which would be conducted in the interest of the State as a whole.

The school and the Press are very important means of popular education. However, perhaps still more effective in forming the character and the intelligence of the nation is the institution of universal and compulsory military service, provided that universal compulsory service is made a fact. The service in the army is valuable, not only because it trains our manhood for war, for it has also a high cultural influence. By placing every single individual in the direct service of the community, military service increases and deepens

the sense of nationality; it teaches men to use body and mind energetically; it awakens in them the sense of order, and teaches them discipline and resolution; it strengthens and steels them for the battle of life. The tuition which the men receive in the army is unfortunately often the only education in patriotism which they receive during their whole life. Germany owes the introduction of universal compulsory service to Prussia's regeneration after her downfall in 1806. The victories of 1866 and 1870-71 have been won by armies formed under the principle of universal compulsory service. The German nation has been made what it is by universal compulsory service, not by the German schoolmaster, who unfortunately is, as a rule, a complete failure in educating the nation. We ought not to underestimate the enormous moral influence of military service. It has made Germany a great nation. Hence we ought not to allow universal and compulsory military service to become a mere phrase, as it is to-day. While the German nation formerly actually contributed one per cent. of the population to the army, that proportion has diminished because the nation does not care to find the necessary money, although it is far

THE BLESSINGS OF MILITARY SERVICE

wealthier than it has ever been. It is particularly noticeable that the population of the large towns furnishes an unduly small percentage of recruits. This is very unfortunate, as the town population would receive the greatest benefit from a thorough military training.

I consider that the State should enable the largest possible number of men to obtain a military training. Universal military service should become a fact. The army should be correspondingly increased. That demand is all the more justified as we can only then throw the full weight of our population into the scales of world-policy.

If we wish to lay a secure foundation for the future of the German nation, Germany has to fulfil various tasks of world-policy.

Our first duty is in my opinion that of securing the German race against mingling with foreign racial elements of minor value. I am referring to the struggle against Slavism, a struggle which Germany has conducted in the past, and which she will have to conduct in the future. Germany is fighting a defensive battle, and not only for herself. She is fighting at the same time for the civilisation of Western Europe against the Slavonic flood. Besides doing this, Germany

must plant the germs of her civilisation upon Slavonic soil.

The Russians and Poles have no civilisation of their own which can enrich the Western nations with new and fruitful ideas. The civilisation they possess they owe nearly exclusively to the Germans, but they have not been able to absorb completely whatever civilisation they received, nor have they been able to develop the German culture any further in any direction by efforts of their own. The Balkan Slavs also do not possess a domestic civilisation comparable with that of Western Europe. Even their Christianity is a kind of idol worship, and has little moral influence. Hence the growth of Slavonic influence in Central and Western Europe would be disastrous to the progress of mankind. The fruits of Slavism may be seen in the domestic affairs of the Slavonic States, in the Russian revolution and Russian pogroms, in Nihilists' attempts and Russian barbarism.

Although the struggle between Germanism and Slavism is at present conducted by peaceful means, there is a struggle. In Russia Germanism is persecuted and oppressed without compunction. In Germany that struggle finds expression

SLAVISM MUST BE CRUSHED

in the German settlement policy pursued in the Polish provinces. The struggle between Germanism and Slavism is also noticeable in the grouping of the European States. The Triple Alliance represents the idea of defence, partly against the Slavonic world, while Russia's alliance with France represents Russia's hostility to Germany and her intention to recommence once more her westward progress whenever the time may serve.

Under these circumstances it seems absolutely necessary that the German settlement policy in the Polish districts should be taken up with energy and without any sentimental weakness with the object of destroying Polonism within Germany's frontiers. It is equally important to prevent the settlement of foreign elements in the heart of Germany, in the great industrial districts, and to prevent the mingling of the German race with members of an inferior race. It is of the greatest importance to Germany's future that the German race should be preserved in its purity, and we must not be over nice. We must not take too much notice of the possibility of international differences arising from an energetic national policy.

After all, one cannot at present determine whether this racial struggle, which is being peacefully conducted, will continue to be so conducted. It does not seem improbable that Russia will sooner or later endeavour to bring about a settlement of the Slavish-German differences by war in order to advance once more towards the West. This is all the more probable, as Russia and France are closely allied, and as the policy of France is animated by her hostility to Germany. Her hostility shapes France's policy.

We must now consider those tasks of Germany which foreign policy only can fulfil.

As has been shown in the last chapter, Germany occupies a very dangerous position. On nearly every side Germany is hedged in by hostile States whose united population exceeds that of Germany. These States oppose Germany's foreign policy with determined hostility, and place us ever and ever again before the choice of fighting or of going without. It is our foremost duty to make an end to this state of affairs. *We must once more regain our political liberty of action* before we can embark upon an active world-policy. We must obtain an unshakable foundation for our position on the Continent of

Europe by enlarging the sphere of our power in Europe itself. Of course we should not think of a policy of conquest. Such a policy would not be in harmony with the spirit of the time, and would not be to our true advantage. In Europe we can acquire territories only by subjecting their population by force and arousing among the people an undying hostility. However, it seems necessary to arrive at a final settlement with France, and it is quite possible to strengthen the Triple Alliance by enlarging it into a Central European Federation. The individual States of which such a Federation would be composed might retain their independence. The creation of such a Federation would greatly improve Germany's military position, and would give a broader and stronger basis to our oversea policy.

This Federation of States would have to be attached to the Triple Alliance, and the Triple Alliance itself would have to experience an evolutionary change, and would have to alter its character. Its purely defensive purpose has proved to be insufficient. It does not do justice to the interests of the three partner States. This purely defensive instrument would have to become a defensive and offensive alliance, in accordance

with definite stipulations whereby the common interests of the three Powers would have to be defined.

Only when we have fulfilled this purpose, when we have freed ourselves from the present position, and when Germany's movements are no longer shackled, can we think of our second task: *the enlargement of the German Colonial Empire and the strengthening of Germany's position throughout the world.*

If we wish to secure to Germanism that prestige to which it is entitled, and to obtain for German intelligence, German labour, and German idealism that influence which is its due in view of the importance of its civilisation, *we must gain a firm footing upon this earth, and we must create everywhere bases for the promotion of German civilisation.*

During the age of discoveries and during the time when the modern European Great Powers were formed, Germany was fully occupied with the war of religion, with fighting the Turks and with resisting the Spaniards and French in their attempts to obtain the mastery of the world. Hence Germany was not able to take part in extra-European policy, and she did not take a

GERMANY MUST HAVE COLONIES

share in the partition of the world. Only during the last few decades she succeeded with great difficulty in gaining a few poor colonies, which in no way fulfil our requirements of the moment, and which still less will answer our needs in the future. Thus Germany has come into a position which is unworthy of her in view of the numbers of her population.

Our colonies are out of all proportion to our economic importance, and that disproportion becomes particularly striking if we compare the colonies possessed by Germany with those belonging to other States. It is certainly possible to develop the German colonies very greatly. They will supply us in the future with more raw materials and absorb larger quantities of German productions. However, our colonial domain will never enable Germany to become economically independent of foreign countries, and their present economic value is only small.

Our industries have to rely for the raw produce they require nearly entirely upon foreign countries, and foreign countries take the bulk of Germany's exports. We are compelled to purchase a portion of the food we require from abroad. Germany has no secure markets for her exports

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

similar to those which England possesses in her colonies. At present the German colonies can absorb only a few German productions, and they will always yield only an unsatisfactory outlet to our merchants. The great foreign countries try to shut out German trade in order to promote their own industries and to become economically independent. It is for Germany a question of life and death that in view of her increasing foreign trade she should dispose of open markets abroad. Bearing in mind the rapid increase of Germany's population, it is equally necessary that Germany's workers should be able to obtain work and bread. One can foresee that we shall not much longer be able to fulfil this twofold purpose within our present frontiers. In ten years Germany will have a population of approximately 80,000,000, and these will never be able to find remunerative work within the present limits of the German Empire. Hence we require settlement colonies, and our present colonies cannot be considered as such, except in a very small way.

Only too late have the German people learnt how important colonies are for the national civilisation. In colonies nation and races rejuvenate themselves, and in them new centres of the

GERMANY MUST HAVE COLONIES

national civilisation arise, centres which have become of the greatest importance to the future of the world. In view of the importance which colonies possess in spreading the national characteristics over the globe, it is conceivable that a time may arrive when a country which possesses no colonies will no longer be accounted a Great Power even if it is ever so powerful in Europe.

In the interest of the world's civilisation it is our duty to enlarge Germany's colonial empire. Thus alone can we politically, or at least nationally, unite the Germans throughout the world, for only then will they recognise that German civilisation is the most necessary factor of human progress. We must endeavour to acquire new territories throughout the world by all means in our power, because we must preserve to Germany the millions of Germans who will be born in the future, and we must provide for them food and employment. They ought to be enabled to live under a German sky, and to lead a German life.

Formerly, in the time of Germany's decline, we enriched foreign nations with our children. Then the Germans were everywhere, as has been said of us, the manure of civilisation

(Kulturdünger). To-day we have become conscious of Germany's national and political importance. The consciousness of ourselves allows us only to go forward, not back. To-day we should consider it a disgrace if we had to labour for other nations instead of for ourselves. We must work in the German way for human progress. When the hour has come, when a great emigration from Germany sets in, then the Germans who must emigrate should find ready for them new lands in which they can settle and remain Germans.

Before long Germany will resemble an overheated boiler, which is ready to burst unless a valve is open to relieve the pressure.

"Security and increase of power!" These words summarise Germany's international political tasks. In order to be able to form an opinion how this object may be achieved, we must consider the ways and means which are at the disposal of Germany's diplomacy. We must also consider the difficulties which we have to overcome. Lastly we must recognise that the struggle for high ideals, that the desire for action, in short that war itself is an instrument of cultural progress.

The intellectual and moral powers of a nation

GERMANY MUST HAVE COLONIES

do not grow and increase in the serene atmosphere of a secure peace. They grow in the storm and stress of a great and eventful time under the influence of a proud and active policy which places a great national aim before the people. Such a policy educates the people to patriotism, moral earnestness, and success.

CHAPTER III.

The Ways and Means of National Foreign Policy

To many people foreign policy is a kind of secret science carried on by statesmen and diplomats, which cannot be understood by ordinary mortals, and these must not venture to criticise it. That idea is erroneous. It is true the men who guide a nation's foreign policy have this advantage over the generality of people, that they are acquainted with the existing treaties and international agreements. Besides, they are generally well informed about other countries through the reports of Ambassadors and Consuls. Therefore they possess a greater knowledge than have the average people. However, it does not follow that the leading statesmen understand the great questions of foreign policy better than those who are not acquainted with its technical details. On the

contrary. The study of history shows that leading statesmen and diplomats have frequently lacked a true understanding of political affairs, and that these have been more correctly appreciated by ill-informed outsiders. I would draw attention to the mistakes made by the leading Prussian statesmen from the death of Frederick the Great in 1784 to Prussia's downfall in 1806; to the feebleness shown by Prussia's representatives at the Congress of Vienna; to the inefficiency with which the Prussian Government was directed after the War of Liberation; to the complete lack of political understanding shown by the leading statesmen during the disorders of 1848 and the following years. These mistakes appear particularly glaring if we remember that during all these years there were men in Prussia who had pointed out the right policy, but who were not heeded.

The insufficiency of leading statesmen, which so often becomes apparent, can easily be explained. In the first place, we find that the most eminent men, possessed of the best judgment and the strongest character, are certainly not always called to direct the policy of the State. Favouritism and chance play mostly a decisive

part in their selection.* Besides clearness of judgment and the ability to come to a decision are easily lost, especially in the case of feeble men who possess a confusing knowledge of all the details of diplomacy, and who try to attend at the same time to all the smaller questions involved. The fear of responsibility is an additional factor which causes men of weak will power to abstain from action. Lastly, purely personal factors are often apt to influence political decisions. For all these reasons outsiders frequently understand the great requirements of foreign policy better than leading statesmen, who only too often lose their sense of proportion by their continual occupation with diplomatic details.

Of course, some experience is required for successfully conducting the business of diplomacy. However, talented men can learn the technicalities of statesmanship without much difficulty. Hence we find that party politicians belonging to all kinds of professions may become great and successful statesmen in a short time. In England we meet year by year with such examples;

* Allusion to the appointments made by William II.
(Note of the Translator.)

and France also is rich in men who have risen from the Parliamentary benches to eminence in statesmanship. This proves that the most important qualifications of a statesman do not consist in knowledge of the technicalities of his office, for which he can rely upon his subordinates, but in farsightedness, sound judgment, self-command, tact and determination. After all, the means employed by statesmen in international policy are very simple. The difficulty consists in choosing the right ones. A statesman must, therefore, not only possess the personal qualities mentioned, but he must thoroughly understand the means which he can employ and their probable effect. Besides, he must possess a very exact knowledge of the strength and aims of the various States, and be acquainted with the character and aims of their leaders. Lastly, a statesman must be able to weigh the innumerable political, economic, and financial factors which determine the action of States; he must be able to discriminate between the essential and the non-essential, and always direct his gaze towards the future.

This brings us to a most important fact. The

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

policy of a statesman is indissolubly connected with his conception of the universe.

Those who have a purely materialistic conception of life must logically consider it their highest aim to make the present life as easy and as pleasant as possible, and to diminish human ills and sufferings. They will see in the State only a legal institution and an insurance society which guarantees to the individual a comfortable and safe way of making a living and enjoying life. However, those who have a larger and more ideal conception of the life of individuals and nations see in individuals and nations merely parts of a greater whole. They consider that the ultimate object of life consists, not in enjoyment, but in the greatest possible development of the intellectual and moral forces which direct the world.

The idealist believes that the purpose of life consists, as far as the individual is concerned, in self-improvement. He sees in the State not only an instrument which enables the individual to enjoy the advantages of civilisation and to protect him in his enjoyment. He believes that it is the duty of the State to develop the intellectual and moral forces of the nation, and to secure to the nation that influence in the world which is its

THE TRUE OBJECT OF THE STATE

due, that the nation should benefit mankind as a whole. To the idealist the State is a teacher of mankind. He believes that the State teaches men to be free and to live together in harmony. He believes that the State is a powerful instrument of progress, and that its last and highest purpose is to give an individual character to the nation. In Treitschke's words, the formation of the individuality is the highest moral task of the individual and of the State.

The highest development is not reconcilable with the idea of individualism. Men can fully develop their highest gifts only when they co-operate, joined together in a great social organism, when they are united in the family, in society, and before all in the State, for the State alone enables the individual to take part in the great life of nations. To be able to fulfil its great intellectual and moral purposes, the State requires a constantly growing political power. A State which aims at the highest must possess the greatest strength.

Only a State which endeavours to increase its power and its sphere of influence can help mankind to arrive at the highest development. Only the highest development of the power of the

State can create a stage for the acting of a drama in which the highest qualities of men have free play.

Those who see in the State a great moral factor must demand that the State should occupy itself, not solely with the present and with the needs of this generation, but that it should endeavour to solve the great tasks of the future, which must be solved in the interests of progress and civilisation. The greatness of the State consists in this, that it is a connecting link between the past and the future. It follows that the individual is not justified in seeing in the State merely an instrument for making life easy and pleasant to him. Hence *the State is not justified in sacrificing the future to those who demand that it should concentrate its energy to enable the people to enjoy the present.*

It must be the leading principle of statesmanship never to sacrifice the permanent interest of the nation to the momentary needs of the time. The statesman must constantly keep his eye on the necessary evolution, and must not be afraid to make use of the most extreme means if the future of the State appears to be jeopardised.

The means which the statesman can use are, as has already been stated, very simple.

In negotiations regarding mutual interests, such as questions regarding transport, traffic, etc., the political purpose in view may always be obtained by skilful negotiation.

In the case of a conflict of interests there are two possibilities. The question at issue is either a question of right or a question of power, and, if it is a question of power, the use of financial power, moral power or military power may be called for.

Nowadays most States respect a clear and indubitable right, because no State cares to damage its moral and political prestige by obvious illegalities and by the violation of rights, especially as, in acting in contempt of a clear right, it would damage its chances of concluding treaties. Undeniable violations of right may become dangerous to a State in future negotiations, especially when circumstances have changed. At the present time the international sense of right and justice has acquired a power and an influence which one cannot disregard with impunity.

In the life of nations it rarely happens that a clear and indubitable right is in question. Diplo-

macy has a peculiar talent for selecting in international agreements words and phrases which allow of different interpretations. If international differences cannot really be overcome, a settlement is often sought by means of a formula, which apparently abolishes these differences, but allows each party to interpret it in its own way. When that is done, diplomats believe that they have achieved a masterpiece of statesmanship, although they have settled their differences only temporarily. Sometimes a real success is accomplished by covering up a conflict in this way, particularly when a statesman wishes to gain time. Frequently such a settlement leads only to self-deception, and the differences which had temporarily been smoothed over reappear. Occasionally it happens that a State concludes mutually contradictory treaties and agreements. Thus it creates dishonestly a situation in which it is able to act in accordance with one treaty or the other at its option, or to waive its treaty obligations altogether. England was guilty of such duplicity by concluding an agreement with Germany which provided for the partition of the Portuguese colonies in certain eventualities, and at the same time guaranteeing to Portugal the

possession of her colonies. The possession of her territories was guaranteed to China by international agreement. Nevertheless entire provinces were taken from China. However, as the integrity of China was nominally respected, it is clear that the contracting parties did not agree as to the meaning of the word "integrity," but gave it different interpretations.

It is important to observe that international law, as far as it is generally recognised, is applicable only to certain specific cases, and that arbitration treaties are concluded only with regard to certain closely defined eventualities. It follows that in international disputes the legal position is as a rule very unclear. Besides, frequently disputes do not concern questions of formal right and of law, but questions of biological and moral right, which may stand in contradiction with formal right and justice. For instance, Belgium possesses by formal right the Congo State. However, as that State does not do any civilising and colonising work in that country, but only exploits it, it has lost the moral right to its possession. Hence the question arises whether from a higher human point of view of justice Belgium should be allowed to enjoy

the continued possession of the Congo State, especially as she has in no way fulfilled the international obligations regarding it which she had undertaken. Germany, on the other hand, has not sufficient colonies, and as, in consequence of the great surplus of births over deaths, she must expect to have an enormous emigration in the future, she may very well enquire whether she has not a moral right to the possession of suitable territories which are only financially exploited by other States.

As the law of humanity, the general law of nature, which, it is true, can never be codified, stands higher than all the agreements based on formal law, it follows that international agreements have only a limited validity. They are valid only as long as, broadly speaking, the circumstances under which they have been concluded remain unchanged. No State can be expected to risk its existence for the sake of a formal treaty to which it has been a party, if it can maintain its existence by disregarding it. A classical example is the Treaty of Tauroggen. Herein lies another reason for the prevailing insecurity of international law, and no further proofs are needed to show that only very few

TREATIES THAT MAY BE DISREGARDED
international disputes, and only quite unimportant ones, can be solved by an appeal to justice, by arbitration.

When it is impossible for contending nations to arrive at an agreement by raising the question of right, a statesman is forced to appeal to might, and to endeavour to carry his purpose by throwing the power of the State into the balance. It may sound contradictory to say that, in the numerous negotiations between States, national power may peacefully be employed. However, the use of power in negotiations is a fact which has always been recognised by all true statesmen.

After all, an appeal to force is not equivalent to a threat of war. In innumerable cases one can negotiate and arrive at an agreement without thinking of war, or even of a quarrel. Between civilised States there are innumerable points of difference which may be settled by agreement. In many cases national progress and development are better served by a compromise than by an appeal to arms, for victory is doubtful. Besides, political morality absolutely demands that the necessary conditions of existence should not be taken away from a competitor State as long as the self-respect and security of one's own

State can be preserved. There are circumstances when even the strongest State may give way, and suggest a compromise without losing prestige and political power. In fact, it will often gain in moral weight by such a step.

However, it must not be forgotten that in all international relations, unless they concern matters of joint interest, the power of the negotiator is taken into consideration, although no actual demonstration of that power need take place. All negotiations of doubtful issue consist, after all, in balancing the power and determination of the opponents. It follows that the greater is the financial, military and moral strength of a nation, and the more powerful are its allies and connections, the more readily will another nation make concessions. On the other hand, the stronger Power will have to reflect whether insistence on its original claims is likely to yield the expected advantages, whether a war would not bring in its train greater disadvantages than concessions on its part. It will further have to consider that one can never absolutely foresee the issue of a war, because, apart from the measurable factors of power which come into play, there are factors which cannot be

POWER DECIDES MOST NEGOTIATIONS

weighed and accurately appreciated. Hence it will always be ready to yield to a certain extent.

The foregoing considerations apply to negotiations regarding both economic and political differences. The most difficult task of statesmanship and of diplomacy lies in utilising international differences in a manner which is likely to yield the greatest advantages in case of a compromise, and in shaping international relations throughout the world with a view to strengthening one's own position and allowing the State to make the best use of the situation thus created. Under these circumstances it is clear that skill and determination on the part of those who have a decisive influence upon foreign policy are qualities of the most far-reaching importance. Statesmen who can neither be deceived nor frightened, and who know how to preserve at least the appearance of extreme determination, and do not compromise themselves, will always prove superior to less skilful and cool-headed opponents. On the other hand, statesmen who over-estimate the power of their opponents and allow them to conclude that they are more anxious to preserve the peace than to obtain a success, and who do not dare to appeal openly

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

and energetically to the decision of arms, will scarcely ever obtain triumphs in diplomacy and will do an ill service to their country. A timorous and over-cautious policy which neglects the principal aim in view because of possible dangers and difficulties, will fail in obtaining success in treating current questions. Besides, it will endanger the future by undermining the confidence in the national strength among the citizens and its allies.

It is quite clear that the decisive factor in all diplomatic negotiations is always the factor of actually existing and therefore effective force. Consequently, it is most important for every State which desires to maintain its position among the Powers, to enlarge its sphere of influence, *and it is particularly important that it should increase all its instruments of power*, its army, its navy and its finances. At the same time, it is at least as important to increase the moral and mental strength of the population in every way. Superior moral and mental force alone can form an equivalent for superiority in the material factors which one's opponents may possess. An advancing civilisation and increasing armaments must go hand in hand. Only

then can the greatest efficiency be obtained. It follows that absolutely the most important task of a modern State consists in making its armed force as powerful as possible, not only in order to be able to be victorious in war, but also with a view to being successful in diplomatic negotiations. The expansion of the armed forces of the nation is particularly valuable, because military service is perhaps the most important means for increasing the mental and moral forces of the nation.

A statesman who does not appreciate the close interdependence between armed strength and policy, and who tries to negotiate with his opponents without constantly relying on the living forces of the State—he need, of course, not continually and demonstratively show his reliance upon force—can never reckon upon success. A leading German statesman has expressed the opinion that continual reliance upon Germany's army, while negotiating, would before long involve Germany in differences with all the world.* If that opinion is founded on his conviction and is not merely a phrase, it would show that he does not understand the very elements of foreign

* Von Bethmann-Hollweg. (Translator's note).

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

policy. Reliance on our military power is the *only* means whereby we can obtain what we require without war. Respect of our armed forces will cause our opponents to be cautious in dealing with Germany. Besides, our readiness to throw the army into the diplomatic balance will encourage our friends, and will powerfully encourage them.

If in diplomatic negotiations, in the course of which we show our reliance upon our armed strength, we do not succeed by peaceful means either in carrying our point or in adjourning the decision: if, for instance, in case of serious differences concerning a question of territory, we cannot obtain its neutralisation or the preservation of the status quo, then we must go to war and defend our justified claims. The stronger our armed forces are, the greater is the probability that we shall be successful. Besides, the better our army and navy are organised, the more highly developed is the military, moral and mental strength of the nation and the greater is the confidence in the political determination of Germany among her allies, the more likely will be Germany's victory.

War is the continuation of foreign policy with

THE POLICY OF FORCE

non-diplomatic means. It is the most powerful, but at the same time the most dangerous instrument of policy. It may be asserted that *the possibility of war is a necessary instrument of foreign policy*. One cannot imagine foreign policy without the possibility of an appeal to arms. If two States are in disagreement, and their disagreement cannot be settled by peaceful means, then no settlement is possible between them except by war. Only the knowledge of the disadvantages to which war may give rise is able to induce a State to sacrifice part of its valuable interests to its opponent.

It is not generally recognised that this is the case. Even in leading circles the erroneous view is often expressed that one can obtain real political advantages by means of negotiations. There are people who believe that one can induce one's opponent to sacrifice his own interests solely by diplomatic means. Many people even endeavour to eliminate war from international life, and to replace it by international laws and law courts, by arbitration. These say that war is a relic of barbarism which brings untold misery upon mankind, that it is a violation of right, that it appeals to the brutal instincts of humanity, that it stands

in contradiction to the law of Christian love, and is therefore unworthy of a modern and progressive civilised State.

The progress of civilisation and the closer economic relations among nations, many assert, create constantly increasing common interests among nations, and should tend to make wars impossible. The abolition of war should further become probable through the progress of morality. These ideas which, in Treitschke's words, come to the front only in times when nations become soft and decadent, have obtained such importance during the last few years that even governments have allowed themselves to be influenced by them. It is noteworthy that, owing to the pressure of public opinion, President Taft has gone so far as actually to propose the conclusion of general arbitration treaties.

In Germany the desire to preserve the peace has, since 1871, exerted an unfavourable influence upon foreign policy. The desire for peace has created a political situation in Germany which I cannot consider favourable to the country. The desire to preserve the peace which everywhere and always is placed in the foreground in Germany, seems to justify our faint-

IS PEACE A BLESSING?

hearted peace policy. To support such views can only do harm and is likely to lame public opinion.

We must strenuously combat the peace propaganda. War must regain its moral justification and its political significance in the eyes of the public. It is necessary that its high significance as a powerful promoter of civilisation should become generally recognised. We must learn to understand that economic and individual interests alone must never be the decisive factor in a truly civilised State. We must recognise that the most valuable treasures of a nation are not material, but moral, that it is necessary to make sacrifices and to suffer in the interests of a great cause, that sacrifice and suffering are more precious than enjoyment. In short, we must become convinced that a war fought for an ideal or fought with the intention of maintaining one's position in the world, is not a barbaric act, but the highest expression of true civilisation, that war is a political necessity, and that it is fought in the interest of biological, social and moral progress.

We must devote some space to the idea that war is a great moral factor, in order to be able to convince the reader.

CHAPTER IV.

The Social and Political Significance of War

IF we wish to understand the significance of war, we cannot confine ourselves to those general platitudes which are usually employed by the peace apostles. War and the possibility of its abolition are at the moment generally discussed. I believe that we can form an opinion whether war is justified or not only if we study it from the points of view of biology, morality and history. It is necessary first of all to look at war from the point of view of natural history. We must enquire into the influence which war has exercised upon the natural development of mankind, and we must ask whether war has promoted the development of the human race and of its civilisation.

Wherever we look in nature we find that war is a fundamental law of development. This great verity, which has been recognised in past

ages, has been convincingly demonstrated in modern times by Charles Darwin. He proved that nature is ruled by an unceasing struggle for existence, by the right of the stronger, and that this struggle, in its apparent cruelty, brings about a selection, eliminating the weak and the unwholesome. That great naturalist has shown that only those types survive the struggle for existence which possess the most favourable conditions. Generally speaking those beings only increase which possess the greatest vitality. The struggle for existence is ruled by biological laws.

The law of the struggle for existence applies also to men. While that struggle among animals and plants is a silent tragedy, men struggle consciously and have regulated their struggle by certain rules.

The struggle for existence, which is the cause of all human progress, is met with in the daily work of man, in the struggle of ideas, sentiments and wishes, in the struggle of sciences and of achievements. All the treasures of civilisation and the very order of society are a result of that struggle. Some things are eliminated in that struggle and others remain. Goethe, who had explored life to its depths, said: "To eliminate or

to be eliminated—that is the mainspring of life.”

Men possessed of a strong mind and will strive to come to the front. The ambitious endeavour to advance. Individuals, competing among themselves, are not always guided by their sense of right. Success in the battle of life leads them on. That is their prize. Many enter the battle of life prompted by unselfish and ideal motives, but more frequently people struggle in the desire after property, enjoyment and honour, while others are spurred by envy, the desire for vengeance, or the longing for power.

The laws and the State take care that lower motives do not become supreme, that the struggle for existence leads to moral and intellectual progress. In the struggle for existence that social order will prove strongest which pursues the highest moral aims, and in which the ablest are given the greatest scope. That is noticeable in political and economic life, and is proved by history.

Families and tribes are composed of individuals, and States of tribes. The laws which apply to individuals apply also to the societies formed by man.

WARS ARE NECESSARY

The relations among nations are dominated by an unceasing struggle for territories, power and predominance, and the question of right is as a rule respected only if its consideration is advantageous. While within a State relations between man and man are regulated by law, no similar force exists in the society of States, for these possess neither a common law nor a supreme central power which adjusts their differences. Hence, if irreconcilable differences arise between nations, the decision must be left to war, which alone can prevent wrong and can furnish a nation possessed of great vitality with the necessities of existence.

If men and States acted absolutely unselfishly war would be avoidable. That is a condition which can neither be expected nor be hoped for. Hence war is inevitable.

It may, of course, happen that biologically weak nations combine, form a majority and vanquish a nation of greater vitality. However, history teaches us that their success will be only temporary. Greater vitality will vindicate itself, and the united opponents will decline by abusing their victory. Hence a strong nation renews its strength after a temporary defeat and thus secures

an ultimate victory. German history illustrates the truth of this general rule.

It may happen that victory involves a moral defeat. In that case the defeated derives the advantage. South Africa serves as an example. The English defeated the Boers, but they acknowledge themselves that they have not been able to break their national spirit. Hence, the united Boers are to-day the ruling nation in South Africa, and before long they will probably have obtained their complete independence, which they could scarcely have obtained had not their heroic resistance awakened in them moral forces which have ensured the continuance of their national individuality for all time.

It cannot be denied that war frequently destroys the strongest vital elements of a nation. On the other hand a victorious nation conquers for itself better conditions of life and thus makes up for its loss. That also is shown by Germany's history.

The biological importance of war is due to the progressive development of humanity. It is evident that its mental and moral force gives the victory to a nation. That force can be found only among people possessed of a strong vitality and

WARS ARE DESIRABLE

of a progressive civilisation. Progress makes for victory. If it were not for war we should probably find that inferior and degenerated races would overcome healthy and youthful ones by their wealth and their numbers. The generative importance of war lies in this that it causes selection, and thus war becomes a biological necessity. It becomes an indispensable regulator, because without war there could neither be racial nor cultural progress.

History shows that war is a powerful instrument of civilisation, and that all great crises of civilisation have been decided by means of arms.

If we imagine a total absence of war in the past, it is clear that mankind would have stood still, or would have morally and mentally degenerated. As wars were necessary for human progress in the past, we may conclude that they will also be necessary to progress in the future.

Human nature is able to be vastly improved and elevated. However, it is neither probable nor desirable that that egotism which is necessary for the preservation of one's existence should be weakened by the desire for a higher civilisation. Besides, it is impossible to replace the selective process caused by war by international

agreements, because one cannot foretell which nation will prove the greatest factor in promoting civilisation, and which possesses the greatest vitality. The root of progress is found in the competition among individuals and nations. Hence it is the duty of every self-conscious and progressive people to take part in this international competition. It must strive by all means to maintain itself, and to obtain the greatest possible influence in the world for its ideas and ideals. It must, therefore, not try to avoid a war if its progress is impeded by obstacles which cannot be overcome by peaceful means.

Every great nation will of course endeavour in the first instance to show its superiority over its competitors by its scientific, artistic and political achievements, while at peace. It must be hoped that the possibility of obtaining such peaceful victories will become greater. Still, even if we leave political questions and questions of honour altogether aside, circumstances may arise in which the means of peaceful competition do not suffice to ensure the superiority of the national civilisation.

Vigorous and progressive nations increase in numbers and require from time to time larger ter-

ritories. That requirement can be fulfilled by emigration to foreign States. However, by emigration large numbers are lost to the race, as the Germans have found to their cost. Therefore it is better to acquire colonies where the surplus of population may settle. These should be established only in countries inhabited by lower races. If territories suitable for colonial settlement are unobtainable, foreign territories must be conquered. The conquest of Korea by the Japanese and that of Tripoli by the Italians furnish the most recent examples of such action.

A nation may be forced into war by the increase of the population and possibly also by regard for the position of its workers. In the great industrial States, part of the population lives by the export trade. If the importing States exclude foreign exports in order to promote the development of their own industries, the exporting States may no longer be able to afford a living to their workers. In consequence of this, they may lose part of their population through emigration, and may, owing to the decreasing number of the workers, their decreasing output and shrinking wealth, lose in addition their political and cultural power.

We must consider the possibility that the necessity of providing the necessities of life for the workers may compel a State to go to war. Economic struggles have very frequently led to military ones. If a nation should try to stop the import of grain or raw cotton into England, or only to impede it, it would have to reckon with the British fleet.

War, from the point of view of natural history and of biology, is evidently necessary as an element in national development. It is equally necessary from the moral point of view. War is not only a biological necessity, but under certain circumstances *a moral necessity*, and is an indispensable instrument of civilisation.

Those who view the life and the tasks of the State from the point of view that has been taken in the last chapter will recognise in the State's striving after greater power a necessary and morally justified tendency. They must admit that the State's aspirations are bound to lead ever and ever again to differences and wars with its competitors. If a State which tries to maintain its position shrinks from a war which is necessary for its further development, it declines, and its inhabitants share in its decline.

WAR IS A MORAL NECESSITY

In the life of individuals and of States there is no standing still. They must rise or decline. I believe it is absolutely wrong to contemplate only the barbaric and pernicious side of war, and to omit its practical and ideal benefits. Those who look only upon the harm done by war have never clearly contemplated a great and serious war. Those who have taken part in war will judge differently. How great and holy was the patriotic wave of 1870! All egotistical interests disappeared before the glorious feeling which united all Germans and moved them to offer themselves unselfishly to the Fatherland!

On the other hand, one must not judge of wars by those wars of the past which have arisen from dynastic or personal reasons, or from sheer lust of robbery.

A war always leads to brutalities and to suffering. But at the same time it gives rise to the noblest actions, especially when the freedom, honour and future of a nation are at stake. Then the brutalities and wrongs of war disappear before the idealism which animates the whole. The common danger unites all in a common effort, and this unifying factor is a force which frees the mind of the people and elevates them for a long time.

Wars destroy the shams of peace, reveal great personalities and places them in power. They give scope to strength, greatness and truth, to all the virtues, to unselfishness and to the joy of sacrifice.

One ought not to over-estimate the economic damage done by war. Although wars bring about economic crises, and do harm to the business of many individuals, the victor usually derives the greatest economic advantage from his victory. Germany's great economic development was made possible only by the victories of 1866 and 1870-71. Throughout history we find that increasing prosperity and increasing political power go hand in hand, because capital and labour require the security of armed power to develop freely. If peace has to be bought with a diminution of political power, the economic damage done by it may prove greater than that inflicted by a sanguinary war. Lastly, it should be remembered that a war which has been chivalrously fought with honest arms is a more moral form of competition than one fought with gold and intrigue under the appearance of peace. Victories of intrigue and gold are won by those who

WAR IS ECONOMICALLY ADVANTAGEOUS

possess gold and lack conscience and morality. They are not triumphs of civilisation.

Wars are ennobling because small-minded men are swamped in the greatness of the movement. The nations and States are at their greatest when fighting with their whole strength for liberty, independence, and honour. Only in States which calculate with the possibility of war will the character of the nation possess that energy which enables them to develop their moral and mental forces to the highest degree.

War has its ideal side and peace has its blessings. At the same time, peace is no blessing if it lasts too long, especially if its maintenance has to be paid for with the abandonment of the national ideals. Such a peace dishonours a nation, and in such a peace small-mindedness and selfishness flourish, while idealism is destroyed by materialism and the simplicity of manners by luxury. In such times money becomes all powerful, and character is of little value. The more deeply we penetrate into history, the more clearly we recognise that peace is the normal and the desirable state, but that wars are required from time to time in order to cleanse the moral atmosphere. Political tension can become so great and the

irreconcilable interests so acute and so involved that the gordian knot can only be cut with the sword. When a nation sees its power jeopardised, when its ability to solve its problems in its own way is threatened, and when the highest possessions of a nation can no longer be preserved by compromise, then *war becomes a moral duty*. Such situations will arise as long as the nations look at the development of the world from different points of view. When the pursuit of their ideals leads to differences, war becomes the highest expression of the will to civilisation and idealism makes it a necessity.

In view of the compelling logic of these considerations it seems surprising that the peace movement has obtained so great an influence. Its success is due to the fact that it is supported by powerful private, and especially by large capitalistic, interests. There is a great contrast between the views of the United States and Germany on the question of peace and war. The United States have conquered their independence and unity on the field of battle, and they have acquired a great heritage of glory, self-consciousness, and liberty. At present the United States have many competitors, but no enemies.

THE PEACE MOVEMENT

Their relations with England are secured by the community of language, not of race. Their differences with Japan cannot endanger their vital interests, should it come to war. America need not fear over-population, in view of her vast and thinly peopled districts in the South and West. The natural wealth of the country makes the Americans independent of foreign States, and their struggle with nature steels their muscles and enables them to undertake the greatest and most difficult tasks. Under these circumstances, it is only natural that the Americans look upon the peace movement with sympathy, for peace can only bring them advantage, while war can only harm them by impeding the development of the country and upsetting the money market. Germany is in a totally different position. Since the collapse of the ancient German Empire the German nation has had to fight against its enemies. It has wrested from the Slavs the territories in the East, and to-day the Slavonic flood beats against its frontier with renewed hostility. Towards the West and South the Germans had to defend themselves against the Latin nations, and to preserve their political independence during centuries of war, without being able to disarm

the hostility of the fanatical French. The most recent political and economic development of Germany has at last made England also our most bitter enemy. England fears that she may lose the mastery of the sea and her trade supremacy. She opposes us throughout the world with hostility, and prevents us acquiring colonies, the possession of which is for Germany a question of life or death.

If we consider our national circumstances, it is evident why the peace idea has many adherents in Germany, but that idea is not much appreciated by the patriotically inclined and by the educated. History has taught us that a State which is in Germany's position can preserve that position only sword in hand.

CHAPTER V.

Courts of International Arbitration and Political Morality

THE last chapter has shown that the peace apostles have failed in all their attempts to prove with their theories that war is superfluous and barbaric. All proposals hitherto made to abolish war by means of courts of arbitration have been unsuccessful.

If we consider every war as a violation of right and see in the absolute predominance of right the highest expression of civilisation and the foundation of true welfare among the States, then one must come to the conclusion that the differences among the States arising from different views regarding a question of right should be adjusted by arbitration. This conception is extremely one-sided. The differences between great States arise, as a rule, not over a question of right, but over a question of might, and questions

of might cannot be decided by an appeal to right. At the same time, one must admit that the idea of arbitration possesses a germ of reasonableness. Arbitration is useful in a contention of States regarding right. Treaties of arbitration have been concluded between various States in order to settle purely legal questions between them. However, when an attempt was made to extend the scope of these treaties to questions of might, when it was attempted to conclude general arbitration treaties, it appeared that the usefulness and scope of international arbitration is only limited.

Two questions immediately arise: firstly, the question as to the law guided by which a court of arbitration should formulate its decisions; secondly, the question as to the guarantees which will ensure that the verdict of the court of arbitration will be carried out and accepted by the national disputants.

With regard to the first question, the reply must be that there is no law, and that there can be no law, by which questions of might can be decided.

Right has a twofold meaning. It means, in the first place, the inborn sense of justice in man;

and, in the second place, the existing law founded upon custom or statute.

If we identify law with justice, then law is a vague, fluctuating, and purely personal conception. Various persons have various views of justice, and the conception of justice varies, not only in individuals, but also among nations. Every nation has its own standard of justice and its own ideals and aspirations, and these arise necessarily from its character and history. The different conceptions of justice among different nations are natural and justified, and, in view of that different conception, two nations may differ on a point of justice. Yet no one can tell whether the one or the other is right. In reply to the second question it is clear that statute law is definite, but it is subject to change. Statute law is merely an attempt at providing justice. Besides, the relations of Society are too complicated to make possible a statute law which provides for all possible cases. Lastly, statute law barely keeps pace with the changing views of right and justice. Through statute law national life is at last tied down by dead formulas, and justice can be provided only by a violent breach of the existing law.

A general world-law is as impossible as is a general and equal conception of justice. Individual and comparatively minor questions may be regulated by international law, but it is impossible to lay down a written law able to regulate all the differences between nation and nation. No nation will allow itself to be told by other nations whether its will to power is justified or not. Even if a written world-law was laid down, no self-respecting nation would sacrifice to it its own opinion as to the justice of its cause unless it was also ready to sacrifice its highest ideals and to degrade itself by having its own sense of right violated.

The same reasoning applies to the question of honour. In every profession and in every individual we find an individual conception of honour. Similarly we find among nations an individual conception of honour, which also is founded upon its history and its political and national claims. An attempt to disallow the Japanese claim to predominance in Eastern Asia and to the domination of the Asiatic seas would violate their conception of national honour. Europe and America occupy different points of view with regard to Asia and the Asiatic seas.

A WORLD LAW IS A DELUSION

Evidently an international court of arbitration would lack a generally valid and generally accepted means for forming its decisions. Besides it would lack the power for enforcing them.

In 1908 a former Secretary of State, Mr. Elihu Root, expressed in the United States the opinion that the High Court of International Justice established by the Second Hague Conference could formulate final and unobjectionable decisions *owing to the pressure of public opinion*. I believe that the present leaders of the American peace movement share Mr. Root's view. However, I think that he greatly over-estimates the uniformity of international views regarding right and wrong, and the compelling force of the findings of an international court.

Public opinion throughout the world cannot be unanimous, because different nations have different conceptions of right. Hence, the only means for enforcing the verdict of an international court of justice would be by means of war if one of the parties declines to accept its finding. Which nation should in such a case enforce the verdict? The difficulty to answer this question should suffice to show that the idea of

an international court of arbitration cannot be realised. Only in a universal monarchy similar to the Roman Empire can a universal court of arbitration be imagined. However, we shall scarcely see such an empire established. The idea of a universal empire has often been discussed by the English-speaking nations, and that ideal is openly advocated in England. Still, I do not believe that the world would bear such a yoke for long, and I am certain that the Germans would not submit to it. As long as the people of the world are organised in a number of nations, as they are to-day, arbitration treaties, as the German Imperial Chancellor said in his speech on March 30th, 1911, must be limited to clearly defined questions of right, and general treaties of arbitration between States afford no guarantee of enduring peace between them. In the case of differences touching their vital interests they would lose their effectiveness.

Lastly, it must be remembered that to a State a favourable verdict by a court of arbitration can never be an equivalent to a victory won in war. If, for instance, we assume that Frederick the Great had acquired Silesia by the verdict of an international court of arbitration, instead of by an

heroic national struggle, the acquisition of that province would not have been as precious to Prussia as it has been. The material advantage of gaining that beautiful province is, of course, very great, but more important was the fact that the State of Prussia proved its strength and vitality by successfully resisting a coalition of European Powers, and that it remained a stronghold of free spiritual and religious development. The wars of Frederick the Great made Prussia great by giving her prestige, and the victories won ensured Prussia's greatness, exactly as the struggle of the Boers against the English has made them a great and independent nation. General treaties of arbitration must be particularly pernicious to an ambitious and rising nation, such as Germany, which has not yet reached the highest point in its political and national development, and which is compelled to increase its power in order to do justice to its civilisation. Every court of arbitration must, of course, found its decision on the status quo and consider it as established in right. Hence it must consider every territorial change which is not approved of by the other nations as a breach of right, even if such territorial change has become necessary

owing to the circumstances of the time. Thus, all progress which requires change of territory would be prevented, and the development of strong States would be stopped by the status quo—to the advantage of decadent nations.

It follows that it is both theoretically and practically impossible to abolish war. It also follows that the abolition of war would more severely harm human civilisation than would war itself.

War is a violent means of policy, and it demands heavy sacrifices. Therefore war is justified only if the highest and the most vital interests of highly civilised nations are at stake. It is, therefore, undoubtedly the duty of mankind to limit war to such cases, and to abolish the possibility of wars which are not fought for the great and abiding interests of mankind. Those who make up their mind to go to war assume a great responsibility. Therefore the question must be raised, in which cases resort to arms for political purposes is justifiable.

It is extremely difficult to answer this question in a general way. If it is the task of the State to promote the highest intellectual and moral development of the people, and to enable them to contribute to the elevation of mankind in general,

then the activity of the State must be regulated by the laws of morality. Hence a war is justified only if it is morally justified. Of course, one cannot apply the conception of individual morality to that of the State. The morality of the State is a thing by itself. It must be in accordance with its peculiar nature, and be founded upon its character and purpose, exactly as individual morality must be founded upon the personality of the individual and its duties towards Society.

The essence of the State is power. The State can fulfil the highest tasks of civilisation among the competitor nations only if it offers to the citizens constantly growing possibilities to exist and develop. It is always immoral for a State to sacrifice its interests to a foreign State, for such action violates the foremost duty of the State, that towards itself. Weakness is the most reprehensible and the most contemptible political sin of the State. It is, as Treitschke correctly said, a sin against the Holy Spirit of statesmanship. It is equally immoral if a State does not strive to extend its power, if such extension is required by an expanding population.

The means employed by statesmanship must be moral. They must be effective, and must not

damage its moral prestige, which is a large, if not the most important, part of its power. Duplicity, unreliability, and treachery are, therefore, reprehensible means of statesmanship. Hence nations should not conclude treaties or alliances by which they do not mean to be bound. They must never allow themselves to be bound by treaty obligations which endanger the existence of the State, or are disadvantageous to it. On the other hand, the State is under no obligation to enlighten its opponent as to the motives of its action or the aims of its policy. That also would be immoral, because such candour would imperil the power and position of the State.

Viewed from this point, France's policy in Morocco and England's policy with regard to the Portuguese colonies give cause to sharp criticism. Germany's Morocco policy also is not free from objection, because Germany did not know how to maintain and defend its treaty rights in that country. A nation cannot waive its treaty rights without incurring the reproach of weakness, which damages its prestige, and its statesmen must act with extreme caution in concluding international agreements in order never to be

placed in a position which compels them to be untrue to themselves.

Caution, combined with determination, characterise the real statesman. The ordinary card tricks and the duplicity of average diplomats are not statesmanship, and must be branded as opposed to political morality.

It follows that it is not only practically useful, but also morally necessary, for Germany to follow an honest, strong, and energetic policy of force, a policy which looks not to present advantages, but to the future that courts of arbitration can only impede Germany's progress; lastly, that we are entitled and compelled to take up arms if irreconcilable differences arise between Germany and other nations, or if we find that other States intend to prevent Germany's historically and biologically necessary development.

Let us now look at the present position of the world from the point of view established in the foregoing pages.

CHAPTER VI.

The Political Position of the World

THE prevailing political tension presses upon all the nations of Europe. Trade and commerce continue, but enterprise is discouraged. Business men refuse to run great risks, because they have not sufficient confidence that peace will be maintained. It is true no one is quite willing to believe in war at an early date. Still, the signs of an approaching storm are in the air, and concern as to the future is all the greater, as all States, and especially Germany, have so much at stake.

The cause of the present tension lies in the political position. It is due to the fact that the present organisation of Europe is untenable, that the distribution of territory among the States does not correspond with their power.

The present position in Europe is untenable

THE ANGLO-GERMAN CONFLICT

in consequence of two factors: the increased power of Germany and her claims based upon that power, and the changed policy of England. These two factors have created conflicts throughout the world. The Anglo-German differences have led to friction in the colonies and in the Near East. It is necessary to understand them in order to obtain a clear idea of the present position of the world.

At the peace of Vienna of 1815 the territories of Europe were redistributed in accordance with the principle of the balance of power. None of the European Powers was to obtain a predominant position on the Continent similar to that which France had occupied. That policy was assiduously championed by England. She thought that she could preserve her predominant position on the sea only if she had no serious continental competitor. This being her policy, she supported defeated France, and endeavoured to prevent Prussia's expansion and to keep Germany disunited and weak. Thus Russia, France, and Austria were made the leading States on the Continent. Prussia and the rest of Germany were merely tolerated, while England, being absolutely independent of Europe, began to use

her sea power and conquered for herself the domination of the world. Turkey continued to dominate the Balkan Peninsula, and remained an important European Power, her territorial losses notwithstanding. The position thus created brought about a balance of power among the States of Europe. The rest of the world was considered by England her sphere of interest.

Since then the European position has fundamentally changed.

The interests of all great European States have grown beyond their narrow frontiers. The great increase of production and improved means of transport have created the world trade. Vast territories all over the globe have been opened up by the European Powers, and new world-Powers have arisen. England has acquired one-fifth of the inhabited earth. The United States have become a world-Power of the first rank. Japan has become an Asiatic Great Power through her victories over Russia. Within the frontiers of the enormous British world-Empire, and especially in the great Dominions, the desire for independence becomes greater from day to day. The relations among the States of the European Continent have completely changed.

THE BALANCE OF POWER

Austria has lost her Italian possessions, and since the war of 1866, has ceased to be a member of the German Federation. She is a purely continental Power, and has only lately begun to take an interest in the sea. Russia has greatly extended her possessions in Asia. She disposes of by far the largest army in the world, and remains a great military Power, notwithstanding her defeats by the Turks and Japanese. France, which occupied the leading place in Europe up to 1870, has lost that position in consequence of her defeat by Germany. Her population is stagnant, and amounts to 40,000,000. In the meantime, France has, in consequence of her skilful policy, and Germany's love of peace, succeeded in acquiring a vast colonial empire in North Africa and East Asia. Italy has become united, and has become a Great Power. She lays claim to a leading position in the Mediterranean, and has begun to acquire colonies for her surplus population. She claims a position of equality among the European States. Turkey, on the other hand, has lost a large portion of her European possessions, and on the Balkan Peninsula a number of small independent States have arisen. These strive to expand at the cost of Turkey. Conse-

quently they form centres of unrest, and here the interests of all European Great Powers collide.

All these political changes have affected the conditions which gave rise to the European balance of power. The power of the States, which were formerly predominant, has altered. The European situation has chiefly changed, because Germany, which formerly was politically quite unimportant, has become by far the foremost Power on the Continent. A new factor has arisen. Germany's altered position and her claims affect the claims and the political and economic interests of the older Great Powers. In the centre and in the former cockpit of Europe there is now a State which possesses a tremendous power of expansion, owing to the rapid increase of its population, its warlike strength, and its incomparable industrial and commercial ability. The rise of Germany is irreconcilable with the old idea of a European balance of power, especially as Germany has acquired colonies, and has gained a most important position throughout the world.

It can really not reasonably be expected that Germany, with her 65,000,000 inhabitants and her world-wide trade, should allow herself to be

GERMANY'S CLAIM TO SUPREMACY

treated on a footing of equality with France, with her 40,000,000 inhabitants. It can really not be expected that Germany should allow 45,000,000 inhabitants of Great Britain (Celtic Scotchmen, Welshmen, and Irishmen side by side with Germanic Englishmen) to act as arbiters to the States of the Old World, and to exercise an absolute supremacy on the sea. It can really not be expected that Germany, with her constantly growing population, should renounce her claims to become a great colonial Power and to acquire territories suitable for settlement, while States with a decreasing or an insufficient population, such as France and England, share the possession of the Old World with Russia, which in the main is an Asiatic Power.

Germany, though she has become a world-Power only lately, is entitled to claim an important increase of her sway, corresponding to her economic and cultural importance. Circumstances compel her to strive for such expansion. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that Germany's desire, even if she acts with the greatest modesty, is one of the reasons of the present tension. Germany's national competitors fully recognise the power of expansion possessed by

the German nation, and its necessity. They therefore conclude that Germany will, notwithstanding her proved love of peace, be at last compelled to enter upon a policy of expansion. England, France, and Russia will never be induced to believe that Germany will for all time resign herself to her present position. Therefore these countries strive to keep down Germany, and to re-create the convenient conditions which prevailed when a weak Germany occupied Central Europe. Before all, France will not, under any circumstances, abandon her claim to a position of political equality with Germany. She feels particularly entitled to claim equality, because her colonies are greater than ours.

[England has joined Germany's enemies, and she has concluded with France and Russia an alliance hostile to Germany, believing that Germany threatens her maritime predominance and her foreign trade. The tension created by this state of affairs is accentuated by the fact that Germany, Austria, and Italy have concluded the Triple Alliance which for these three States is a necessity. Austria requires its support, in order to enlarge her influence in the Balkan Peninsula, and to create there new markets for her indus-

tries. Italy requires it, as she desires to obtain a predominant position in the Mediterranean, to which she is entitled by her geographical position and her past. The aims of Italian policy are directly opposed to the interests of England and France, for these two States wish to rule the Mediterranean. Austria's desire to gain influence in the Balkan Peninsula is opposed by Russia, which endeavours to dominate the Slavonic States in that part of the world and to extend her power to the Mediterranean.

The opposing aims described tend to increase the hostility of England, France, and Russia towards Germany. These States believe that they can easily deal with Austria and Italy after Germany's defeat, while the victorious Triple Alliance, dominating the Baltic, the North Sea, and the Mediterranean, would undoubtedly acquire a predominant position in Europe similar to that possessed by the ancient German Empire in the time of Henry VI.

The fear of Germany's power and Germany's desire for expansion have brought about the political tension. Yet no one can pretend that Germany has caused it by challenging the nations by an aggressive policy. The States hostile to

Germany are animated by sentiments similar to those which animated the French after 1866, which found expression in the words: Revenge for Sadowa. These feelings are particularly noticeable in England, and they are encouraged openly and secretly by the English Government. The probable development of Germany in the future and her growing sea power rob the British of their sleep.

During the last forty years England's position has undergone an extraordinary and scarcely advantageous change. Great Britain had preserved, until recently, the rule of the sea which she had acquired at the beginning of the last century. No Power was able to dispute her predominance. By her naval supremacy Great Britain had acquired her world-Empire, the bulk of the world's trade, and her great wealth. Her policy of splendid isolation was thoroughly justified. No nation could attack England, or threaten her colonies or her trade. She required no allies. Her unchallengeable position was strengthened by the fact that her policy aimed successfully at involving the European Powers in wars among themselves and maintaining among them a balance of power. The conti-

ENGLAND'S DECLINING POSITION

mental Powers were to balance each other in such a way that none of them was able to participate in world-politics. These were to remain England's monopoly. That privileged position enabled England to exploit the whole world, and allowed Englishmen to consider themselves as the predominant nation, a form of conceit which is characteristic of all Englishmen. Things have altered of late. Most European Great Powers have acquired colonies and built up navies which combined are stronger than the English Navy. These were especially Germany, the United States, France, Russia, Italy, Japan, and lately Austria.

The absolute and world-wide naval supremacy of England became a thing of the past. It was not impossible that several States would combine against England. At first England endeavoured to protect herself by the Two-Power standard, by creating a fleet stronger than that possessed by the two second-strongest Powers combined. However, soon it appeared that even wealthy England was not able to maintain a Two-Power standard and to provide the men required for manning the ships. Besides, it became clear that

even the strongest English fleet could not maintain England's power in all parts of the world.

Since the time when Japan had built a strong navy and had destroyed the Russian fleet, the possessions and the commerce of Great Britain in Eastern Asia could no longer be protected by English ships. In case of war England's colonies and commerce in Eastern Asia might have fallen to the Japanese, who ruled the Asiatic seas. To protect herself against all eventualities, England was forced to abandon her isolation and to strengthen her position by alliances. She became Japan's ally, bringing her into a position of financial dependence, in order never to experience the hostility of the Japanese fleet, but to be able to use it for her own protection.

England found it impossible to draw into the orbit of her interests the United States, her most dangerous competitor for naval supremacy. Only quite lately her attempt to conclude an alliance with that country under the cloak of a general treaty of arbitration has completely failed. England was therefore all the more eager to strengthen her position by alliances in Europe. In the first place, it was important to prevent a

ENGLAND FORCED TO SEEK ALLIANCES

possible combination of the stronger naval Powers by making them subservient to English interests. Besides, it was desirable to strengthen England's position in case of a quarrel with the United States. Lastly, it was probably also considered that those States which might serve as allies should offer guarantees that they would not build up fleets able to compete with those of England. These considerations were, of course, not openly avowed by the British Government. At the same time one cannot doubt that they proved decisive.

At the time when the necessity of an alliance with other Powers was felt by England, the States on the European continent were divided into two hostile camps: the Triple Alliance and the Dual Alliance, composed of France and Russia. England had the option of joining either group. She chose to join the group hostile to Germany, and from her point of view she acted probably wisely.

Germany is, after the United States, Great Britain's greatest economic competitor. In South America, in Eastern Asia, in Africa, and in the Near East, German and British economic interests absolutely collide. Besides, German

enterprise and German industry prove frequently superior to English throughout the world. England is interested in destroying Germany's competition. That attitude is understandable from a purely commercial point of view. It is still more natural if one considers that among the nations of Europe Germany is the ablest, that it possesses the greatest power of expansion, that it is likely to become a maritime Power of the first rank, and to acquire on the Continent a predominant position likely to disturb England's policy of the balance of power.

In any case, the further increase of Germany's power meant that England's position as a world-Power would be jeopardised. Germany was all the more dangerous as, in alliance with Italy, she opposes absolutely England's policy in the Mediterranean. France and Russia, on the other hand, threaten in no way England's predominance on the sea and in the world's trade.

The French nation seems to have arrived at the utmost limit of its physical development. Neither as a colonising nor as a maritime Power is France likely to become dangerous to England. Besides, Great Britain and France have

arrived at an agreement with regard to their colonial policy.

England's relations with Russia are not dissimilar to those with France. Although the abiding interests of both States in the Near East and in Central Asia are opposed in many points, an agreement has for the time being been concluded between them, abolishing the friction between the two States. Both States are likely to co-operate unless irreconcilable differences should arise in the Near East. Besides, Russia will scarcely ever be able to become dangerous to Great Britain as a sea Power.

France and Russia seem very able, in conjunction with England, to keep Germany down. France is Germany's mortal enemy. Her policy aims chiefly at revenge for her defeat of 1870-71. Russia has certain interests which brings her into opposition with Germany. She naturally desires to obtain predominance in the Baltic and a free entrance to the Mediterranean. By that policy she comes naturally into opposition with the Powers of the Triple Alliance. To Germany the predominance in the Baltic is a question of life or death, and the maintenance of a powerful Turkey a question of the utmost importance. Austria

cannot tolerate Russia's predominance in the Balkan Peninsula, and Italy would find it disadvantageous to see a new naval Power arise in the Mediterranean.

It is not necessary to prove that the opening of the Dardanelles to the Russian fleet may conceivably become dangerous to England, threatening her position in Egypt and the route to India. Still, England considers this danger not to be one of immediate importance, and has resolved for the moment to co-operate with Russia in order to get rid of Germany's competition.

When England decided to ally herself with Russia and France she did not only consider the necessity of keeping down Germany and preventing her further expansion, but she had also to consider means for destroying the German fleet. We cannot deceive ourselves on this point. The ultimate consideration of British policy has, since the mighty development of the United States, been the question of Anglo-American relations. England sees in the United States her only real rival for the domination of the world. As the danger of an Anglo-American war is immeasurably great, she seeks to be on friendly terms with the great Republic as long as possible.

CHANCE OF ANGLO-AMERICAN WAR

The differences between the two countries are so great that England must constantly calculate with the possibility of an Anglo-American war. The relations of England and America towards Canada, and the problem of the Panama Canal, furnish sufficient inflammable matter. They may lead to the most serious differences between them. In case of an Anglo-American war England would naturally desire not to have a powerful fleet, such as the German fleet, in her rear, for it would tie her navy to her shores. Therefore the German fleet must be destroyed. That is the Alpha and the Omega of British policy. That is the necessary and logical consequence of the Triple Entente. That is the thread which leads us through the labyrinth of English diplomatic activities and relations. It would be folly if we allowed ourselves to be deceived on this point. The maintenance of English naval supremacy, at least in the Old World, is, in England's view, indeed possible only if the German fleet is destroyed. Germans must calculate with the fact that England strives to destroy their fleet.

It is difficult to offer an opinion as to whether England would not have been wiser to arrive at an agreement with Germany, and whether it is in

England's interests to arrive at such an agreement, even at the present time.

When England joined the group of European Powers hostile to Germany she embarked apparently on the only course by which she could preserve her old position in the world. However, by doing this England challenged Germany and Germany's allies to battle, and it is by no means certain whether that battle will be fought with peaceful weapons or with weapons of war, and whether it will end in England's victory or in that of Germany. However, an English victory would lead to certain dangers which might eventually lead to England's downfall.

If England should decide to side with Germany she would, first of all, have to concede to Germany a position of absolute equality. She would have to give up many interests, and she would have to share with Germany her predominant position. On the other hand, she would benefit. No dangers would threaten her, for England and Germany combined would be able to oppose successfully the Powers of the whole world.

Hitherto England has disdained to arrange her relations peacefully with Germany. She feels

ENGLAND HAS CHALLENGED GERMANY

confident that she is strong enough to bear down Germany with the help of her allies, and to maintain her predominance over the Powers of the Old World. That is her leading idea. It induced her to join France and Russia in the Triple Entente, and it was that step, which was taken without compelling necessity and without having been challenged by an unfriendly act on Germany's part, that has caused the political tension which at present dominates all Europe. This tension will not diminish until Anglo-German relations have become clearer. The Anglo-German tension naturally influences international politics in all their aspects, because English and German interests come into contact in every quarter of the world, and everywhere the States group themselves in accordance with their opinion as to whether their interests will be best safeguarded if they are on Germany's or on England's side.]

CHAPTER VII.

Is an Arrangement with England Possible?

IN view of the position of the world, the prevailing tension, and the constantly growing danger of war, depicted in the last chapter, it is only natural that in many quarters, and especially in official circles, an attempt has been made to abolish the causes of that tension and to secure the peace of the world. Germany is particularly strongly interested in obtaining its aims by peaceful means, because a European war threatens her with the greatest dangers.

From the contents of the last chapter it will be seen that an attempt to solve peacefully the problems of the time is extremely difficult, or rather impossible, as long as England continues her present policy. Of course, there are optimists who believe that a nation can be at the same time the friend and the enemy of another nation. These think that England may very well

continue to belong to the Triple Entente and be a friend of Germany. They point to Italy, which, although she belongs to the Triple Alliance, entertains the best relations with France and England. Of course, no one can deny that diplomacy has repeatedly undertaken the thankless task of achieving the impossible by abolishing irreconcilable differences through the carefully selected words of a treaty. However, the advocates of such a policy forget that a policy such as that pursued by Italy cannot be continued for ever, and that diplomatic agreements of the kind mentioned do not last. That may be seen by the treaty of Algeciras and the Franco-German Agreement of 1909. Both have not succeeded when tested by experience. The non-success of Italy's peculiar policy is evident to all. It is true that that country has received England's and France's consent to the acquisition of Tripoli. However, that policy has not led to a rapprochement between these States, but to their estrangement and to the weakening of Italy's military position in the Mediterranean. Italy has recognised by now that she can obtain the position in the Mediterranean which she desires only in opposition to France. In case of war she must

either temporarily abandon Tripoli or maintain there a considerable force at the cost of her position in the principal theatre of war. The Italian Government tries to provide for that contingency by an enormous increase of the fleet and by co-operation with Austria in all maritime questions. France has concentrated her entire fleet in the Mediterranean with the evident intention of strengthening her position in that sea and attacking Italy in case of need. Thus the relations between Italy and France and between Italy and England show that permanent co-operation between States is impossible if such co-operation can only be effected by neglecting permanent interests. The policy which aims at detaching Italy from the Triple Alliance and forcing that country into the sphere of the Triple Entente has merely led to the strengthening of the Triple Alliance. Italy's proceeding and experience should teach Germany to abstain from attempts to accomplish the impossible. It is useless to disguise existing political differences. It is best to look at things as they really are, and not as they should be or might be.

The necessity to look at matters as they are is particularly necessary with regard to Anglo-

German relations. No one will deny that a peaceful arrangement with the great Germanic world-Power on the other side of the North Sea would be for Germany, and for England too, of the greatest advantage. Therefore it is undoubtedly desirable to take all possible steps to obtain a peaceful settlement. Still, it must be perfectly clear to us that we shall have to overcome great difficulties if we wish to protect Germany's interests not only in the present time, but also in the future.

There are two possibilities for arriving at an understanding with England. Such understanding must either be a permanent one or one of a limited nature.

If a permanent understanding be desired, Germany's important interests must be fully safeguarded. Nothing must remain which is apt to impede Germany's necessary development. That demand leads to the condition that England must give up her claim to a predominant position throughout the world, which she raises at present, and that she recognises that Germany possesses equal rights, side by side, with her.

England would have to give Germany an absolutely free hand in all questions touching Euro-

pean politics, and agree beforehand to any increase of Germany's power on the Continent of Europe which may ensue from the formation of a Central European Union of Powers, or from a German war with France. England would have to agree that she would no longer strive to prevent by her diplomacy the expansion of Germany's colonial empire as long as such development would not take place at England's cost. She would further have to agree to any possible change of the map of North Africa that might take place in Germany's or Italy's favour. England would further have to bind herself that she would not hinder Austria's expansion in the Balkan Peninsula. She would have to offer no opposition to Germany's economic expansion in Asia Minor, and she would have to make up her mind that she would no longer oppose the development of Germany's sea power by the acquisition of coaling stations.

As the concessions enumerated in the foregoing would in no case involve a material sacrifice on England's part, but would only mean the unconditional acknowledgment and benevolent support of Germany's natural development, Germany, on her part, would be able to bind herself

ON AN ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE

that she would give equally benevolent and energetic support in promoting England's interests.

It must remain an open question whether such an understanding should take the form of an alliance. By its nature it would be equivalent to an alliance, and on the basis of such an understanding England and Germany could peacefully arrange their economic interests throughout the world. Such an agreement would create an irresistible force, which would necessarily promote the development of both nations. It would create a civilising factor which would advance human progress. It would go a long way to banish war, and the fear of war, or would at least diminish its dangers. If England in this way approaches the Triple Alliance, European peace would be assured, and a powerful counterpoise would be created to the growing influence of the United States. Anglo-German co-operation would also diminish the pressure of East European Slavism, which is scarcely a factor that promotes civilisation, and the Yellow Peril would find in this combination an irresistible obstacle.

It is obvious that an Anglo-German understanding would have the most far-reaching

advantages, not only for England and Germany, but for all civilisation. At the same time, it is clear *that England would have to change her entire policy.* The basis of all negotiations between England and Germany would have to be the demand that *England would have to leave the Triple Entente,* and would have to effect a redistribution of her fleet. [After all, it must be clear to all endowed with intelligence that Germany can never arrive at really close and cordial relations with England as long as England is allied with Germany's enemies. Besides, Germany could never have confidence in the honesty of England's peaceful assurances as long as the whole British fleet is concentrated in the North Sea and kept ready for a war with Germany.]

To the question: Is it likely that England will enter upon such an agreement with Germany? the answer must be an unconditional No. England has made her choice in full knowledge of the political position. She has prepared her political measures against Germany for a long time, and she has entered into obligations with Russia and France of which she cannot easily rid herself. Lastly, she has spent excessive sums upon her navy, and has established naval bases with a view

to a war with Germany. England's entire world-policy is conducted in a sense hostile to Germany. It can certainly not be assumed that that country will effect a complete change of its political system, and that it will give to Germany those tangible guarantees of her peaceful intentions which Germany must demand from her in the interest of her security. Besides, English public opinion would make such a change of policy impossible. All Englishmen are united in their determination to maintain their naval supremacy. Besides, the people in England generally believe that the German nation is hostile to the English. That belief is absolutely ineradicable since the time when public opinion in Germany vigorously supported the disgracefully outraged Boers. After all, the British Government probably believes that it can conduct its diplomatic campaign so successfully that, in case of a war with Germany, all trumps will be in England's hands.

England's policy in the East proves that England has not the slightest intention of coming to a peaceful agreement with Germany, treating Germany as an equal. It proves that she sees in Germany an opponent whom she endeavours by all means to bear down. All English utterances

which describe England's policy as disinterested and unselfish, especially those made during the present troubles in the Balkans, must be described as sheer hypocrisy.

The fact that England and France have promoted Italy's enterprise in Tripoli in every way proves their intention of causing differences between Italy and her partners in the Triple Alliance with a view to isolating Germany and Austria. That opinion is confirmed when we consider the threatening attitude of the Balkan States, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, and Greece during the present Balkan troubles. Of course, there is a possibility that these States are acting spontaneously and are endeavouring to make use of Turkey's helplessness. It may be that the Balkan rulers are giving way to the demands of the people in order to save their tottering thrones. However, those who look at the matter without prejudice cannot help feeling convinced that the Balkan States have scarcely acted on their own account, that they must have powerful support if they attack Turkey, and at the same time seriously violate the interests of Austria and Roumania. We must ask which nation is encouraging and supporting them.

ENGLISH HYPOCRISY AND INTRIGUE

At first sight it seems that Russia is behind the Balkan States. One comes to that conclusion from Russia's traditional Philo-Slav policy and from her military measures. However, it can hardly be assumed that Russia should have caused just at the present moment a war in the Balkans, or should have allowed it to break out, unless she could count upon powerful support if the Balkan troubles should lead to a great European war. Neither Russia nor France can desire a war at the present moment. Russia's domestic position is threatening, and the unfortunate issue of a war could easily bring about another revolution. France cannot desire a war because a large portion of her military forces are tied up in Morocco, and her military preparations are not yet complete. If one thinks of the powder question, of the sad state of her navy, and the incompleteness of her military preparations in Algiers and Tunis, one must come to the conviction that France desires to keep the peace for another three years.

Only England is interested in bringing about at an early date a general war which will lead to a war between England and Germany. In the first place, England finds it from day to day more

difficult to man her rapidly increasing fleet. Before long she should have arrived at the limit of her capacity for manning her ships. In the second place, the Baltic and North Sea Canal is approaching completion, which will give a very important military advantage to Germany. Besides, the German navy is increasing from year to year. Hence it is obvious that the position is gradually changing to England's disadvantage. In the Mediterranean an important increase of the Austrian and Italian fleet is impending. All these circumstances make it obviously desirable for Great Britain that a war should break out as soon as possible, and she must do all in her power to receive in such an undertaking the support of France and Russia. As Russia has so far always been disinclined to embark upon a war of aggression, one cannot help concluding that England would like to bring about a war between Russia and Austria by means of the Balkan trouble in the hope that such a war might lead to a general European war. That surmise has also appeared in the Press.

If a war in the Balkans should lead to a general European war, Austria's armies would in part be tied up in the Balkans, and thus Germany would

become practically completely isolated. That would be a further advantage to her enemies. The proposal to settle the affairs of the Balkan Peninsula by the Concert of all the Great Powers would, if the surmise expressed in the foregoing is correct, be merely a cloak under which the Powers of the Triple Entente would play their own game while keeping Germany and Austria-Hungary in a state of inactivity.

Of course, one cannot prove whether and how far these surmises correspond with the facts. It will probably never be possible to unravel the Anglo-Russian policy of intrigue. Still, this assumption would explain the attitude of the anti-German Powers and the boldness of the Balkan States which otherwise is inexplicable. Once more one would have to come to the conclusion that England is very far from seeking an honest and lasting understanding with Germany, that she rather strives to continue her policy of hedging about and isolating Germany, which she had begun so successfully.

We must try to make the best of things as they are. The tension between England and Germany will remain until their differences are decided by war, or until one of the two States

voluntarily abandons its policy and pretensions. As such an abandonment to the claims and pretensions of England would mean for Germany a complete sacrifice of her political and national future, we must make up our mind to contemplate the possibility that either England tenders Germany her hand in order to arrive at an understanding with us, or that she compels us to defend our justified national claims by force of arms.

There remains the possibility of a limited understanding with Germany, an understanding which would not make an Anglo-German war impossible, but would delay it for some time if we saw an advantage in such a delay. It is worth while to consider this possibility also, because many Germans recommend an Anglo-German understanding. I believe that we shall be deceived if we reckon upon it being possible.

As has been observed, England has, in view of her entire policy, the most lively interest not only to prevent Germany's further development, but to bring about a war with Germany as soon as possible, before circumstances change to England's disadvantage. This position of affairs and the probably fixed resolution of England not to change her political system makes it obvious that

WAR WITH ENGLAND IS NECESSARY

even a temporary agreement with England can be purchased only by great sacrifices on the part of Germany. Herein lies for us a great danger. We are expected to make the heaviest sacrifices in order to obtain perhaps only a short delay of a necessary war. We must proceed with the greatest caution, and not sacrifice a single position which is necessary for our progress. It would be a crime against the Fatherland if we would enter upon obligations which would jeopardise our future as a world-Power in order to obtain the very dubious advantage of delay in war.

There are people who believe that we should confine ourselves to being a continental Power in order to purchase England's good-will. Those who recommend this can scarcely have realised the consequences of such a policy, which would most seriously damage the influence of Germany and of German culture throughout the world. It would sacrifice the position of Germanism abroad and inflict the most serious damage upon our foreign trade by the withdrawal of the moral protection provided by the policy of force. This policy would perniciously react upon Germany's domestic position. Before long emigration

would once more set in, and Germans would once more become "the manure of civilisation." The great progress of the nation would come to an end. All who have a German heart in their breast must protest against such a policy of renunciation and self-humiliation. All proposals made by irresponsible Englishmen with a view to obtaining an understanding with Germany make the preservation of England's absolute naval and commercial predominance a condition. These proposals are therefore unacceptable for all those who believe in Germany's future.

We must learn to understand that an arrangement with England by means of an agreement, either on the basis of a permanent friendship or of a temporary arrangement, is impossible unless we are ready to make sacrifices which put in question the whole political and national future and the economic progress of the German people. Nevertheless, we need not give up all attempts to arrive at an understanding on an acceptable basis. However, we must draw a sharp line which we must not cross in making concessions. At the same time we must prepare with the utmost energy for the greater probability that no understanding between the two countries can be

WAR WITH THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

reached. If no understanding can be come to it means war, not only with England, but with the Triple Entente. In view of the present international position it is our duty to create the most favourable conditions possible for such a war.

CHAPTER VIII.

The Military Preparations for War

THE greatest crime that can be committed against a nation is the neglect of its armed power and the diminution of its armed force. The school of arms is the most invigorating tonic in the formation of character. The armed force is at all times the only security and guarantee of favourable political, social and cultural development. The true measure of civilisation lies in the moral, mental and physical force of the people, elements which find their fullest expression in its armed forces. When army and navy are neglected, or lose prestige among the people, the national organism sickens. On the other hand, a superior and properly used armed force always guarantees political success, which in turn leads to moral, economic and cultural progress. That is shown by the most recent history.

IMPORTANCE OF WAR READINESS

Through the war-readiness and excellence of the Prussian army, Germany was united. The German Empire built up its economic success on the basis of its armed force. Universal and compulsory military service had formed a nation which was superior to its enemies and competitors in industry, enterprise and reliability. The armed strength and the heroism of the Japanese defeated gigantic Russia, made Japan the leading Great Power in Eastern Asia and gave her great influence in world-politics. Proud England found herself forced into an alliance with Japan in order to preserve her position in Eastern Asia.

Now let us look at the fate of those States which have neglected their armed forces. After 1866 Napoleon tried in vain to strengthen the army. Parliament opposed him determinedly. The Empire entered upon war with absolutely insufficient forces, and was soon beaten to the ground. The military impotence of Spain brought about her disgraceful defeat in the war about Cuba. Russia had to lay down her arms before little Japan, because the spirit of her army had been sapped by the revolutionary agitation, and because her fleet was not up to date. Thus Russia lost her great position on the Pacific, and

enabled the yellow race to obtain political prestige. In the Boer war the obsolete and ossified English Army failed even against a weak peasant militia. England's volunteers and colonial forces proved as a rule militarily inferior. Proud Albion could not break the spirit of liberty among the Boers, although her soldiers were more than twenty times as numerous, and was compelled to make peace with them. In consequence the Boers have become practically the ruling nation in South Africa, and their position is a hidden but ever-present danger to Great Britain. From examples innumerable we learn that States or nations can politically and culturally maintain themselves only by their armed force.

It is the most important duty of every advancing State unceasingly to enquire whether the utmost has been done in improving its armed force, whether its military organisation corresponds with the political requirements of the time, and enables the whole people to be prepared for war and to obtain the benefits of a military training. Such investigation is particularly necessary when world-historic developments are impending. This is the position of the German Empire. Even the most shortsighted must

GERMANY IS ILL PREPARED

see that at the moment Germany stands before the question whether she is to obtain equality with the three great world-Powers, England, Russia, and the United States, or whether the European balance of power is to be preserved, and Germany is to sink down to the level of a second-rate State, and so lose gradually her economic pre-eminence. In view of the present position, we must examine whether Germany is militarily sufficiently prepared for all eventualities.

We cannot hide the fact that in view of the dangers of the time we have not done the utmost. We have abandoned universal military service, in fact, though not in principle, and therefore weakened Germany's armed strength. Military power is no longer founded exclusively on masses of men. The men require a thorough training. We have neglected the elementary schools to such an extent that they no longer educate the youth to a joyous patriotism. We have done nothing to extirpate from the soul of the nation the pernicious doctrine of Social Democracy. Its influence destroys public spirit, the sense of duty and patriotism, and damages directly and indirectly the warlike spirit, and therefore the

strength, of the nation. The protection afforded to Society by anti-Socialist young men's societies, etc., does not suffice for combating the terrorism of "the party without a Fatherland." The State must act. It neglects its most sacred duty and jeopardises the national future by doing nothing to prevent the poisoning of the mind of the people.

In many directions reforms are necessary to strengthen the root of Germany's military power. However, the improvements required cannot quickly be instituted. They can therefore affect our present position only little. Hence we must enquire whether Germany's existing armed forces correspond with the needs of the time.

Germany's probable enemies are France, England and Russia. France has developed her armed strength to the utmost. She possesses, what Germany formerly possessed, universal military service. Therefore, she is able to mobilise almost as large an army as Germany, although her population is very much smaller than ours. According to reliable calculations, France can mobilise a field army and reserves of 2,300,000 men, and these can be reinforced by her militarily organised forest guards and frontier guards. Be-

hind these stand the reserves, who are by no means inferior to the German reserves, for they are more frequently called up for duty. In addition France has in case of war about 1,250,000 territorials with their reserve, that is troops of the Landwehr and Landsturm. Furthermore, France is about to enrol the natives of Algiers and Tunis in the army, and it can scarcely be doubted that she will in course of time succeed in raising three army corps of natives for war in Europe. In case of war, the French troops in Africa would be replaced with negro battalions. For some considerable time Morocco cannot yield any troops to France. It is worth noting that in view of the threatening political situation, France is giving the last touches to her armed force. Her example deserves imitation.

While on Germany's western frontier all men will be mobilised against Germany in case of war, our Eastern neighbour disposes of much larger numbers of troops. As Russia does not issue exact figures relating to her army, it is difficult to give reliable estimates. On the basis of the recruits called up during the last few years the peace strength of the Russian army, inclusive of Cossacks, and frontier guards, is 1,346,000.

The probable war strength of the tactical units in case of war should be 1,800,000, exclusive of frontier and fortress troops. Therefore, the Russian field army should be at least 2,000,000 men strong. Of course a large portion of these men would have to remain in Siberia, Turkestan, the Caucasus, in the interior and in Finland, to maintain order. These garrisons may come to about thirteen army corps, or 540,000 men in round numbers. On the other hand, we must add to the field army about 50,000 Cossacks of the second and third line, and numerous reserve divisions. Of these two may be mobilised for every army corps, and they can reinforce the field army. It follows that if we deduct 540,000 men of the field army for garrison duties, etc., the active troops of the field army who can be employed in Europe number 2,000,000 men, and this number can be greatly increased in case of need. It is an open question whether Russia possesses a sufficient store of arms and war materials for such masses. At any rate, one should not under-estimate her resources.

We must calculate with the fact that Russia and France together have about 4,300,000 men in their field armies, who will be reinforced by

RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH WAR STRENGTH

150,000 Englishmen, for that is the strength of the number which England is able to employ abroad. The remaining troops possessed by England or which can be raised cannot be used outside the country, or have to remain in the colonies for their protection.

Germany has 3,500,000 trained soldiers inclusive of her standing army, allowance being made for wastages. Calculated on the same principle, Austria-Hungary disposes of 2,180,000 men. It is not known how large a proportion of the whole army would be used in the army of the first line in Germany and Austria in case of war, and if it were known it would be unsuitable for publication. Still, however large the number of reserve troops which will be added to our field armies may be, they will never represent numbers equal to those which France, Russia and England combined can place in the field. The numerical superiority of Germany's united opponents will not even be equalised if we add the Italian troops to those of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Italy has a field army of 775,000 men in case of war, and in addition 70,000 men of the first and second line troops. Her *Landsturm* is

390,000 men strong. It must be remembered that the protection of the coasts and of Tripoli requires considerable numbers of troops, and that the mountainous nature of the frontier would make it difficult for Italy to attack France, even if she had the best will.

It is therefore absolutely clear that in case of a European war, Germany will have to fight against considerably superior numbers, which may be increased still further if the smaller European States should participate in the war.

Holland has 80,000 men garrison troops, and in addition a field army of 80,000 men. Belgium is likely to put 80,000 men into her fortresses, and 100,000 men into the field, and she is increasing her army. Denmark, which probably would be drawn into the war, mobilises 62,000 men. Sweden can raise a field army of about 200,000 men, and Switzerland one of about 141,000 men. The participation of these States on one side or the other would certainly have some influence upon operations.

The military forces of the Balkan States are important, because they may force Austria or Russia to leave troops on their frontiers facing the Balkan States. Thus, they may weaken the

armies which Russia and Austria can throw into the principal theatre of war. Turkey has a war strength of 700,000 men. All of these cannot be employed in Europe, but they may be reinforced by Landsturm troops. Their assembly in Europe would require a considerable space of time. Bulgaria can mobilise from 200,000 to 250,000 men, Serbia about 170,000 men, Montenegro 40,000 to 45,000 men, Greece 145,000 men, and Roumania 280,000 men. In addition, all these States have troops of the second line, which may be used for garrison purposes, and for reinforcing the field armies. The armies enumerated would, in case of war, partly fight among themselves. Nevertheless, circumstances might compel Austria to employ considerable numbers of troops on her southern frontier. On the other hand, the attitude of the Balkan States might compel Russia to use part of her armies in that direction. Still, the Balkan States would weaken Austria-Hungary more than Russia, because Austria is more directly affected by the Balkan troubles, being much nearer to the Balkans. Besides, she does not dispose of as large a number of reserves as does Russia.

If one carefully considers the military position

in Europe one must come to the conviction that political combinations are conceivable in which the German army would have to fight against overwhelmingly superior numbers. That possibility cannot be denied. If we assume that considerable Austrian forces would be tied down in the Balkan Peninsula, Germany would be almost isolated in her fight against the forces of the Triple Entente. It is difficult to imagine that, if an opportunity should offer, Germany's opponents would not make use of it and attack Germany in order to arrive at a final settlement. Can anyone really believe that if such a situation should arise, England would be ready to recognise Germany's equality as a world-Power, that France would give up the revenge for which she has prepared for a long time, or that Russia would fail to make up for her recent defeats and to carry out her plans in the Near East? Even if the Governments of our opponents should not wish to act, public opinion would force them to intervene. Let us not be deceived by constantly repeated assertions made in favour of peace, or by the agreements concluded among the various Cabinets. These diplomatic measure are, after all, only a cloak under the protection of which

every State hides its own interests. It will be dropped as soon as a favourable opportunity offers. Power is the only regulator of foreign policy. Every State would sin against itself if it did not employ its power when the right moment has arrived. We must reckon with these facts. If we do not, Germany will be defrauded, and we shall have to pay with our blood for our folly.

If we weigh against each other the various factors of power, we come to the absolute conviction that, in case of war, the German army will have to fight under extremely unfavourable conditions as far as numbers are concerned. We must, therefore, make use of the short span of time which only may be left to us, in order to arm with all our means. Although numbers are not the only decisive factor in war, they are of the greatest importance. At the last moment one cannot make up for the neglect of past years. All that is possible must be done. Bills such as the last Army Bill are not in accordance with the circumstances of the time. They consider chiefly Germany's financial convenience, not her military position. They are not shaped in accordance with our necessities. There are hours in the life

of nations when one must abandon the traditional path, and take to exceptional measures. That hour has arrived. Only if we strike rapidly and determinedly with our whole national strength can we hope to weather the storm which may break at any moment.

The increases provided by the last Army Law must be carried out at once, and not in the course of several years. Third battalions must be formed, the number of non-commissioned infantry officers must be increased, all artillery batteries must be brought up to six guns, and the surplus of able-bodied men which cannot be placed in the army must receive training in the Ersatzreserve. I am no friend of that formation which creates a military proletariat, but in the position in which we are it is better than nothing. Training would enable us to use the men of the Ersatzreserve soon after the outbreak of war for filling up the gaps in the field army. Time will scarcely allow of the absolutely necessary increase of cavalry. Therefore, it is all the more necessary to create cyclist battalions and machine-gun sections. The experience of the last great manœuvres has shown the necessity of this measure, which I have advocated for years. If

THE GERMAN ARMY IS TOO WEAK

the cavalry fails us, the army operates in the dark, and cannot effect surprise attacks. For the same reason we must promote aviation with the greatest energy and provide an efficient army service corps for all field formations. I believe that the creation of machine-gun companies, which has been demanded by many, is urgent and extremely desirable, although it is not so important as the other demands which I have raised.

We must strike with our entire national strength and increase the tactical value of our troops to the utmost. High fighting ability and rapidity of movement are the only means by which we can make up for insufficient numbers. Only if we endeavour to solve this task with our entire strength can we hope to succeed. A nation of 65,000,000 which fights with *all* its strength is unconquerable. But woe to the nation which relies on the semblance of power, which underestimates its enemies, relies on half-measures, and hopes that luck or chance will give it that success which can be obtained only by its own exertions.

We must treat naval matters with equal energy. We must expect that we shall have to fight greatly superior forces. England alone had on

the 15th May, 1912, sixty-two battleships and thirty-nine armoured cruisers. Of these nineteen were Dreadnoughts, and only eight were out of date. Besides, she had eighty-four armoured cruisers (seventeen obsolete), two hundred and twenty-four large torpedo boats (seventy-nine obsolete), thirty-six obsolete small torpedo boats, and sixty-eight submarines, of which fifty-nine are of recent date. England has ready for immediate service thirty-five battleships, thirty-two armoured cruisers, of which sixteen are battle cruisers, fifty-two protected cruisers, one hundred and seventy-four large and eleven small torpedo boats and sixty-five submarines, and all these ships are fully manned. Besides she has in reserve sixteen battleships, five battle cruisers, twenty-five protected cruisers, thirty-four large and twenty-one small torpedo boats, with nucleus crews which can rapidly be mobilised. England is building twelve battleships, five battle cruisers, nineteen protected cruisers, forty-five large torpedo boats and about seventeen submarines. Some of these join the fleet in 1912. England intends building two new ships for every one built by Germany in order to maintain her supremacy. By the redistribution of the fleet, dated

THE BRITISH NAVY

1st May, 1912, the British naval strength in the North Sea has been still further increased. The Atlantic fleet has been called back to England, the Mediterranean fleet has been sent to Gibraltar, and both have been reinforced with battleships. The First Fleet is always ready for war. It can be used against Germany at a moment's notice, and it consists of thirty-two battleships, divided into four squadrons, and the necessary cruisers. Four further squadrons of eight battleships each form the Second and Third Fleet, and these two have their headquarters in England, and part of the ships is always in English waters. The Second Fleet can be mobilised in a few hours, and the Third in a few days. These two fleets have their complement of cruisers. There are altogether thirteen squadrons of cruisers. Most torpedo-boat destroyer flotillas are stationed on the English east coast. The whole fleet has been strategically organised for a war with Germany, and its distribution gives proof of England's intentions.

The aims of British policy are confirmed by the position of the French navy. The new French Navy Law provides a battle fleet of twenty-eight ships. Formerly her intention was to build forty-

five battleships. This diminution is explained by the fact that the French firmly reckon upon the assistance of the Russian and English fleets in case of war. That has been expressly stated in France. In the French Parliament a pronouncement has been made that the French Navy Bill makes provisions in accordance with the naval programme of the Triple Entente. From this statement one can conclude how firmly England is bound to France, and to France's policy. France would certainly not have given up her naval independence unless she felt sure that she could absolutely rely upon England's support.

The foregoing views are confirmed by the strategical distribution of the French fleet. The statement has been made that its principal purpose consists in dominating the sea in the western Mediterranean. The French fleet has the task of resisting the united fleets of Austria and Italy and securing the connection between France and its North African possessions at all costs. The bulk of the French fleet has been concentrated in the Mediterranean, and the protection of the Atlantic coast of France, and of the Channel, has been handed over to the English fleet. On the

northern coast France retains a few flotillas for coast defence.

The French programme of naval construction should be completed by 1919. At present France has a fleet of considerable strength, the efficiency of which has been greatly increased by the present Minister and his predecessor. On the 15th May, 1912, were ready twenty-two battleships, of which six were Dreadnoughts, and only one was obsolete; twenty-two battle cruisers (one obsolete); three obsolete battleships for coast defence; fourteen protected cruisers (four obsolete); seventy-five large torpedo boats (six obsolete); a hundred and seventy-three small and mostly obsolete torpedo boats, and sixty-nine submarines, of which thirty-one were obsolete. Ready for immediate service and fully manned are fourteen battleships and armoured cruisers, nine protected cruisers, forty-nine large and thirty-seven small torpedo boats and sixty-two submarines. Of the other ships eight battleships, five armoured cruisers, one coast defence battleship, two protected cruisers, and nine large and forty-eight small torpedo boats have nucleus crews.

To Germany the Russian Baltic fleet is more

important than the French Mediterranean fleet, because the former threatens Germany's coast, and forces us to divide our fleet at least temporarily.

Russia's Baltic fleet consists at the moment of five battleships (one obsolete), six armoured cruisers, of which two are large ones, six protected cruisers, seventy-eight large torpedo boats (eighteen obsolete), fifteen small and obsolete torpedo boats and twenty-five submarines. All these ships are fully manned and ready for immediate action, except one battleship, one armoured cruiser, three protected cruisers, and eight large and seven small torpedo boats, which have nucleus crews. The Russian Baltic fleet is at present not very important, but it will be increased in 1914 by four Dreadnoughts which are completing, and by 1917 eight Dreadnoughts and eight battle cruisers of the most recent construction are to be ready.

If we look to our allies we find that Italy has fourteen battleships, of which five are obsolete, ten armoured cruisers (one obsolete), eight protected cruisers (one obsolete), fifty-eight large torpedo boats (seven obsolete), fifty small torpedo boats (thirty-one obsolete), and thirteen sub-

marines (one obsolete). In the course of 1912 the first Dreadnought and three small cruisers are to join the fleet. Seven modern battleships are building, and of these two are to be ready in 1913. It cannot be doubted that Italy will strive to strengthen her fleet very greatly in order to be able to hold her own against the French fleet in the Mediterranean. Austria has twelve battleships, three armoured cruisers, six protected cruisers (two obsolete), eighteen large torpedo boats (six obsolete), sixty small torpedo boats (twenty-four obsolete), and six submarines. Of these six battleships, two armoured cruisers, four protected cruisers, ten large and thirty-three small torpedo boats and the submarines are fully manned. Four Dreadnoughts are building, and one of these is to join the fleet in 1912.

At present the French fleet is superior to the combined Austrian and Italian fleets, especially if it is reinforced by the English Mediterranean squadron. However, in the course of the next few years the position of Austria and Italy will become much more favourable, for then they will possess a considerable number of Dreadnoughts. When Taranto has been converted into a naval base, as is intended, the co-operation of the two

fleets will become much easier. At any rate, Austria and Italy will not occupy as difficult a position as will Germany in the Baltic and North Sea.

Apart from her obsolete and militarily valueless ships, Germany had on the 15th May, 1912, twenty-eight battleships, of which eight were Dreadnoughts, eleven armoured cruisers, among which there were two Dreadnoughts, three coast defence battleships, thirty-four protected cruisers, a hundred and twenty large torpedo boats, sixteen submarines and seventy obsolete small, and eleven large obsolete torpedo boats, which still have some value. There were building nine battleships, four battle cruisers, seven protected cruisers, twelve large torpedo boats, and a number of submarines. Of these the battleships "Kaiser," "Friedrich der Grosse," the large cruiser "Goeben," and the small cruisers "Magdeburg," "Stralsund," and "Strasburg," are to join the fleet in 1912, the battleships "Kaiserin," "König Albert" and "Prince Regent Luitpold," the battle cruiser "Seidlitz," and the small cruisers "Ersatz Seeadler" and "Ersatz Geyer" are to join the fleet in 1913. Hence the German fleet should dispose in 1913

of thirteen Dreadnought battleships and four Dreadnought cruisers, and approximate the strength provided by the Navy Law. According to the Novelle of 1912, the German fleet is to comprise forty-one battleships, twelve large and thirty small ships, which are to form the battle fleet, and eight large and ten small cruisers for service in foreign seas. Three squadrons of eight battleships and a flagship with eight large and eighteen small cruisers form the active battle fleet. The reserve fleet is composed of two squadrons of battleships, four large and twelve small cruisers. All the ships of the active fleet are permanently ready for service, and so is one-fourth of the reserve fleet. Hitherto two squadrons formed the active fleet, and two the reserve fleet, each being provided with a flag ship. All the ships of the active fleet were to be constantly kept ready for service, and only one-half of the reserve fleet. Besides a reserve of four battleships and of large and small cruisers had been provided, but this reserve has been dropped by the Novelle.

If we now compare the numbers and power of the German and English warships it appears that England possesses an overwhelming superiority.

consequently it is difficult to understand that the naval authorities have been contented with the small provisions of the last Navy Law, especially as the German nation was undoubtedly ready to vote the funds necessary for navy and army.

It cannot be denied that the war readiness of the fleet will be greatly increased by the formation of a third squadron. In 1914 there will always be ready for immediate service twenty-five German battleships and eight large and eighteen small cruisers. Our war readiness will be considerably increased by the submarines which, in accordance with the last Navy Law, are to be increased to seventy-two. However, it must not be overlooked that the improvements made really add to the strength of the fleet only three battleships and two small cruisers. The formation of the third squadron has been made possible by dropping the reserve of four battleships and of large and small cruisers, and by diminishing the number of men of the reserve fleet. Thus a diminution of the war readiness has been effected. No acceleration of naval construction has been brought about. The third squadron will be formed only in 1914, and the cruiser fleet will remain in the sad state as regards

THE GERMAN NAVY IS TOO WEAK

armoured cruisers in which it is at present. Some of our large cruisers are not up to date, and can, therefore, not act efficiently.

The new navy law creates a superior war readiness immediately on the outbreak of war, but it fails to reinforce sufficiently our naval power. Besides, notwithstanding the measures taken, the war readiness of the fleet remains very greatly diminished at the moment when the reservists of the fleet are sent home. This might be provided against by increasing very greatly the number of men in the reserve fleet, of whom part should join the active fleet when the latter dismisses the time-expired men. In other words, we can increase the war readiness of the active fleet only at the cost of the reserves. The neglect of providing a reserve of ships is dangerous. In war we shall have to reckon with heavy losses of ships, while part of the men on the lost ships will be saved. Hence the reserve ships could be manned from the crews of the lost ships. If there are no reserve ships, the active fleet shrinks in war, and the shrinkage cannot be replaced.

The new navy law seems to me only a stop-gap. It is not easy to understand why the naval authorities did not ask for more. I believe the

formation of a third squadron should go hand in hand with an acceleration of construction, the building of the absolutely necessary battle cruisers, the gradual creation of a reserve of new ships, and the increase of the men on the reserve fleet, so that we can immediately replace the time-expired men of the first fleet from these reserves. In view of the danger of the position, an acceleration of naval construction should immediately take place. It is doubtful whether such acceleration can be effected without its becoming publicly known. We must not be influenced by the question of expenditure. The German nation is rich enough to provide all that is needed.

Not only money, but time also, is required to complete Germany's naval armaments. To meet successfully the aggressor we must rely in the main upon a strategic defence, making use of our powerful coast defences and our excellent internal communications. Not only Kiel and Wilhelmshaven must be safe against any attack. The line of islands, Sylt-Heligoland-Wangeroog-Borkum, must be so strongly fortified as to be impregnable. Between the North Sea and the Baltic the Kiel Canal creates a connection which

allows us to appear unexpectedly in either sea. It is absolutely necessary that the Kiel Canal should be completed as rapidly as possible, and that all the gaps in our coast defences be filled without delay. Our naval bases should be made absolutely impregnable, and artillery and sea-mines should be prepared for use at a moment's notice. At any moment, when the English fleet may endeavour to fall on us by surprise, we should be ready.

Those who constantly recommend harmony among the Great Powers, and who dwell so much on the necessity of peace, may find my demands exaggerated. However, it cannot be too strongly pointed out that appearances are deceptive, that diplomacy can never abolish the great differences among the nations, and cannot prevent their natural development. With elementary necessity things are drifting towards a violent solution of the tremendous tension in Europe which has been created by the inner unsoundness and impossibility of its present state. And we can weather the storm only if we meet it with our entire strength.

CHAPTER IX.

Can Germany Hope for Victory?

IF one considers the superior number and power of our enemies, one might think that resistance against them would be hopeless. This is not the case. We have to bear in mind that Germany's enemies will scarcely be able to act against us at the same time. Only a simultaneous attack by them would have the greatest effect.

The French army can be rapidly mobilised, but the Russian only slowly. The long distances of Russia and the inferiority of her railway system make the concentration of large masses of troops a very protracted process. While Russia is collecting her masses, we have only one enemy to fight, and we must make the best use of our opportunity.

It seems very doubtful whether the English Expeditionary Corps will be sent at once to the

WHAT WILL THE ENGLISH ARMY DO?

Continent. Perhaps the English will prefer to keep it at home until the war on land has been decided in France's favour. It has to be borne in mind that the 150,000 men England disposes of are the only reserve of her troops stationed in the colonies. Therefore it is dangerous for England to send her Expeditionary Force to the Continent before the issue of the Continental struggle has become apparent. If the Franco-British forces should be defeated, the United Kingdom might conceivably experience very serious difficulties in the colonies.

While the participation of the English Army appears doubtful, it is clear that Germany's military strength would receive some support if England or France should violate the Belgian, Dutch or Danish neutrality by sea or by land. At least Holland would join Germany in such a case.

The fact that Germany can operate on inner lines is an additional advantage. We can, with a comparatively small number of troops, defend Germany in one direction and attack with the bulk of the army in the other direction. If we succeed in decisively defeating one enemy, the victorious army can turn upon the other who has

only been masked by our troops. Circumstances will decide whether we shall attack in the first instance France or Russia.

Germany's western frontier is exceedingly favourable for defence. Here a weak army can hold its own during a long time and inflict heavy losses upon the enemy. If the aggressor should endeavour to avoid the powerful Rhine front by marching through Belgium or through Switzerland, he would raise further enemies against himself, and thus strengthen Germany. The Swiss army, when fighting in its mountains, cannot easily be defeated. On the other hand, the Belgians would be of inferior military value to Germany, because of their French sympathies.

The Russian frontier lies dangerously near Berlin, the centre of Germany's power. The German eastern frontier is ill adapted to a stubborn defence. Here the greater danger threatens us. Hence an attack on Russia is very tempting, especially as a German attack upon eastern France is made difficult by the French frontier fortresses. If the Russian army concentrates near the German frontier it can easily be reached, and might be defeated before its concentration has been completed. But if Russia assembles

THE GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

her troops farther in the rear, as seems likely, much time would be lost in attacking them in the interior, and even in the event of a victory, the transportation westward against France would be difficult and slow, in view of the inferiority of the Russian railway system. Besides, it must be remembered that France is certainly our most important and our most determined enemy. A German victory over the French would have a greater effect upon the Russian Government than a German victory over the Russian would have upon France. The latter would only increase the energy of the French, while a French defeat would cool Russia's ardour.

Circumstances will decide whether the attack will be directed against the one or the other Power. At any rate, it is necessary that our army is so strong that it is certain to defeat one of the opponents before the other can act with effect. This shows the necessity of increasing Germany's armed strength to the utmost.

Germany's position can be greatly improved by her allies. It would be desirable that, in case of war, Italy and Austria would immediately act on the offensive. It seems necessary to make ar-

rangements with this end in view. This is particularly necessary if Germany should at first act on the defensive in the East. In that case the Austrian offensive against Russia, carried out in the most decisive manner, would be of the greatest value. We should, in that case, have to assist our ally by an active defence carried out in the enemy's country. It should be Italy's task to divert as large a part as possible of the hostile forces by an attack. It would materially assist if the attitude of the Balkan States would induce Russia to place considerable forces on the Roumanian frontier.

The military position is by no means as unfavourable to Germany as, in view of the numerical factor, it appears at first sight. It is even more favourable if we compare the mental and moral qualities of the army leaders on both sides. It is a mistake to underestimate one's opponents. Such underestimation led to France's defeat in 1870 and England's in the Boer war. It is still more inadvisable to overestimate them. That lames one's energy. Kuropatkin lost more than once the victory which was in his grasp by overestimating the Japanese. We must, therefore, strive to gauge without prejudice our enemy's

THE GERMAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN

power and our own. Hence we must recognise in the French opponents of equal value. That is confirmed by all one hears about their army. In view of the patriotism and self-sacrifice with which the French people have striven for many years to improve their army, it would be incredible if the results should not correspond with the exertions made. We must calculate with the fact that the French have a first-rate army, and that Germany can only be victorious if we can defeat the French under all circumstances. Germany's armaments must correspond with this demand. In my opinion they are as yet insufficient.

At least, at present, the Russian army is inferior to the French. The Russian soldier has always been an excellent fighter. However, the Russian army has during the last war shown so great a lack of initiative and intelligence, and such inferiority in tactics, that one cannot assume that matters have much changed since then. During her last wars Russia has produced no talented soldier except perhaps Skobelev. Incapacity among the officers was general and hopeless. Again and ever again victory was left to an inferior enemy without necessity. The Russo-Turkish and the Russo-Japanese wars have

proved that the Russian army can be defeated by smaller numbers. Still, it would be dangerous to exaggerate Russia's inferior capacity.

The Boer war has shown what the English can do. They have not been able to defeat the South African peasant militia, in spite of their enormous superiority. They have borne great losses only when they could not get away. After all, the army is composed, not of the flower of the nation, but, for the largest part, of inferior elements. The officers in command also showed nearly everywhere that they lack the true military spirit and do not recognise the importance of personal initiative. Even the much-praised Lord Roberts has achieved only successes in manœuvring, but never a victory. It is difficult to say whether, since then, the English army has made any important progress. Opinions differ, and I personally cannot express one. Still, it will be advisable not to underestimate the capacity of the English, because of the experience of the Boer war. If they should act on the Continent they would, after all, be a considerable reinforcement to the French. On the other hand, an English Expeditionary Army would be, so to say, a tangible security which we could keep in our hands,

WHAT IS THE ENGLISH ARMY WORTH?

if taken, in order to enforce peace. Still, this fact can hardly be considered as a military advantage.

Although, in the case of Germany's enemies, numerical and actual superiority do not go hand in hand, Germany's moral superiority might not suffice as a counterweight to her enemies' superior numbers. The Austrian army must be considered to be equal in quality to any other army, and the Italian troops, especially those from the North, should give satisfaction. However, it is difficult for the Italians to act with effect, and an Austrian army attacking Russia has to overcome vast distances and great difficulties before bringing about a decision. Germany will, therefore, at least at the commencement of war, have to bear the principal burden in the West and the East, and she will be successful only if she acts with her whole national power and increases without delay her armaments to the utmost.

If we wait until our enemies are able to strike with their united force, or until our allies and friends are prevented from assisting us with energy, we must reckon with the possibility of

a defeat, and then we shall experience heavy and terrible times.

Now let us look at the naval position. We have seen that the united Austro-Italian fleet will find it difficult to resist, especially if the English should send a number of powerful modern battle cruisers to the Mediterranean, as appears to be probable. The greatest possibility of success for Italy and Austria lies in fighting the hostile naval forces separately. In the Mediterranean France's interests lie chiefly in the West and England's in the East, between Malta and Egypt. The united Austro-Italian fleet might utilise this position stationed in the Ionian Sea.

In case of a naval struggle, England's superiority over Germany is so great that, if the fleets of both nations are equally ready for war, and are equally well concentrated, a German attack would lead to certain defeat. We can find salvation only by acting on the defensive. Unless Germany's naval concentration has been effected before England is ready, we must first keep our fleet in the background and endeavour to weaken our opponent and to tire him out by forcing him, if he wishes to fight us, to blockade the German ports, to divide his forces, and to expose himself

to loss from our coast batteries. If the English fleet exposes itself for a moment, we must immediately attack it by surprise and endeavour to whittle it down by inflicting upon it losses here and there, without ever allowing ourselves to be drawn into a struggle with superior forces. It may be considered probable that if we act in this way it should be possible that Germany will not only be able to maintain herself against England's naval superiority, but that, in course of time, the two fleets will become approximately equal. Then a moment may arrive when we can challenge England to naval battle.

The English fleet must certainly be considered to be an extremely powerful opponent. It has to preserve the glory of a great past, and its training is founded upon century-old experience. However, it has its defects. Already now it is very difficult to find the necessary men, and especially the technical ratings. Hence a limit has been set to its enlargement, unless universal and compulsory service should be introduced. The German artillery is at least equal, and probably superior, to the English, and the same is the case with regard to the torpedo arm. Besides, the latest English ships have not come up to expecta-

tions, and some have shown grave defects. This applies particularly to the ships "Orion" and "Lion." But also the first Dreadnoughts are defective.

I think that England can absolutely defeat Germany only if she should succeed in attacking the German bases, especially Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, from the land side. That possibility has to be reckoned with. Hence we must sufficiently fortify both towards the land. The existing fortifications are no longer adequate.

It is obvious that England will find it extremely difficult to obtain a decisive victory over Germany on the sea. On the other hand, it might be impossible for Germany to compel England by force of arms to make peace. Peace could only be obtained by our securing a crushing and destructive victory over England's allies, particularly over France. Besides, England would probably be inclined to make peace if, in the course of the war, risings and revolts were to take place in her colonies, which would threaten England's position throughout the world. It may be considered a fact that in India, in Egypt and in South Africa there exists sufficient inflammable material.

While we cannot act on the offensive in the North Sea, but must fight England indirectly, the position is entirely different in the Baltic. There the offensive is advisable for two reasons. Firstly, we must dominate the Baltic at any price, in order to be able to keep open the sally ports leading through the Danish Archipelago, and the important route to Sweden. Secondly, in order to fulfil this purpose, we must defeat, if possible, the Russian fleet, which might dispute our position and threaten the Baltic coast and Kiel. At present it seems easy to defeat Russia by sea, but soon it will be more difficult, as her navy will be considerably strengthened in 1914. This is a factor with which we have to reckon in our political calculations, for we must, under all circumstances, be secure against an attack in the rear by Russia, if we wish to fight the English with success in the North Sea. Of course it would be desirable, if we could operate in the Baltic in agreement with Denmark and in alliance with Sweden. If this is not possible, matters will be very difficult for Germany. Therefore it is very advisable to regulate in advance by diplomatic means the relations between Germany, Denmark and Sweden.

The importance of the Kiel Canal is quite obvious. We cannot permanently divide our naval forces between the North Sea and the Baltic. If we did, we should be too weak in either. We must be able to unite our fleet in either basin and act with surprise. To further strengthen our position, it would be important to construct a canal between the Elbe, Weser and Ems in connection with Wilhelmshaven. Then all the sally ports of the German fleet would be interconnected, and surprise more easy than at present. Unfortunately it is now too late for this step. Therefore we must accelerate and complete our naval armaments and make up for their insufficiency by energy in warfare. On sea and on land success is based on resolution and daring. That we are able to achieve success in this manner needs no proof. A hesitating and vacillating policy will not know how to use the armed forces of the nation in time with energy and to good purpose, and rarely will the soldiers be able to make good the mistakes of the statesman. *Policy and warfare must both be conducted by the identical principle of initiative and daring. Only then shall we be successful.*

CHAPTER X.

Political Readiness for War

IN studying the political history of States one finds that the greatest successes have been obtained whenever an active policy, following a distinct aim, has unceasingly endeavoured to utilise the political position of the world to its advantage, and has in all enterprises only calculated with the factor of force, disregarding every law except that of its own advantage. Whenever success was hoped for by following a vague waiting policy, or when the policy of the State was influenced by the sentimental peace dreams of their statesmen, the national policy was nearly always barren of success or led to perdition. It lies in the nature of things that this should be so. A firm will and energetic action guarantee one's moral superiority over one's opponents and lame their resolution. Besides, the statesman who is

given to observation and inactivity leaves the field free to his competitors. As he can only rarely unravel their plans, he cannot foil them, and he must limit himself to a policy of defence, although he is ignorant where and how he will be attacked. Thus he will always be at a disadvantage, and before long he will find himself pushed aside and will be treated without consideration.

Foreign policy is a struggle of opposing interests, and he who abandons the initiative will soon lose every favourable position and see himself surrounded by his enemies. France and England show the advantages enjoyed by an active, expansive and never-satisfied policy. France has founded an enormous colonial empire, and has known how to make all elements hostile to Germany subservient to her policy. Thus a nation of 40,000,000 people, defeated by Germany, dares to-day to prescribe limits to our expansion. England is unceasingly occupied in strengthening her position throughout the world and in laying the foundations of a new Colonial Empire in case she cannot preserve her present possessions. She strives at the same time to keep down all the States which might become danger-

ous to her in the future. The domination of the world by England and the United States, acting in unison, seems to be the ultimate aim of the grandiose world-wide and hitherto successful policy which has made that country the arbiter of the Old World. The action of these States should be a model to Germany, and our own past should warn us against the policy of drift and self-denial. We must clearly and distinctly follow that aim which is necessary for our future development, and we must strive towards our goal in unceasing political activity.

I have shown in these pages the aims which we should strive for. We must now look into the means by which we can attain them. Let us, therefore, briefly sum up the leading ideas which should guide Germany's foreign policy:

We can secure Germany's position on the Continent of Europe only if we succeed in smashing the Triple Entente, in humiliating France, and giving her that position to which she is entitled, as we cannot arrive at an agreement for mutual co-operation with her.

We can enlarge our political power by joining to Germany those middle-European States which are at present independent, forming a Central

European Union which should be concluded, not merely for the purpose of defence, but which should have the purpose of defence and offence, for promoting the interests of all its members. This object can, in all probability, be realised only after a victorious war, which establishes for all time confidence in Germany's power, and makes it impossible for Germany's enemies to oppose our aims by force.

We can enlarge our colonial possessions and acquire a sufficiency of colonies fit for the settlement of white men. Much may be done by peaceful means. At the same time, it is clear that England will undoubtedly oppose all colonial acquisitions of Germany which will really increase our power, and that she will, with all the means at her disposal, endeavour to prevent us acquiring coaling stations and naval bases abroad. Colonies fit for the settlement of white men will in any case not be obtainable without war with other States.

Wherever we look everywhere the road leading to the accomplishment of our purposes by peaceful means is barred. Everywhere we are placed before the choice either to abandon our aims or to fight for the accomplishment of our purpose.

An understanding with England would, of course, promote our aims and would diminish the necessity of war. However, such an understanding can, as has been shown, not be reckoned with. England's hostility to Germany is founded upon the political system of that country, and we only do harm to our most important interests if we strive to bring about an understanding with that country.

Exactly as Bismarck clearly recognised in his time that the healthy development of Prussia and of Germany was possible only after a final settlement between Austria and Prussia, every unprejudiced man must to-day have arrived at the conviction that Germany's further development as a World-Power is possible only after a final settlement with England. Exactly as a cordial alliance between Germany and Austria was only possible after Austria's defeat in 1866, we shall arrive at an understanding with England, which is desirable from every point of view, only after we have crossed swords with her. As long as Germany does not consider this necessity as a leading factor in her foreign policy we shall be condemned to failure in all important matters of foreign policy.

Of course we need not proclaim these views to all the world for the benefit of our opponents. We may even earnestly endeavour to work for our purposes by peaceful means. However, we must never allow ourselves to enter upon a course which hampers our ultimate aim, and we must unceasingly keep before our eyes our true purpose. We must, therefore, politically and militarily, prepare ourselves for the struggle which is probably unavoidable. Then only can we hope for success.

The first requirement of this policy is to strengthen and complete our armed force as quickly as possible. The second is to gain the confidence of the people and to do nothing that can diminish it, so that at the decisive moment the Government will find the firmest support among the people. Then it can meet the danger unflinchingly. In the present time, when all wars are national wars, it is particularly important that the soul of the people should be stirred to its depths. It is further necessary to secure, in the case of war, the co-operation of those States the interests of which coincide with our own. Lastly, we Germans must take the fatal decision by our own free will, and not allow our opponents to force war

GERMANY MUST BEGIN THE WAR

upon us. Only then can foreign policy create a favourable situation for war. German policy must be ready for immediate action if it wishes to fulfil the needs of the time.

If we look around among the States of Europe we see that France, England and Russia have allied themselves with the object of keeping Germany down. However, the objects of each of these States are at variance. Russia has apparently no intention to attack us, and wishes only to prevent Germany's further expansion. France, on the other hand, desires a war of revenge, in order to regain Alsace-Lorraine. England wishes to destroy our fleet and to prevent us increasing our colonial possessions. These three Powers pursue opposing aims in many parts of the world, especially in the Balkan Peninsula and in Asia. Their only connecting link is hostility to Germany, which unites them. They are opposed, in the first instance, by Germany and Austria. Although between Germany and Austria there is only a defensive alliance, they must always support one another. Their interests collide nowhere. Advantages and dangers affect both in the same way. The two are allied with Italy. Italy's true interests point to the Triple Alliance,

and she seems inclined to remain in it. The Powers of the Triple Entente have, however, not without success, endeavoured to entice her from her allies by the promise of advantages. Thus the young kingdom has been seduced into following a separate policy in accord with France and England without considering the interests of the Triple Alliance, and the consequence is that Italy finds herself to-day in a very difficult position. Italy has much diminished the confidence that she would faithfully abide by the treaty of alliance, and has weakened her military position in case of war by the conquest of Tripoli, the possession of which impedes her military action. In the Balkan Peninsula also the Austrian and Italian interests are to a certain extent opposed, although lately these differences have been adjusted.

Belgium and the Slavonic Balkan States are likely to incline towards Germany's enemies. Switzerland is honestly neutral, and will fight whoever attacks her. Holland is in a difficult position. If she fights on Germany's side she risks losing her colonies to England, who has looked upon them with envy for a long time. If she supports the Triple Entente her position on

WHICH STATES WILL HELP GERMANY?

land is endangered by Germany. Circumstances will dictate her attitude. Sweden will probably maintain her neutrality, but her interests are opposed to those of Russia. Denmark's position resembles that of the Netherlands. She is threatened at sea by England and Russia, and by land and sea by Germany. Her position is all the more difficult as, in view of the strategical importance of the Danish Straits, the maintenance of her neutrality seems impossible. Roumania has the strongest interest in joining the Triple Alliance, in order to preserve her independence between Bulgaria and the enormous power of Russia. Lastly, the attitude of Turkey is of decisive importance to the combatants.

Turkey's interests are diametrically opposed to those of the Slavonic Balkan States. Apart from Russia, the Balkan States are Turkey's principal enemy. Turkey must also be on her guard against England, because, although England does not wish Constantinople to fall into Russia's hands, she strives after domination in Arabia and Syria, in order to secure the Suez Canal against attack. Besides, she endeavours to undermine the religious position of the Sultan as the head of

Mahommetanism in order to free her Mahommetan subjects from the Sultan's influence.

Japan is at present bound to England through financial considerations. As the Japanese have concluded a temporary agreement with Russia, we must reckon with the fact that in case of a European war Japan will strive to obtain a footing in Northern China.

The United States are politically independent. However, there are conflicting interests between them and England. The United States are England's most dangerous competitor in commerce, especially in Eastern Asia, and the United States are not willing to bear England's naval supremacy. Canada also is a point of friction between the two countries. On the other hand, no important differences divide Germany and the United States. Of course a peaceful division of the world between England and the United States is thinkable. However, there are at present no indications pointing that way. On the contrary, the enormous increase in power which would accrue to England, should she defeat Germany, would be opposed to America's interests. It follows that co-operation of the United States and Germany is in the interest of both States.

AMERICA SHOULD ATTACK ENGLAND

It is also worth noting that much inflammable material smoulders in the English colonies, in India, South Africa, and Egypt. Hence risings and national revolts are by no means impossible in case England should be involved in an unfortunate or dangerous war. These are factors with which we have to calculate, and which we must utilise to our advantage. That is our duty.

The interests which divide the Powers composing the Triple Entente enable us, no doubt, to hamper their co-operation, or to make it impossible. A rapprochement between Germany and the United States would undoubtedly strengthen our political position.

We must further endeavour to promote Italy's policy of expansion in the Mediterranean, in order to attach that kingdom firmly to the Triple Alliance, and to divert its gaze from the Balkan Peninsula. We must induce Italy to aim at the acquisition of Tunis. We must endeavour to arrive at an understanding with Holland and Denmark in case of war, and to maintain the best relations with Sweden and Switzerland.

Germany's relations with Turkey and Roumania are of particular importance to us. Both States may be made a counterpoise against Rus-

sia. Besides, Turkey is the only State that is able to threaten seriously England's position by land, for she can strike at the Suez Canal, and thus cut through one of the vital nerves of the British Empire. Besides, the continued existence of a powerful Turkey is of the greatest importance to Germany, because, in case of war, the route through Turkey would probably be the only one over which we could freely draw food and the raw materials required by our industry. The sea would be closed to us in the North by England, and in the Mediterranean by England and France. Therefore we must never tolerate that European Turkey falls under Russian, which means hostile, influence. This would probably be the case if the Balkan States should expand to the *Ægean*. It follows, furthermore, that the military power of Turkey must remain undiminished if that State is to be of any real use to Germany. An enfeebled Turkey would not be able to oppose successfully the Slavonic influences in the Balkan Peninsula and to keep herself free from Russian and English influence.

Our position is such that we cannot regard without concern the weakening of the States friendly to Germany. The numerical superiority

TURKEY SHOULD STRIKE AT EGYPT

of our opponents is so great that we cannot tolerate such an event. It would be a very serious mistake of our policy to remain neutral if the position of our allies and friends should seriously be endangered. If Austria and Russia should come to blows, Germany cannot act as a spectator, for her ally, having to oppose superior forces, may be defeated. We must therefore immediately come to Austria's help, even if such a step should lead to a great European war, which, after all, is unavoidable.

The same considerations apply to Turkey. If the Turks are defeated, if Roumania is made powerless before the great European war has broken out, the position of the Triple Alliance will be greatly weakened. Such weakening might be of decisive importance for the issue of the war, especially if Turkey and Roumania should join our opponents. It would be a dangerous illusion to believe that paper guarantees will preserve Turkey in its present limit, even if such guarantees are signed by all the Great Powers.

Russia would not be able to act upon such a guarantee if her Slavonic brethren in Turkey should be defeated, while an attempt on Austria's part to take away the fruits of war from the vic-

torious Balkan States would immediately lead to a great European war under conditions eminently unfavourable to Germany and Austria-Hungary, because Austria's forces would be tied up in the Balkans. It is in the strongest interest of the Triple Alliance to avoid that possibility. If it should come to war in the Balkans, it would be in Germany's interest to fight for the preservation of Turkey.

A policy which is ready to act is demanded in the interest of self-preservation and of political wisdom. It would be very dangerous to follow a waiting policy. That is seen from our own history. We need only think of the position in 1805. Russia and Austria were then at war with France, and endeavoured to obtain Prussia's support. The thoughtful were convinced that a war between Prussia and Napoleonic France was inevitable. Only the Government closed its eyes, remained neutral for the sake of peace, and looked on when Russia and Austria were defeated. It was to be foreseen that isolated Prussia would in turn be attacked by the conqueror. Her hesitation brought about her downfall. Let our experience be a warning to us.

Let us not wait again until our allies are de-

feated and we are placed before the choice either of fighting alone or of ingloriously giving way. Not only army and navy, but our foreign policy also, must be ready for immediate action. Our statesmen must unceasingly labour to improve the conditions for the approaching struggle. They may co-operate meanwhile with other Great Powers for particular purposes, but they must constantly bear in mind that an understanding with the Powers of the Triple Entente can only be a strictly limited one. Therefore Germany's statesmen must be determined to take to arms as soon as our interests are seriously threatened. The responsibility of bringing about a necessary war under favourable circumstances is much smaller than the responsibility of making an unfortunate war inevitable by following a policy of present advantage, or by lacking the necessary resolution.

CHAPTER XI.

On the German People and its Government

I HAVE endeavoured to prove in these pages that it is impossible to obtain for Germany a position which corresponds to the importance and the justified pretensions of the German people as long as the present grouping of the Powers continues. I have shown that German policy has the task of bursting the Triple Entente, of establishing on an unshakable basis Germany's power in Europe and of acquiring the necessary colonies.

I have endeavoured to depict the dangers which we have to overcome, and I have shown at the same time that we must renounce our hope for Germany's further progress and for our future as a civilised nation if we are satisfied with the cramped position in which we find ourselves. I have also shown that we may reach the goal by

GERMANY MUST STRIKE QUICKLY

acting with determination, boldness and self-sacrifice, and that we must reach it if we wish to be worthy of the name of Germans. We need not fear the number of our enemies if we call *our whole population* to arms and are willing to spend all the money required.

If we succeed in preventing the co-operation of our enemies, and in defeating them singly by daring attacks, we are entitled to hope for victory. Besides, as the interests of our opponents are opposed in many directions, we may bring about a position which enables us to challenge them under conditions not too unfavourable to Germany. If we maintain an attitude of inactivity and drift, Germany's position will become more and more unfavourable, and will require ever greater sacrifices. It is the duty of the Government to shape the policy of the Empire in the direction outlined. It must demand an increase in armaments. It must drive a wedge between our opponents, it must support our allies with the greatest energy and strengthen their faith in our power and determination. It must select the moment for striking when all peaceful means have failed. It must be the author of the historic deed which will free the Fatherland and

lead it from its present dangerous position to the heights.

The task of the people will be as important as that of the Government. A determined and daring policy is possible only if it is supported by the great majority of the people, in a spirit of patriotism and with the joy of self-sacrifice. Such a spirit was raised in Germany in 1911 through the Morocco crisis; and in spring 1912 the people and the Reichstag were willing to make the greatest sacrifices. It is not clear why the Government did not place itself at the head of the nation which demanded action. An inquiry into the reasons, however, seems undesirable on political grounds.

Lately the political situation has changed to Germany's disadvantage, and the insecurity and danger of the position have become accentuated. In the tremendous crisis through which we are passing nothing can be more pernicious than a misunderstanding between the German nation and its Government. Unity and mutual confidence are absolutely necessary, and therefore I consider it the foremost duty of every patriotic German to express with all the means at his disposal the opinion in Parliament and in the

THE PEOPLE MUST CLAMOUR FOR WAR

Press that only an enterprising policy pursuing the highest aims can promote Germany's truest interests and safeguard her future. Again, and ever again, must the people declare their willingness of self-sacrifice and demand an increase in armaments, which alone can secure victory. Again, and ever again, the Government must be told that it can reckon upon the utmost exertions of the nation if it opens to Germany a path to a great future. The Government has the duty of initiating action, and the people the duty to prove spontaneously their will to power. They must urge the Government on and inflame among Germany's leaders that confidence and that resolution which lead to great deeds. Only when every single German does his duty, not only in battle, but also in civil life, can we obtain the palm of victory.

CHAPTER XII.

POST SCRIPTUM

The Political Situation of the Moment

THE foregoing pages were written before the decision had fallen in the war between Turkey and the Balkan States. There was still hope that Austria and Roumania would actively interfere either in order to prevent the struggle or at least with a view to saving Turkey from a great defeat. When I was writing this book it could not be foreseen how little Turkey was prepared for war, how much her strategical concentration had been neglected, and how pernicious the influence of the Young Turks had been upon the formerly so excellent Turkish Army. Before the outbreak of war it seemed probable that it would lead to a protracted struggle and an indecisive result, and that in the end the will of the Great Powers chiefly interested in the Balkan Peninsula would exercise a decisive influence. In view of these

anticipations, it was justifiable to consider the armed strength of Turkey as an efficient factor in European politics.

Since then the position in the Balkan Peninsula has completely changed. The Turks have suffered a crushing defeat, and none of the European Powers have come to their aid. It is true that Italy has indirectly aided the Turks by concluding peace with them. On the other hand, the Powers of the Triple Alliance have helped to a certain extent in bringing about Turkey's defeat. By endeavouring to preserve the peace in the Balkans, working hand in hand with the Triple Entente, the Powers of the Triple Alliance have caused Turkey to delay her mobilisation in the vain expectation that peace would really be maintained. The attitude of Turkey cannot be excused by the recommendations of the Great Powers. Still, the fact remains that the Powers of the Triple Alliance encouraged Turkey in her carelessness instead of encouraging her to energetic warlike measures.

A terrible awakening has taken place. The Great Powers did not for a moment think of enforcing their peace programme. The States of the Triple Alliance could not find the necessary

energy actively to defend their interests, while the Triple Entente desired to see Turkey weakened, if not broken. To the Entente Powers the victory of the Balkan States could be only advantageous whilst it would most seriously damage the States of the Triple Alliance. The Entente Powers would certainly have been ready to interfere in case of a Turkish victory, but they did not feel called upon to work for the preservation of that State. The Triple Alliance Powers have received their lesson, and they will find it difficult, if not impossible, now to secure for themselves the advantages which they might easily have obtained had they interfered at the right moment.

Turkey has been in a state of decay for a long time. Still, it was absolutely in the interests of the Triple Alliance to delay the expulsion of the Turks from Europe until the great European war, which will decide the fate of the Central European States, has been fought. Owing to the course of events the Triple Alliance will now have to fight such a war under far less favourable conditions. Before Turkey's defeat Germany could calculate upon the co-operation of Turkey and Roumania. To-day all this has changed,

and a state of affairs has arisen which brings with it the greatest perils for Germany and her allies.

It is difficult to foresee the issue of the war. The Chatalja line has not yet been taken by the Bulgarians, and peace negotiations have commenced. Still, it is clear that Turkey cannot hope to reconquer her lost provinces, and that the partition of its European territories has commenced. However this will be effected, Austria and Roumania, and therefore the Triple Alliance, too, will lose by it. If Austria agrees to the enlargement of the Balkan States, hoping to place them under her influence, she will collide with Russia, which follows the same policy. It cannot be assumed that in a competition with Russia for the favour of the Balkan Slavs Austria will be successful. It is, of course, possible that the Balkan States, supposing they remain united, will try to shake off Russia's influence and support Austria. Still, one cannot calculate upon the lasting unity of the Balkan States, as they pursue opposing interests. Serbia will be hostile to Austria as long as several million Serbs remain under Austrian rule and desire reunion with the Serbians of the kingdom, and these will remain hos-

tile to Austria until they have obtained an outlet on the Adriatic. We must, therefore, reckon with the possibility that, in case of a great European war, the Balkan States will be found on the side of the Triple Entente, hoping to expand at Austria's expense. Thus the Triple Alliance will lose its secure route through Turkey, by which it could receive supplies in case of a war against the Entente Powers. The neutralisation of that route would be of little value in view of the insecurity of paper guarantees. Only a few days ago the Great Powers agreed to maintain the status quo in the Balkan Peninsula. To-day they indignantly repudiate that idea. They would certainly not respect the neutrality of a trade route in time of war.

It is to be anticipated that Roumania also will in future cease to be a supporter of the Triple Alliance. It is true that she marches at present with the group of Central European States in order to obtain with their aid an increase of territory at Bulgaria's expense. However, it appears more than doubtful whether she will be able to continue on the side of the Triple Alliance. Being wedged in between the powerful State of Russia and a greatly enlarged Bulgaria, Rou-

WHAT WILL ROUMANIA DO?

mania will no longer be able to pursue an independent policy. In all probability she will completely fall under Russia's influence or join the Balkan League. In either case, Roumania has nothing to hope for from the Triple Alliance, and necessity will cause her to range herself on the side of our enemies. Hence, in case of a European war, part of Austria's forces will be immobilised in the Balkans, where her troops may be supported by Italians. Possibly the Russian Black Sea fleet will join the English and French squadrons in the Mediterranean, and Germany will have to defend herself not only against the French and English armies, but also against the bulk of the Russian troops. The superiority against which we have to fight has increased, and Germany's strategical war preparations must be changed accordingly.

In consequence of the Balkan war Germany's prestige throughout the world has suffered, though without justification. Turkey's defeat is celebrated by our enemies as a German defeat. The fact that the Turkish army had Krupp guns and German instructors induces them to depreciate the German army. All England is triumphant at Turkey's defeat, which is attributed

to German military training. Besides, the English clearly recognise that the Triple Alliance has lost power by that defeat. In France similar sentiments prevail. Formerly only the French army was eager for war. Now the whole nation shares these feelings. The people are sure of victory, and armaments are secretly increased in expectation of war. In Russia the Pan-Slavists are gaining ground and are attacking Austria. Even little Belgium has found that she has a French heart, and she is jubilant at the defeat of the Turks and the lost labour of the German instructors.

The peril of a general war has come nearer. The strained relations between Austria and Serbia may lead to war. Even if the present quarrel should be settled, the Austro-Serbian differences remain. We cannot expect that the Powers of the Triple Entente will not make use of their improved position. Urged on by public opinion, they may try to enforce their will upon Germany. That would be logical and natural. Even to-day it is possible to use the Balkan question by playing upon the opposing interests of Russia and England, and so make their co-operation against Germany impossible. However, success is not

probable. Hence a wise and farseeing policy must calculate with the possibility of war. France and Russia seemed hitherto not to consider the moment favourable for striking. The unexpected events in the Balkan Peninsula have completely changed the position for them. The German Government must be on its guard.

All the pusillanimous supporters of a policy of surrender who do not wish to embark upon a real world-policy, and who desire that Germany should continue to exist in its narrow Continental confines, will, under the circumstances, certainly loudly assert that Germany has no vital interest in the Balkans, and protest against energetic action. Never dare and never strive! That is the motto of those Philistines to whom peace is the most precious good, even if the greatness and the future of the Fatherland are at stake. They will energetically point out the dangers of a war against superior forces, and demand that the Government should avoid war by its moderation, instead of preparing for it by energetic action.

These German pessimists and men of little faith must be told again and again that it is the strongest and most vital interest of Germany

that the position of Austria-Hungary in the Balkan Peninsula should remain intact, and that Italy's claims in the Mediterranean should be supported ; that notwithstanding the altered position of affairs, Germany's own advantage requires that Constantinople and as much territory in Europe as possible should remain Turkish, as long as Russia belongs to the Triple Entente ; that Germany should defend Turkey's Asiatic possessions with all means in her power, and that a " hands off " should be addressed to the French and English if they should desire to interfere with Turkey. And again, and ever again, it must be pointed out that we have no reason to be afraid of war if we act with our whole armed strength, if we do everything to be as strong as possible on the field of battle, and if we are determined to act before Germany's opponents are ready if it becomes clear to us that an honourable peace cannot be maintained.

Our enemies envy us not only our position and our world-wide trade, which increases our national wealth from year to year, and which we have conquered by two victorious wars. Exactly as they envied Frederick the Great Silesia, they desire now to crush us. It would be unworthy

of our past and of our German name if we should bow down before their hostility without a struggle. Our claim to a great position in the world may certainly lead to a war similar to the Seven Years' War. Still, we shall be as victorious as was Prussia's hero king. That is my absolute and joyous conviction. A great war will unify and elevate the people and destroy the diseases which threaten the national health. The latent forces within our armies require arousing. They will make it unconquerable in hard times. Besides, it is not yet too late to complete our armaments. In very little time the cadres and the number of horses can be increased, the machine guns procured, and the cycling battalions be raised. The Army Service Corps can be reinforced with motor vehicles. Germany's highly developed industry will satisfy the highest requirements. Besides, it is necessary, in view of the changed situation, to strengthen and modernise the fortresses on the eastern frontier. The war readiness of the German navy and the strength of the coast fortifications can very greatly be increased in a short time. A strong will can achieve all this as if by witchcraft.

Our future lies in our own hands. Small men

will talk finance and whine that we cannot afford it. We can find the necessary funds easily, in case of need, by loan. Goethe has told us that the character of a nation may be seen by the quality of its armies and law courts, and that finances are comparatively unimportant. The truth of this has been proved in the War of Liberation, when impoverished Prussia raised 200,000 soldiers and crushed Napoleon, although she had only 5,000,000 inhabitants.

In view of Germany's tremendous wealth, and in view of the fact that the future of State and nation are at stake, it seems criminal to speak of financial difficulties. Germany does not lack money. What we want is a firm will to greatness. Then only shall we obtain greatness. Everyone must do his best. All true Germans must gather round the Emperor, ready to give their blood and their treasure for the honour, the greatness, and the future of the German nation. "Through war to victory!"

Kriegsbrauch—The Customs of War

Published by the German General Staff, Berlin, 1902

Introduction

To conduct war with energy it must be made not only on the combatant forces of a hostile State and its fortresses. Equally strong endeavour must be made to destroy its entire intellectual and material resources. The claims of humanity, the sparing of human lives and of property, may be considered only in so far as the nature of war permits. Although the purpose of war allows a State which is at war to employ all means suitable for attaining its purpose, experience has taught us that it is in our own interest to limit the use of certain warlike measures and entirely to omit others. The spirit of chivalry and of Christian morality, the advance of Culture, and last but not least the recognition of one's own advantage, have led to a voluntary limitation in the means employed in time of war. . .

In the course of the nineteenth century various attempts have been made to formulate and modify the existing customs of War, to lay down laws of War binding upon all nations and armies, in other words, to create an international Law of War—a *codex belli*. However, hitherto, a few points excepted, all these attempts have failed. If, nevertheless, the words "Rights of War" are used in the following pages, it must be remembered that we are not referring to a *lex scripta* which is based upon international treaties, but only to a mutual, though not expressly covenanted, agreement of nations regulating warfare which is intended to set limits to arbitrary action, limits which have been established by custom, tradition, humanity, and calculating egoism, limits which are respected not because of the existence of some superior force controlling the action of States, but because of the "fear of reprisals" . . .

The modern customs of War are not merely founded upon the tradition of former ages and upon ancient military customs and views. They are the precipitate of the currents of modern thought. . . .

The study of the history of War will prevent

officers forming views of exaggerated humanity. It will teach them that wars cannot be conducted without certain severities ; that rightly considered true humanity lies often in their unsparing use. . . . To understand the Right of War we must study it not only from the point of view of the military historian, but we must acquaint ourselves with the fundamental views of modern international law. This is the object of the present work.

Irregular Troops—*Levée en Masse*

The prejudice against the use of irregular troops is founded on this, that the lack of a thorough military training and the absence of a severe discipline, easily induces them to perpetrate crimes and to disregard the customs of war. . . . According to International Law, no State is compelled to limit its military forces in case of war to its standing army. On the contrary, a State is perfectly justified to arm all the inhabitants able to bear arms, and to authorise them to take part in the war. Therefore, up to the most recent times, authorisation by the State has been the absolutely necessary condition of recognising irregular troops as combatants.

The organisation of irregular troops in military formations, and their control by responsible officers, does not suffice to entitle them to be treated as combatants. More important than the foregoing condition is that by their outward appearance they can easily be recognised as soldiers, and that they carry their arms openly.

Guided by the view that one can never deny to the people their natural right of defending their country, and that smaller States, possessed of inferior power, can only protect themselves by arming the people—by a *levee en masse*—the majority of authorities on International Law have demanded, in making proposals for codifying the Laws of War, that they should, on principle, be recognised as combatants.

The Means of Warfare

All means of warfare may be used without which the purpose of war cannot be achieved. On the other hand, every act of violence and destruction which is not demanded by the purpose of war must be condemned.

Among the means of warfare which are not permissible are: The use of poison against individuals and against masses of the enemy, the

poisoning of wells or of food and the spreading of infectious diseases; murder in every form; the use of arms or missiles which cause unnecessary suffering; the killing of incapacitated wounded men and of prisoners; the killing of soldiers who have laid down their arms and have surrendered themselves.

Closely connected with means of warfare which are not permissible is the employment of uncivilised and barbarian peoples in European war. Considered from the point of view of right it is evident that no State can be prohibited to employ troops taken from its non-European colonies. However, with the modern tendency to humanise warfare and to diminish the sufferings caused by war, the employment of soldiers who lack the knowledge of civilised warfare, and who consequently perpetrate cruelties and inhumanities prohibited by the customs of war cannot be reconciled. The employment of such troops is as inadmissible as is the use of poison, murder, etc. The Employment of African and Mohammedan Turcos by France in 1870 was undoubtedly a lapse from civilised into barbarous warfare, because these troops could have no understanding for European and Christian

civilisation, for the necessity of protecting property, and of safeguarding the honour of men and women.

Treatment of Prisoners of War

No measures should be taken against prisoners of war beyond keeping them under guard. They should especially not be incarcerated as if they were to be punished. They should not be fettered, and their liberty should not be unnecessarily restricted unless special reasons justify such measures or compel their adoption. The housing of prisoners of war should take place in edifices which are as healthy, clean and decent as possible. Prisoners of war should not be placed into prisons and other houses of punishment. . . . It is opposed to the Right of War that prisoners should be kept under conditions where they lack sufficient air and food, or be brutally treated, as has happened in the American Civil War in a prison of the South with regard to soldiers belonging to the North American States.

The food of prisoners of war must be sufficient and in accordance with their condition in life. . . . Prisoners of war retain their private

property, arms, horses and documents of military importance excepted.

Prisoners of war must be treated in accordance with the laws of the land in which they are kept, and in accordance with the prevailing regulations governing the treatment of the troops of the country. They must be treated like the soldiers of the State which retains them, neither worse nor better.

As regards the right of killing prisoners of war, the following opinions prevail. They may be killed :

- (1) In case they commit crimes which, according to civil or military law, are punishable with death ;
- (2) In case of resistance or flight ;
- (3) As reprisals, either against the killing of prisoners by a hostile Power, or against other transgressions of a hostile army ;
- (4) In case of pressing necessity.

Many teachers of International Law maintain that the killing of prisoners, as a form of reprisal, is inadmissible for reasons of humanity. To assert that such action is not permissible under all circumstances would, according to Professor Lueder in his book "War Rights on Land," be an erroneous conception of the im-

portance, the seriousness and the right of war, flowing from an understandable but exaggerated and unjustified feeling of humanity. It must not be overlooked that also, as regards the killing of prisoners, the necessity of the war and the security of the State must be considered in the first place, but not the idea that prisoners have to be spared at any price.

In transporting prisoners, commanders and soldiers guarding them must do everything in their power to ease their lot as much as possible, especially if they are ill or wounded. In particular, they must be protected against insults and ill-treatment on the part of an excited populace.

Sieges and Bombardments

War is conducted not only against hostile combatants, but also against the inanimate means of war possessed by the enemy. Among the latter, hostile fortresses take the first place, but war may also be made upon every town and village which hampers military action. All inhabited places may be besieged, shelled, stormed and destroyed if they are defended by the enemy

THE GERMAN CUSTOMS OF WAR

and under certain circumstances also when they are only occupied by him.

The prohibition to shell open towns and villages which are neither occupied nor defended by the enemy, has been formulated by the Hague Conference. However, that prohibition appears superfluous, as the modern history of war scarcely knows a case in which such shelling has taken place.

Ruses of War

The employment of ruses of war has been considered lawful since the most remote times. . . . However, certain ruses are not reconcilable with honest warfare, namely those which degenerate into perfidy, fraud, and the breach of the given word. . . . Among these are to be mentioned pretended surrender with the object of killing an unsuspecting opponent on his approach, the abuse of the white flag or of the Red Cross. . . . These crimes violate the most ancient principles of war. The natural sense of right possessed by all men, and the spirit of chivalry which lives in the armies of all civilised States have branded such proceedings as crimes against humanity and against Right, and, guided by

these sentiments, one refuses to recognise any longer as equals opponents which thus openly violate the laws of honour and justice. The views of military authorities with regard to these means of warfare differ in many points from those expressed by reputed teachers of International Law. Thus, the use of the enemy's uniform, the use of the enemy's flags or of neutral flags in order to deceive, is declared admissible by the majority of those who expound the theory of legitimate warfare. On the other hand, the military writers (see Boguslawski, "Der Kleine Krieg") have expressed themselves unanimously against their use, and the Hague Conference has supported their opinion by prohibiting the use of the enemy's uniform and flags, and placing their use into the same category as the abuse of the White Flag and of the Red Cross.

Professor Lueder, in his "Handbuch der Völkerrechts," writes: "The ugliness and immorality of such ruses cannot alter the fact that their recognition is admissible. The purpose and necessity of war entitle those who conduct it, and under certain circumstances make it even their duty, not to allow decisive advantages to

escape them which can be obtained by the use of these ruses."

**Customs of War Relating to the Enemy's Country:
Rights and Duties of Inhabitants**

While in past ages the laying waste of the enemy's country, the destruction of his property and even the enslaving of the inhabitants was considered a natural consequence flowing from a state of war, more recent times have introduced more lenient views. While formerly the opinion prevailed that the destruction of private property was "the principal means of warfare," and that the right to plunder private property was unlimited, to-day the opinion prevails universally that the inhabitants of a hostile country are no longer to be considered as enemies. . . . It follows that the citizens of an occupied country possess the *right*, that neither their life may be taken nor that their honour and liberty be diminished, that every case of unlawful killing of the civil population, that every malicious or careless wounding, that every insult, every disturbance of the domestic peace, every attack upon the family, upon honour, and upon morality, in short, every unlawful or criminal

attack and insult, is exactly as punishable as if it had been perpetrated against the inhabitants of one's own country. . . . On the other hand, the inhabitants of an enemy-country have naturally the duty to behave peacefully, not to take part in the war in any way, and not to harm in any manner the troops occupying their country.

The majority of writers are unanimous in condemning the forcing of the people to give information about their own army, the conduct of war, and about military secrets concerning their own country. Nevertheless, it is not always possible to do without such information. Force to obtain it will no doubt be used with regret, but the purpose of war will frequently make that step necessary.

Private Property in Time of War

As, in accordance with the views of International Law as to the right of war prevailing to-day, war is made not between private people but between States, it follows that all arbitrary devastation of the country, and every wilful destruction of private property, unless it is called for by the necessity of war, is opposed to International Law. . . . It follows:

THE GERMAN CUSTOMS OF WAR

- (1) All unnecessary devastation, destruction, arson, etc., in the enemy's country is prohibited, and soldiers guilty of such action will be punished as criminals according to law.
- (2) All destruction and damage brought about for military reasons is permissible.

The following double rule prevails: *No damage, not even the smallest, must be done unless it is done for military reasons. On the other hand, the greatest damage may be inflicted if it is demanded by the conduct of war.*

Plundering and Loot

According to modern views, the victor may appropriate, without any formalities, all movable property belonging to a hostile State. He may confiscate the monies deposited in national offices, but discrimination must be used, for the monies in communal offices are considered to be private property.

Some consider the taking of private property from a defeated combatant to be permissible. The conflict of opinions has, however, led to the rule that the taking of valuables, money, etc., from a defeated combatant is inadmissible, and

that only the taking of his military outfit is permitted.

Plunder is the worst form of taking other people's property. It consists in robbing the citizens of the country by making use of the terror of war, in abusing the superior force possessed by the military. The worst feature of the crime of plunder lies in this, that the plunderer appropriates objects of value in the presence of the frightened owner, who cannot offer any resistance, and that he takes objects which are not required by his necessity, such as food and clothing. If objects are taken from uninhabited houses, or from houses from which the owner is absent, the crime is theft, but not plunder.

Forced Requisitions and Contributions

Contributions of war are sums of money which are levied by force from the people of an occupied country. They differ in character from requisitions in kind because they do not serve an immediate requirement of the Army. Hence, requisitions in cash are only in the rarest cases justified by the necessities of war. Monetary requisitions have generated from the old

THE GERMAN CUSTOMS OF WAR

custom of ransom. In former times, the burning of towns was not undertaken against an agreed-upon payment in cash. Thus, ransom arose from the right to destroy and plunder private property. As Modern International Law no longer recognises the right to destroy and plunder, and as the maxim that wars are made upon States and not upon private individuals is no longer in doubt, it follows logically that forced contributions in money are not permissible according to present day views, because such contributions represent only an arbitrary enrichment of the victor. The victor is, in particular, not entitled to recover the cost of war by a tax upon private people, even in the event that he was forced into war by the action of the enemy. Therefore, the demand of contributions in cash is permissible only in lieu of taxation, in lieu of contributions in kind, or as a form of punishment.

The Custom of War Relating to Neutral States

The fundamental demand which neutral States should satisfy is the equal treatment of the belligerents. It follows that a neutral State may assist both belligerents provided it gives

equal assistance to either. However, as this is absolutely impossible, and as probably both parties would complain about greater favour shown to the other, experience has led to the establishment of the following principle: the basic condition of neutrality is that a neutral State gives no aid to either combatant.

The principal duties of neutral States are the following:

1. The territory of a neutral State must not be used for the conduct of war by any of the belligerents. In the Franco-German War of 1870-71, the Prussian Government complained about Luxemburg's attitude, because that country did not prevent the flight of large masses of French soldiers across Luxemburg territory after the fall of the fortress of Metz. The government of a neutral State must therefore, after a declaration of war, prohibit the troops of both belligerents to march through the country, and it must prevent the establishment of factories and workshops in its territory for providing either belligerent with warlike requirements. According to International Law, the organising of troops and the collecting of volunteers within the territory of neutral States is also permitted.

THE GERMAN CUSTOMS OF WAR

2. If a neutral State borders upon territory upon which the war is fought, its government must place sufficiently strong military forces on the frontiers in order to prevent the crossing of the frontier on the part of the armies at war which may desire to march through, to rest after a battle, or to avoid capture. Every individual belonging to the fighting armies who crosses the border of a neutral State must be disarmed and restrained from rejoining the armies during the war. Organised bodies of soldiers which cross the frontier must be treated in the same manner. They are not prisoners of war, but must be prevented from re-entering the theatre of war. . .

Neutral States have the following rights:

1. A neutral State is entitled to remain at peace while its neighbours are at war.

2. The belligerent States must respect the integrity of the neutral territory. They must not interfere with the exercise of its governing power even if the necessity of war should demand violation of these rights. Consequently, neutral States possess the right of asylum for members of the armies at war as long as no favour is shown to either side. Even the reception of a large or small body of troops pursued by the

hostile army, does not entitle the pursuer to continue the pursuit across the frontier of a neutral State. It is the duty of a neutral State to prevent troops which have crossed its border to reorganise themselves and to embark upon an attack across the neutral frontier.

3. If the territory of a neutral State is entered upon by one of the nations at war for the purpose of military action, the neutral State is entitled to oppose the violation of its territory by all means in its power, and to disarm the troops which have entered it. If entry upon neutral territory has been effected by order of the army commander, the State violating the neutrality is obliged to give full satisfaction and to pay for all the damage done. If such violation has been done without authorisation, the guilty parties are liable to prosecution at law. If the violation has taken place in consequence of ignorance as to the position of the frontier, and not intentionally, the neutral State can demand the immediate cessation of the wrong, and the taking of measures which will ensure that no repetition will occur.

Rules of the Hague Conference

Extracts from the Regulations adopted at the Hague Conference of 1907, and subscribed to by Germany:—

Article 2.—“The inhabitants of a territory not under occupation, who, on the approach of the enemy, spontaneously take up arms to resist the invading troops without having had time to organise themselves . . . shall be regarded as belligerents if they carry arms openly, and if they respect the laws and customs of war.”

Article 3.—“The armed forces of the belligerents may consist of combatants and non-combatants. In the case of capture by the enemy, both have the right to be treated as prisoners of war.”

Article 4.—“Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them. They must be humanely treated. All their personal belongings, except arms, horses, and military papers, remain their property.”

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

Article 22.—“ Belligerents have not got an unlimited right as to the choice of means of injuring the enemy.”

Article 23.—“ It is particularly forbidden to employ poison or poisoned weapons; to kill or wound by treachery individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army; to kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or no longer having means of defence, has surrendered at discretion; to declare that no quarter will be given; to employ arms, projectiles, or materials calculated to cause unnecessary sufferings; to make an improper use of the flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as of the distinctive sign of the Geneva Convention; to destroy or seize enemy property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war. . . . A belligerent is likewise forbidden to compel the subjects of the hostile party to take part in the operations of war directed against their own country, even if they were in the service of the belligerent before the commencement of war.”

Article 25.—“ The attack or bombardment, by

RULES OF THE HAGUE CONFERENCE

any means whatever, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden."

Article 27.—"In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as far as possible, buildings dedicated to public worship, art, science, or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes. It is the duty of the besieged to indicate such buildings or places by distinctive or visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand."

Article 28.—"The giving over to pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is forbidden."

Article 46.—"Family honour and rights, individual life, and private property, as well as religious convictions and worship, must be respected. Private property may not be confiscated."

Article 47.—"Pillage is expressly forbidden."

Article 50.—"No collective penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of individuals

BRITAIN AS GERMANY'S VASSAL

for which it cannot be regarded as collectively responsible."

Extracts from the Hague Convention of 1907 concerning the rights and duties of neutral Powers:—

Article 1.—"The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable."

Article 2.—"Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral Power."

Article 10.—"The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act."